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Terrorism studies have increased following the attacks in the United States on 
September 11, 2001.  While a great deal of research has focused on the influence of 
state-sponsored counterterrorism strategies on terrorist activities, limited attention has 
been directed towards examining the influence of non-state actors on terrorist 
organizations (TOs).  This dissertation seeks to assess the role that an influential but 
often overlooked player may have on terrorist activity: the non-governmental 
organization (NGO).   
Many TOs and NGOs engage in similar campaigns, primarily providing 
services or advocating for a shared constituency or minority that experiences 
suffering at the hands of a majority, usually the state.  Both TOs and NGOs require 
the support of the constituents in order to maintain group legitimacy, fundraise, and 
recruit.  In addition, both vie for media attention in order to publicize the issue, 
radicalize the larger community, and exert pressure on the state.   Public support and 
  
attention is limited and difficult to acquire, placing TOs and NGOs in competition.  
As such, within the rational choice and game theoretic frameworks, when faced with 
an NGO competitor, TOs are hypothesized to adjust their activities in order to gain 
constituent support, media attention, and to eliminate the competition. 
Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), this dissertation 
assesses the influence that Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and local NGOs have on TOs in Algeria, Lebanon, and 
Turkey between 1987 and 2011.  Results from autoregressive Poisson and negative 
binomial models demonstrate limited support for the hypothesized relationships.  
NGOs appear to have a marginal influence on TO activities in Algeria, an extremely 
limited impact in Lebanon, and no relationship in Turkey.  Overall findings suggest 
two conclusions: NGO activities, in general, do not appear to escalate TO violence 
and NGO campaign activities specifically focused on de-escalating TO violence 
appear to be ineffective in these three countries.  Replication is needed in additional 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
“Read thousands of books and I will power myself with knowledge. Pens and 
books are the weapons that defeat terrorism.” ― Malala Yousafzai at the opening of 
the new Library of Birmingham.  
 
Terrorism rips communities and cultures apart and leaves a path of destruction 
in its wake.  While the devastating consequences of terrorism are relatively well 
known and well researched, we still know very little about what determines the 
frequency of terrorist attacks and the factors that lead to an escalation in behaviors.  
This dissertation seeks to assess the role that an influential but often overlooked 
player may have on terrorist activity: the non-governmental organization.  The 
rational choice/deterrence and game theory frameworks suggest that, when presented 
with a competitor, an individual or group will alter behavior in order to eliminate or 
best the competition.  It is hypothesized that terrorist organizations will view non-
governmental organizations as competitors for constituent allegiance, community 
support, and scarce resources.  As such, it is hypothesized that non-governmental 
organizations’ presence and activities will contribute to a terrorist organization’s 
decision to engage in, increase, or decrease violent activity in an attempt to present 
itself as a viable competitor and to overcome the competition. 
Key Players and Underlying Dynamics 
Following the developers of the Global Terrorism Database, terrorism is 




non-state actor, motivated by a political or social goal, intended to send a message to 
a larger audience and carried out outside the parameters of international humanitarian 
law (LaFree et al., 2014).  Terrorism is often the response to a perceived injustice or 
inequality (Ehrlich and Liu, 2002).  Terrorism can arise in conflict zones where an 
oppressor, frequently a state actor representing the ethnic or cultural majority, 
undermines or disregards the rights and freedoms of the oppressed, usually a cultural 
or ethnic minority (Adamson, 2005; Flanigan, 2006).  Within a domestic context, this 
persecuted community is typically a part of the citizenry, but maintains a unique 
identification as part of an oppressed constituency.1  In response to a dynamic of 
oppression, a terrorist organization (TO) may form or take up residence, with the 
stated purpose of achieving policy change, autonomy, or freedoms and recognitions 
for the disadvantaged or minority community (Lichbach, 1987).  From the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) to the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), 
many TOs declare that their mission is to represent and defend the defenseless, often 
by any means necessary.2   
TOs are not the only organizations that operate with the goals of defending an 
oppressed constituency (Ly, 2007).  Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are 
often mandated to protect human and civil rights, to ensure dignity and security for all 
world citizens, and to hold oppressors accountable for their actions (Eriksson and 
                                                 
1 The distinction between citizenry and constituency will be made throughout the dissertation.  
Members of the constituency are most likely part of the citizenry but not all citizens are part of the 
constituency.    
2 The main motto of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is “long live the Bangsamoro nation.  
Victory or to the graveyard” (Moro National Liberation Front, 2014).  The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) was originally founded with the purpose of creating a sovereign state for the minority 




Sadiwa, 2008).  Persecuted communities in a conflict area can, therefore, attract the 
attention of NGOs, in addition to capturing the interest of a TO. 
While NGOs and TOs may share the same goal of alleviating suffering for a 
persecuted community and may share the same adversary of the state actor, majority 
community, or oppressor, they differ considerably in the tactics they choose to 
employ (Flanigan, 2006).  The act of terrorism requires, by definition, the use of 
violence or threat of the use of violence (Post, 2004).  TOs, therefore, are 
organizations that have formed around the supposition that violent action is a 
powerful and acceptable means of affecting change.  NGOs, on the other hand, are 
required, by definition, to maintain a non-criminal status and, as such, are not 
permitted to engage in violent action (Willetts, 2002).  In addition, NGOs maintain 
their legitimacy partly due to their choice of using non-violent means to promote 
change.   
Therefore, in a conflict area, the constituents of an oppressed community may 
have two “heroes” arise: TOs and NGOs.  Although these two groups may share 
some similarities and, logically, may improve their chances of campaign success 
through an alliance, they are inherently at odds with each other.  NGOs cannot align 
themselves with a violent partner without losing credibility in the eyes of supporters 
and the international community; support for NGOs often arises specifically due to 
the fact that they employ non-violent and diplomatic tactics (Willetts, 2007).  Along 
the same lines, NGOs and TOs are also structured differently; while NGOs are 
generally accountable to their board of directors, their members and, ultimately, the 




Lehnardt, 2005), TOs are autonomous and typically lack comparable parameters of 
accountability (Foster, 2001).  An alliance on behalf of the oppressed would require 
navigating these organizational differences.  In addition, NGOs often seek a goal that 
is less extreme or more compromising than the TOs’ goal and, therefore, is 
incompatible with TOs’ ideal outcome (Morgan, 2004).  TOs may also view the 
NGOs as part of the problem; NGOs are representatives of a majority community that 
the TOs may perceive as being a contributor to an oppressive situation (Clarke, 
1998).  Many NGOs originate in the western world and, to the TOs, NGOs are 
outsiders and they can symbolize unwelcome western influences (Wright, 2012).  The 
polio vaccination campaign in Pakistan provides a ready example; international 
humanitarian NGOs are actively engaged in an anti-polio campaign, but the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the local TO, rejects their services, claiming that the health 
care workers are spies for the United States government and the polio vaccine is a 
ruse designed to sterilize Pakistani children (Fox News, 2012).  Therefore, NGOs and 
TOs are not natural allies and their active participation in a conflict area may lead to 
organizational dispute, rather than to organizational compromise and collaboration.   
Both NGOs and TOs rely on the support and approval of the disempowered or 
disenfranchised community (Flanigan, 2006).  Support from this community is 
essential; without some level of allegiance from the oppressed constituency, 
campaigns to promote change lose legitimacy (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Slim, 
2002).  The organization loses power and authority in a given campaign if their 
presence and support are unwelcome.  Beyond legitimacy, TOs and NGOs need the 




2012).  Their financial resources and membership relies on the donations and 
allegiance of the oppressed community.  Shining Path (SL) in Peru illustrates this key 
point; Shining Path made little effort to win the support of the constituency and, 
instead created a climate of fear in the local population.  The villagers allied 
themselves with the state, took up arms, and actively opposed SL’s presence 
(Flanigan, 2006).  The capture of SL’s leader in 1994 marked a pivotal moment in the 
decline of the TO; however, academics posit that the lack of local support contributed 
substantially to the demise of the organization (Boliver, 2005; Kay, 2007). 
Given that NGOs and TOs are unlikely to align with each other, the need to 
solicit support from the same constituency makes them competitors.  They may vie 
for the scarce resource of constituent attention, approval, and participation (Murdie 
and Stapley, 2013).  The members of the oppressed community are left with the 
option of allying with the TO, a local body that often has representatives in their 
community, but employs the use of violence, or to ally with the NGO, often an 
international body that may only have a temporary presence, but uses less 
controversial and more diplomatic means of seeking change (Stapley, 2014).3  There 
are additional options available to the constituents as well, such as remaining neutral 
or allying with the repressive majority actor.  Regardless of what the public ultimately 
                                                 
3 One option not discussed in this dissertation is the fact that the local community may ally with both 
NGOs and TOs.  As will be discussed further in chapter three, it is posited here that TOs view the 
dynamic between themselves and NGOs as a zero-sum game.  Constituent support of one organization 
equates to a lack of constituent support of another organization.  Therefore, while citizen support of 
both groups may be possible, it is argued here that this potential dynamic does not play a prominent 




opts to do, the TO and the NGO are engaged in a competition for constituents’ 
allegiance.4 
Do NGOs Really Matter? 
The previous section outlined the dynamics that may exist between a TO and 
an NGO.  It is upon this backdrop that we return to the original focus of this 
dissertation: identifying the influence that NGOs may have on TO activity.  The 
argument that NGOs will have an impact on TOs has relevance if there exists a 
reasonable expectation that the constituents will choose to support the NGO over the 
TO.  If, however, there are no logical grounds upon which to expect that the 
constituents will support an NGO, the likelihood that NGO activity will have any 
influence on TO activity is diminished considerably.  This expectation requires two 
supporting arguments: that the TO activity is unacceptable or undesirable to some of 
the constituents and that the NGO activity is acceptable or even desirable to some of 
the constituents. 
Terrorism: The push factor 
Terrorism is costly, causing a great deal of harm to a country, its citizenry, 
and to the oppressed constituency.  It has political, social, and economic 
consequences that stretch beyond the immediately recognizable aftermath of violent 
incidents.  The long-term outcomes of terrorist activity can include military action, 
suspension of rights, civil and political distrust, and war. Additional consequences 
can affect political stability, economic vitality, and international relations.   
                                                 
4 NGOs and TOs may also compete with other similar groups (i.e.: TOs compete with other TOs and 
NGOs compete with other NGOs).  However, this dissertation will focus primarily on the competition 




The short and long-term impacts of these effects are ultimately borne by the 
citizenry, domestic and global, as they experience the loss of health and well-being, 
freedoms and liberties, and stability and security following an attack.  As part of the 
citizenry, the constituency can bear the general burden of these outcomes along with 
the rest of society.  In addition, the constituency can become directly caught between 
the TO and the oppressor as the two forces engage in an escalation of violence in the 
constituents’ territory (Kay, 2007).  Finally, the constituents may face increased 
persecution as the oppressor seeks to punish the constituency for the actions of the 
TO.  An example of this can be found in the 2006 Lebanon War when Shia Hezbollah 
members crossed the border and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers (Kattan, 2006; 
Norton, 2007).  Israel retaliated, leading to 34 days of warfare, resulting in the death 
of more than a thousand people and the displacement of an additional million people; 
the majority of the victims were members of the Shia constituency.5  A further 
example is provided by the Uigher Muslims in China.  China is officially recognized 
as an atheist state and has a history of religious persecution (Taylor, 2014).  Uigher 
extremists have rallied around a campaign for religious freedoms, causing the 
Chinese government to clamp down on religious expression, further marginalizing the 
Muslim community.   
Bearing the brunt of these outcomes can facilitate a punitive attitude amongst 
the constituency, leading to overall rejection of and active abhorrence towards 
terrorist groups (Angus Reid, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). Oppressed communities can 
become incensed to the point that the public will willingly give up liberties and may 
even bear arms and engage in physical force in an attempt to eradicate violent 
                                                 




political expression or threats to stability and security (Davis, 2007; Davis and Silver, 
2003).  Constituent groups may form and can become quite prominent and 
established in their regions (Carey et al., 2013).  An example includes the Sahwa or 
Awakening Council in Iraq; this Sunni group formed in response to the aggressive 
anti-government activities perpetrated by Sunni TOs such as Al-Qa`ida in Iraq and its 
predecessor, Tawhid and Jihad.   These TOs were rallying for the creation of an 
Islamic state, yet endangered and frequently targeted members of the Sunni 
constituency (Freeman, 2008; The Hindu, 2013).6 In this case, the public has chosen 
to ally itself with the state, rather than the TO.  In addition to the Sahwa Council, 
researchers have documented more than 300 militias that have taken up arms in 
defense of the state in the face of violent uprisings, often TO-led (Carey et al., 2013). 
Non-violent action: The pull factor 
Oppressed communities may choose to ally with the state when faced with 
harmful terrorist activity, potentially taking up arms, but they may also choose a non-
violent and diplomatic approach to affecting change by aligning themselves with an 
NGO.  In addition to being a nonviolent alternative, NGOs also offer the potential for 
success.  Many important historical achievements for a given constituency have been 
the result of a campaign of non-violent civil resistance, and many of these effective 
campaigns have been spearheaded by NGOs mandated to protect human rights and 
supported by NGOs designed to serve a humanitarian function (Boli and Thomas, 
1997; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Stiles, 2006).  These campaigns are often times 
successful in regions where violent means have failed to promote positive change.  
                                                 
6 The Sahwa Council is funded by the United States military.  This civilian group operates primarily as 




Academics posit that the success of these campaigns is partially due to the 
participation advantage that they have over TO campaigns; there are less barriers in 
place restricting the constituents from forming an alliance and, ultimately, achieving 
their goals (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).  East Timor in the late 1990s and early 
21st century provides a ready example; the people, working with the support of local 
and international NGOs, ousted Indonesian soldiers and achieved recognition of state 
independence (Hunt, 2004). Further examples exist with the Iranian revolution in the 
late 1970s, during which a campaign of non-violence succeeded where a campaign of 
violence failed; the People Power movement in the Philippines that ousted President 
Marcos in the 1980s, during which international NGOs were pivotal in training the 
local communities in effective non-violent action; and the restoration of democracy in 
Chile in 1990 (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Clarke, 1998).  All of these campaigns 
were aided or led by NGOs.  Examples such as these illustrate that NGOs can be 
effective allies in promoting change through nonviolent means. 
Research Questions 
As summarized in the previous sections, both NGOs and TOs are potentially 
powerful advocates for an oppressed community.  However, TOs can cause harm to 
the constituents, making them a less appealing ally in the struggle for rights and 
freedoms or independence, particularly when presented with a viable alternative.  As 
such, given that NGOs and TOs are in competition for the support of the 
constituency, it is reasonable to posit that the arrival of an NGO in a conflict area 
and/or the activities that the NGO engages in, particularly in relation to the 




ultimately, ensure group survival.  Therefore, it is rational to speculate that the TO 
will respond to the NGO presence, altering activity in order to eliminate or best the 
competition or to present itself as a more appealing ally to the constituents. 
These suppositions point to several key research questions.  The broadest 
query is whether NGO presence and activity has an influence on TO activity.  If a 
relationship is evident, the next goal is identifying the particular NGO activities that 
exhibit a relationship with subsequent TO activity.  In addition, it is possible that 
specific NGO measures are more likely to elicit an escalation in TO activity, while 
others may serve to decrease it; identifying the directional impact these factors have 
is of particular interest.  There is a multitude of possible ways to address these 
questions; however, it is posited here that rational choice/deterrence and game theory 
are appropriate models within which to start to tease apart the influence that NGOs 
may have on TOs in conflict areas.   
Theoretical Framework 
 The rational choice/deterrence perspective suggests that the perceived 
benefits of a given terrorist action may outweigh the consequences of public harm 
and negative public opinion (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Cornish and Clarke, 1986).  
This theory suggests that terrorist groups are rational and weigh the costs and benefits 
of a given activity, selecting a course of action that has minimal costs or maximal 
benefits; this is the utility function and can include components that TOs value such 
as group survival and public impact (Becker, 1968; McCarthy, 2002). The game 
theory model is an extension to the rational choice model.  This perspective considers 




payoffs based on opponent’s choices.  By this logic, terrorists may make different 
decisions after considering the possible actions available to their competitors.  
Therefore, these two complimentary perspectives suggest that terrorist organizations 
consider costs, benefits, and competitor options and, as such, select courses of action 
that minimize costs, maximize benefits, and strategically bests competitors.   
When applying rational choice to terrorism, it is necessary to identify the 
various factors that would be included in a TO’s utility function.  While harm to its 
affiliates and constituents are two possible consequences, there are additional costs, 
such as loss of membership, resources, and support.  The benefits need to subjectively 
outweigh these costs in order to rationally perpetrate terror.  These benefits may 
include recruitment potential, economic viability, policy change, and overall group 
survival.   
In regards to game theory, TOs need to consider the presence and role of 
NGOs and, amongst other things, whether they share a similar campaign and 
constituency, have a physical presence, and are capable of capturing the attention of 
interested parties. Possible TO courses of action need to be weighted with regard to 
the options available to NGOs, whether those actions will bolster or undermine the 
NGOs, and how the NGOs may respond.  The effects of a course of action on NGOs 
and their potential response may serve to accentuate or diminish the immediate utility 
of violent activity.  For example, if the TO targets civilians, this may reduce civilian 
support for the TO, freeing the citizenry up to ally with a nonviolent advocate. 
As will be elaborated upon in the chapter three, the role that possible 




academic research.  However, attention has been given primarily to the role of the 
state or government actors and the role that non-governmental actors play has been, 
for the most part, overlooked.  This oversight can affect the predictive ability of any 
deterrent measure; if NGO activity has a significant relationship to TO activity, 
attempts to decrease or eliminate TO activity need to take NGO factors into 
consideration.   
Overview of the Present Study 
This dissertation is guided by rational choice and game theory to address the 
above-mentioned research questions to assess the relationship between NGO and 
terrorist activity.  It uses monthly time-series data of terrorist incidents in three 
countries between 1987 and 2011.  While non-governmental actors can include any 
number of communities or collectives, the following analysis will focus on the impact 
that human rights and humanitarian NGOs have on terrorist activity.  The study 
investigates the influence of international and local NGOs on the frequency of violent 
terrorist activity in selected regions.  The international NGOS included in the analysis 
are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), and Amnesty International (AI); and the role that they and local NGOs play 
in the number and target of terrorist attacks in Lebanon, Turkey, and Algeria is 
examined.7  These areas are occupied by one or more dominant TOs, including the 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting 
                                                 
7 As described further in chapter four, the international NGOs included in this dissertation are selected 
for their size, their reputation, and for the duration and diversity of their activities.  The countries of 
interest are selected for a variety of reasons, including NGO presence, diversity in TO orientations and 
campaigns, and availability of data.  Lebanon and Turkey also have notable and long-standing 
oppressed communities that TOs have defended over time.  TOs in Algeria, on the other hand, do not 
traditionally advocate for the citizenry.  Algeria is included in the analysis as a control and comparison 




(GSPC), and Al-Qa`ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) in Algeria, 
Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey.  The 
selection of these NGOs and the specific countries and their TOs limits the 
generalizability of the results; however, as one of the first empirical studies designed 
to look at the relationship between NGO activity and subsequent TO activity, these 
countries, their TOs, and the selected NGOs serve as an important starting point to 
better understanding the relationship between these entities.8   
Chapter two provides an overview of the context within which NGOs and TOs 
arise in defense of an oppressed community, the differences and similarities between 
NGOs and TOs, and the dynamics that can arise between them.  Chapter three 
summarizes the rational choice/deterrence and game theory frameworks that inform 
the hypotheses tested by this dissertation.  The chapter also includes a review of the 
relevant theoretical literature.  Chapter four is devoted to the specific countries, 
NGOs, and TOs that are the focus of this dissertation.  The chapter presents a 
qualitative summary of the development of oppressed communities in Lebanon, 
Turkey, and Algeria, and the TOs and NGOs that respond to that oppression.  Chapter 
five summarizes the data used in this study as well as the methods chosen to analyze 
the hypothesized relationships.  Chapter six presents the results of the analysis, while 
chapter seven provides concluding thoughts concerning the results. 
                                                 
8 To the best of this author’s knowledge, only one other study has assessed this relationship.  In 2013, 
Murdie and Stapley published an article assessing the relationship between aggregate global NGO 




Relevance of the Study 
The breadth and depth of the impact of NGO activities is a relatively unknown 
component in a terrorist group’s utility function.  Select NGO activities may carry 
little weight while others may be highly influential (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; 
Stapley, 2014).  Given that NGOs can be active in regions that are subject to terrorist 
activity and engaged in campaigns similar to those of TOs, there is value in assessing 
the relationship between NGO measures and subsequent violent group behaviors.  
These NGO measures may be influential in a variety of ways.  As demonstrated in 
chapter three, some policy measures implemented and enforced by government actors 
are more effective than others (e.g., Dugan et al., 2005; Enders et al, 1990; LaFree et 
al., 2009); perhaps this difference is partially informed by the unrecognized activities 
of non-governmental actors.  In addition to complimenting or undermining state 
policy, NGO activities may be independently influential (Murdie and Kakietek, 
2012).  It is unknown, for example, if particular NGO activity, such as sending 
delegates to conflict zones, media coverage, or campaign work targeting an oppressor 
or a TO, serves to incite terrorist activity.  If it does, NGOs can be better prepared to 
deal with the consequences of particular actions.  In addition, null findings can better 
inform resource allocation; if NGOs have no influence on TOs, their funds may be 
better invested elsewhere.  Finally, if particular NGO tactics and activities de-escalate 
terrorist activities, identifying and prioritizing these tactics would be an important 






CHAPTER 2: The Key Players 
 
Both terrorist and non-governmental organizations can arise in defense of an 
oppressed community.  This chapter elaborates on the context within which these 
organizations may form around or become involved in conflict, as well as the 
characteristics of non-governmental and terrorist organizations and their shared 
similarities.  In addition, this chapter further develops the perspective that these two 
types of organizations are competitors for scarce resources and constituent support.   
The Context 
Many armed conflicts around the world are a fight over group inequalities 
stemming from ethnic, religious, or economic differences amongst communities 
(Stewart, 2002).  These inequalities may indicate a majority/minority divide, within 
which the minority community is disadvantaged (Dahrendorf, 1958).9  Oftentimes, 
the majority/minority division can also be viewed as a dynamic between an oppressor 
and the oppressed (Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Dahrendorf, 1988).  In these cases, the 
majority instigates a campaign of tactical violence targeting the minority or it simply 
seeks to quell the distinctive nature and needs of the minority community.  This 
dynamic lies at the center of many armed conflicts and revolutions that permeate 
national and international relations (Dahrendorf, 1988; Vold, 1958).  While history is 
replete with case studies of this particular majority-led dynamic, some ready 
examples include the Nazis in Germany, the Serbs in Bosnia, or the Hutus in Rwanda; 
                                                 
9 Not all conflicts arise from a majority/minority divide and not all majority communities are in a 
position of power in a given region; however, this dissertation will focus on the typical armed conflict, 




in these extreme cases, an oppressive majority community sought to eradicate a 
minority group due to religious, cultural, or ethnic differences (Staub, 1999).  
While majority-led conflict is a traditional scenario, an alternative dynamic 
exists when a minority group, or a perceived oppressed community, organizes in 
opposition to the majority, in an attempt to gain power, recognition, rights and 
privileges (Hannum, 1996; Marx and Engels, 1848).  This may result if a distinctive 
group seeks autonomy, sovereignty, or economic, cultural, and religious 
independence from a larger population.  Examples of this minority-led resistance are 
apparent in the Tibetan campaign for autonomy in China or the Basque separatist 
movement in France and Spain; in these cases, armed conflicts arose from a minority-
led struggle to gain independence from a sovereign state (Silva, 1975; Smith, 2008). 
These conflicts, whether majority- or minority-led, may capture the attention 
of the national and international community (Cooper and Berdal, 1993).  Many 
outsiders will maintain neutrality and refrain from becoming involved in the struggle.  
However, while the nexus of the conflict will remain with the oppressor and 
oppressed groups, a second circle of active participants may arise from the national 
and international communities.  This second circle of participants, a group that may 
be affected in varying degrees by the conflict, will relinquish a position of neutrality, 
opting instead to ‘pick a side’ (Altfeld and Mesquita, 1979).  This group can be 
conceived of as the advocates; those that ally themselves with the majority in support 
of a campaign of oppression or those that align themselves with the minority in 




While the advocates of the oppressor or majority are certainly of interest and 
include well-known and important conflicts such as state support of the Hutu people 
in Rwanda (Kuperman, 2000), this dissertation will focus on the advocates of the 
constituency, or the oppressed community, specifically in conflict areas where state 
actors disregard the rights of a minority group.10  These advocates can take many 
forms, all of which share a vested interest in protecting or representing the minority 
constituency.  One of the more readily identifiable advocacy groups that can form 
around conflict is the terrorist organization (TO); this group is willing and able to 
employ violence in order to promote change and/or protect a constituency (Ziemke, 
2009).  Another easily identifiable group that may form or organize itself around an 
minority group is the non-governmental organization (NGO); this group sits on the 
other end of the tactical violence spectrum and adheres to a strict policy of non-
violent action while still sharing similar goals and campaigns with the TOs (Lehr-
Lehnardt, 2005). This chapter will focus on the roles and dynamic of these two 
groups in conflict areas. 
Terrorist Organizations: Their Role and Their Relevance 
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism, partially due to the 
diversity in legal definitions employed across countries (Golder and Williams, 2004); 
however, there are some key characteristics that are used by academics and analysts 
to determine whether a given event should be labeled as a terrorist incident.  
Generally speaking, a terrorist event is one that involves the use of, or threat of the 
use of, violence with the intention of sending a message to a larger audience in order 
                                                 
10 Ideally, future work will assess the dynamics of oppressor advocates; however, given the potential 




to promote political, social, or economic change (LaFree and Dugan, 2007).  Acts that 
are perpetrated without intention or by state actors are usually not considered to be 
terrorist incidents.11  TOs, therefore, are organizations that engage in terrorist activity 
and, as organizations, share connections between individuals and hierarchical 
components, with the goal of drawing attention to perceived injustices and affecting 
change through the use of strategic violence (Jackson, 2006).  
Likely partly due to country-specific definitional differences mentioned 
above, there currently exists no globally accepted list of designated TOs and, as such, 
the sheer number of TOs is open to debate (Schmid, 1983).  However, many countries 
have created their own formal list, populated by groups that engage in acts of 
terrorism, as defined by their legal system.  The Unites States, for example, has a list 
of more than 50 foreign groups that have been identified as terrorist organizations, 
although this number changes as groups are added or removed (United States 
Department of State, 2012a).12 Other institutions operate with a working list of 
several hundred to several thousand TOs, depending on whether the list is populated 
with groups that are currently active or were active in recent times (Schmid, 1983; 
START, 2013).  Therefore, an accurate estimate of TOs at any given point in time 
may range from less than a hundred to several thousand.   
TOs may fulfill many purposes and functions but most TOs operate to serve 
the interests of their constituencies or, specifically, the minority or oppressed 
                                                 
11 There are exceptions to this expectation, as noted in the following paragraph. 
12 Ironically, Iran lists the United States Army as a foreign terrorist organization, running counter to the 




community mentioned previously.13  As noted by Flanigan (2006), terrorist groups 
are often created in response to exclusion and suffering; the terrorist group serves to 
protect and fight for the marginalized group.  Whether the group is inherently 
nationalist-separatist or religious extremist, the goal of the group is, for the most part, 
designed to yield benefits for oppressed community members (Lichbach, 1987).  
Terrorism seeks to achieve these goals by “undermin(ing) the prestige of the 
government, …demonstrat(ing) the possibility of struggle against the 
government…arous(ing) in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and 
their confidence in the success of their cause” (Narodnaya Volya, as cited by Hewitt, 
1990: 146).  The manner in which a TO aims to achieve these goals differs 
considerably amongst groups and nearly three out of every four TOs do not survive 
their first year (LaFree, 2010).  However, some TOs are successful to varying 
degrees, leaving an undisputed lasting impression on the national and international 
communities.   
TOs can be well-organized and permeate multiple institutions within a given 
nation-state; some even hold political offices, offer educational and financial 
incentives to a community, and serve as social, religious, and cultural leaders (Levitt, 
2004; Tavernise, 2006).  These TOs have succeeded in establishing themselves as 
reputable and respected organizations to the local community.  Hamas in the 
Palestinian territories offers a ready example of the power and prestige that a 
designated TO may hold.  While the group employs terrorist tactics against Israel, it 
also serves as a democratically elected leader of the territories, as a religious 
                                                 
13 Many TOs do not advocate for an oppressed constituency but, instead, form in response to 




movement providing services and support to the Palestinian community, as a provider 
of social services, and as the law and order enforcer for the region (Gunning, 2007).  
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) offers another example of a successful and 
effective TO; the IRA was integral in the formation of the Irish Free State in 1922, 
forever changing the political and demographic face of the region (Victoroff, 2005).  
Hamas and the IRA are indicative of the relevance that a TO may have in gaining 
power and leaving an impression.  However, TOs are not the only influential 
advocate of a given constituency; NGOs also serve this function. 
Non-Governmental Organizations: Their Role and Their Relevance 
While there is a great deal of diversity in the way that NGOs are defined, there 
are some qualifying criteria that are presented in the academic literature.  An NGO is, 
in the most general sense, an organization that operates independently of any given 
nation-state (Claiborne, 2011).  The independence of NGOs allows them to 
theoretically fulfill their given mandate free from government pressure and influence.  
In addition, NGOs tend to be non-profit and are often funded by the local and/or 
global community, minimizing the impact of any given corporate interests (Haque, 
2011).  Lastly, NGOs, in theory, are not criminal organizations and, as such, remain 
within the purview of the law, thus maintaining a non-violent agenda (Willetts, 2011).   
In addition to these basic criteria, authors have noted some additional 
attributes.  Boli and Thomas (1997) identify some principles inherent in NGO 
ideologies, particularly in regard to NGOs that operate on the international stage.  
They posit that NGOs are built on a foundation of universalism, individualism, 




citizenship.14  NGOs have a range of responsibilities and agendas, although they tend 
to cluster into several key areas of concern, including health, infrastructure, 
development, education, refugee services, basic needs, environmental concerns, and 
human rights (Spar and Dail, 2002). NGO tactics for achieving specific goals are 
diverse and include such activities as education, enforcement, empowerment, 
documentation, lobbying, preventative work, and assistance (Eriksson and Sadiwa, 
2008; Welch, 1995).   
In 1997, scholars noted that, while NGOs were, at the time, important local 
and global actors, they were less well-conceptualized than the other key actors, such 
as states and corporations (Boli and Thomas, 1997).  However, in the past 15 years, 
NGOs have started to take a more prominent role in the academic literature, partially 
due to the rapid growth in their numbers.   Sources speculate that there is 
approximately 1.5 to 2 million NGOs operating within the US alone (The Economist, 
2000; U.S. Department of State, 2012b).   In regards to NGOs that operate in multiple 
countries, there are estimated to be between 40,000 and 50,000 international NGOs 
(Farris, 2013; Hortsch, 2010); this has increased from 29,000 in 1995 (The 
Economist, 2000).  The growth in the number of local and international NGOs has 
been termed "a global associational revolution" (Salamon, 2010: 167).   
Not only are practitioners and researchers intrigued by the growth in NGO 
numbers, they also acknowledge the influential position that NGOs hold domestically 
                                                 
14 Universalism assumes that humans have similar needs and all humans can join and benefit from 
NGO activity (Boli and Thomas, 1997).  Individualism is the expectation that all participants are 
individuals, rather than collectives.  Rational voluntaristic authority assumes that authority is informal 
and achieved through rational procedures, rather than external legitimation.  The dialects of rational 
progress require the application of science, professionalism, and a degree of expertise, with a focus on 
development.  Finally, world citizenship assumes that everyone is bestowed the same rights and 




and internationally.  Spar and Dail (2002: 172) summarize the current academic 
position regarding NGOs when they posit simply that “NGOs have power.”  This 
statement is justified; the role that NGOs have played and continue to play in political 
and social affairs is striking.  They have become an integral part of the drafting of 
laws and treaties, they are essential to the collection and distribution of development 
aid, and they serve as a representative for the general public and a buffer from the 
government (Clarke, 1998; Spar and Dail, 2002; Welch, 1995).  In addition to power, 
NGOs also have a highly visible presence (Michael, 2002; Raustiala, 1997).  Their 
presence can be detected in such pivotal moments as the drafting of the Landmine 
Ban Treaty, the restoration of democracy in Chile and the Philippines, and the 
abolition of torture, amongst many other local and global victories.   
Non-Governmental Organizations and Terrorist Organizations: Similarities and 
Differences 
NGO presence in such campaigns as the abolition of torture is indicative of 
the primary function of many NGOs in conflict-ridden regions.  NGOs generally 
serve a humanitarian function, providing services and relief, or a campaigning 
function, advocating for the betterment of society, specifically for marginalized or 
minority communities (Lucas, 1992).  In conflict areas, their activities and presence 
are designed to benefit an oppressed constituency located in that area.  Therefore, the 
goals of the NGOs may be very similar to the goals of the TOs.  They are both 
seeking to affect political and social change at a national and international level in 
order to alleviate the suffering of an oppressed people or to facilitate the 




these similar campaigns can be found with the Kurdish people.  Both Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch have active campaigns focused on Kurdish 
safety, security, and political and cultural freedom.  On the other hand, the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist group, is also focused primarily on the 
political and cultural freedoms of the Kurdish people, as well as the creation of an 
autonomous Kurdistan.   
While NGOs and TOs may have similar campaigns, they diverge in the 
selection and implementation of political activities.  It can be posited that violent 
activity is simply an extreme option on a continuum of tactics for political change 
(Flanigan, 2006; Wright-Neville, 2010).  This perspective requires that terrorism be 
acknowledged as a strategic tool deployed with the intention of gaining media 
attention and drawing international recognition of a particular issue or grievance.  
Once terrorism is conceived of in this way, the line between NGOs and TOs becomes 
blurred, differentiated mainly by the presence or absence of violent and coercive 
activities. 
While the violent/non-violent distinction between TOs and NGOs is 
informative, it is not definitive (Willetts, 2002).  Some advocates of violence employ 
other non-violent and pro-social tools.  Two of the more notable examples, Hamas 
and Hezbollah, are organizations that have developed separate branches of activity, 
including a militant and a social-services/charity branch (Levitt, 2004; Prusher, 
2000).  Engaging in assistance or philanthropic activities in addition to militant work 
serves several functions, including advertising terrorist ideals (Ly, 2007), gaining 




populace along a continuum of social acceptance, and gaining political support in the 
rare cases where the TO also has a political branch (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 
2009).  Interviews with TO charity and political workers provide support for the 
supposition that philanthropic activities garner community support and acceptance 
(Flanigan, 2008). 
In summary, NGOs have increasing presence, power, and standing in the 
political and social process.  They can affect change at a national and international 
level. They may engage in campaigns and strategies that are similar to those engaged 
in by TOs, differing only in the deliberate and intentional use of violent tactics.  
Meanwhile, TOs may also have presence, power, and standing.  They also can affect 
change on a local and a national level.  In addition, they too may engage in charitable 
activities that mimic the activities of NGOs with the purpose of gaining social 
acceptance and support.  While the position of NGOs and the similarities they share 
with TOs may be of interest, more is needed to predict that NGOs may have an 
impact on the TOs decision-making.  Despite the fact that TOs and NGO activities 
seem to run parallel to each other, evidence that they share a point of dynamic 
interplay is missing.  This interplay can be found in the natural competition that may 
form between NGOs and TOs. 
Non-Governmental Organizations and Terrorist Organizations: Conflicts and 
Competition 
The reliance on the same constituency suggests that NGO activities would 
interact and conflict with TO activities.  With few exceptions, the campaigns of the 




attention of the organization; without a broader constituency, the organizations’ lose 
their substantive value and appeal (Brown and Kalegaonkar, 2002; Crenshaw, 1981).  
Specifically, in areas where both NGOs and TOs operate, they can rely on the 
constituents for legitimacy, funding, recruits, and attention.  In regards to legitimacy, 
the organizations’ status depends on a supportive constituency, as the organization 
maintains its legitimacy only if the oppressed community welcomes its support 
(Nemeth, 2013; Paul, 2009).  If those they are supporting reject their activities, both 
NGOs and TOs will lose credibility.  Public rejection from a constituency can lead to 
group extinction (Flanigan, 2006; Gvineria, 2009).  In fact, research evidence 
suggests that TOs may even engage in an escalation in violent tactics in order to 
recruit, mobilize, and win the support of their constituents (Bloom, 2004). 
As mentioned above, organizations, for the most part, rely on the resources 
that the oppressed community and its supporters grant them, such as funding.   In 
order to receive monetary support from the constituents, organizations need to remain 
in good standing and favor with those individuals; a failure to do so could lead to the 
financial demise of a group (Alymkulova and Seipulnik, 2005).  While NGOs refuse 
to accept government or corporate funding (Willetts, 2002), TOs generally lack the 
legitimate opportunity to receive this kind of funding, leading them to elicit support, 
oftentimes through illegal means (Linn, 2005).15  With limited financial resources, the 
organizations’ financial survival is partially or fully at the mercy of the constituents 
and their supporters.   
                                                 
15 TOs may also elicit support through legal or legitimate means, such as community donations and 




Organizations also rely on the constituents and their supporters to populate a 
base of volunteers (Wymer Jr. and Starnes, 2001).  For NGOs, limited funding creates 
the need to solicit volunteers or staff members willing to operate within a lower pay 
structure.  TOs, on the other hand, require disposable recruits to execute violent 
actions, as each risks being arrested or killed, leaving an ever-present need to acquire 
more volunteers (Bloom, 2004; Nemeth, 2013).  In addition, the number of members, 
supporters, and volunteers attached to a given organization can impact the power and 
influence an organization wields (DeNardo, 1985).  Politicians and policy makers are 
more likely swayed by the arguments of many than by the arguments of a few. 
A further potential area of competition between NGOs and TOs involves the 
media.  A common strategy for affecting political and social change requires 
stimulating media coverage and visibility in order to gain name and issue recognition 
(Adamson, 2005; Frey and Luechinger, 2002; Fussey, 2011).   Media coverage may 
be effective at soliciting public support of TOs in select circumstances, such as when 
messaging resonates with pre-existing audience grievances (Lemieux and Asal, 2009) 
or the media describes the TO in a favorable way (Weimann, 1991).  Media coverage 
and the manipulation of social media can be perceived as a crucial component to TOs 
and their recruitment and information dissemination strategies (Wilkinson, 2007).  
Given limited media attention, organizations may find themselves competing for 
media coverage around particular issues (Scott, 2001).  In addition, messages by the 
media could be biased in favor of one organization over another (Andrews and Caren, 
2010).  In fact, the media could even completely subjugate the activities of one 




Therefore, the media is a tool by which to inform and influence the constituents and, 
as such, is a valuable resource.   
One further area to consider is the content and target of the NGO campaign.  
While NGOs and TOs may advocate for the same constituency and, ultimately, 
campaign around a shared antagonist, an NGO could also publicize that the TO is 
harmful to the constituency, particularly if the TO engages in violence that results in 
casualties amongst the oppressed community.  NGOs might emphasize the negative 
impact the TO has on the public and offer pleas for TO withdrawal or alternatives to 
TO activity (Duffield, 2006).  Many of the larger human rights NGOs have engaged 
in such campaign practices (Spar and Dail, 2002).  For example, Amnesty 
International released a series of reports and articles criticizing Hamas’ activities in 
Gaza and calling on Hamas to cease all violent activity and comply with the NGOs 
nonviolent campaign strategy (Amnesty International, 2009).  In a similar vein, 
Human Rights Watch actively campaigned against the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in DR Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Southern Sudan, 
appealing to the governments and militaries of the LRA-affected nations to 
investigate and persecute LRA actions (Human Rights Watch, 2010).  These active 
campaigns have resulted in an increase in public interest and condemnation of the TO 
(in the case of HRW and the LRA) and an upsurge of TO counter-criticisms directed 
towards the NGO (in the case of AI and Hamas) [Associated Press, 2009].  Therefore, 
NGO interest in TO activities could be viewed as threatening to the TO and, thus, can 




The shared need for legitimacy, funding, recruits, and media attention, paired 
with the potential for NGOs to publicly criticize the TO, lays a foundation upon 
which to predict that NGOs will have an impact on TOs; however, this argument only 
has merit if it can be reasonably argued that TOs believe that the constituents will 
view NGO activities as an attractive alternative to TO activities.  As mentioned 
previously, both NGOs and TOs have the power to influence and both groups are 
attractive allies.  However, TOs also cause a great deal of devastation that could 
increase the appeal of NGOs, possibly legitimating NGOs as a competitor whose 
presence warrants a response. 
The Push Factor of Terrorism: Severing Ties with the Constituents 
Terrorism is a costly event that has social, political, and economic 
consequences.  These consequences have an immediate and direct impact on the 
citizenry, in general, and the TOs’ constituency, in particular, including long-term 
influences that can cause hardship.16  Perhaps the most readily identifiable 
consequence of terrorism for the citizenry is the number of fatalities and injuries 
accrued from attacks.  The U.S. State Department reported that, in 2013, there were 
more than 9,700 terrorist attacks targeting non-combatants worldwide, resulting in 
more than 17,800 fatalities and 32,500 injuries (United States Department of State, 
                                                 
16 As mentioned in the previous chapter, this dissertation focuses on domestic conflict that relies on an 
oppressed/oppressor dynamic, which requires the presence of a marginalized or persecuted 
community.  The members of the oppressed community are often members of the citizenry, but are a 
unique subgroup in that they experience marginalization that is not shared by the citizenry as a whole.   
The consequences of terrorism may impact the constituency directly through, for example, targeted 
attacks and counter-attacks or geographically-concentrated social and economic upheaval.  Terrorism 
may also affect the constituency indirectly through consequences levied at the citizenry as a whole, 
such as national security measures and political instabilities.  Consequences that affect the constituency 




2013).  More than one quarter of all attacks targeted private citizens and property, 
while the remainder of the attacks was distributed across 19 other target types.17   
In addition to physical repercussions, terrorist attacks have short- and long-
term economic consequences that can also adversely affect the TO’s constituency.  
Beyond the immediate costs of medical care and structural damage, terrorism can 
influence the financial status of a nation-state (Enders and Sandler, 1991).  This can 
be seen in such economic indicators as the tourism industry, investment practices, and 
the value of goods, services, and stocks (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie and 
Gardeazabal, 2008).   
Researchers have determined that terrorism can have a significant impact on 
tourism as the likelihood of personal violence targeting international visitors’ 
increases.  Enders and Sandler (1991) assessed the impact that transnational terrorism 
had on tourist activities in Spain and the subsequent financial repercussions of such 
incidents between 1970 and 1988.  They calculated that transnational terrorism 
deterred more than 140,000 tourists from visiting Spanish territory.  During the same 
period, continental Europe lost approximately $16 billion in tourist revenues as a 
consequence of terrorism (Enders et al., 1992).   
In addition to tourism, terrorism can also impact other economic indicators, 
including employment, foreign direct investment, goods, services, and stocks.  
Greenbaum and colleagues (2007) assessed the impact of terrorist attacks on business 
and employment, concluding that the growth of employment and business formation 
and expansions were negatively impacted during the year following a violent attack.  
                                                 
17 As elaborated upon in chapter five, it is extremely difficult to determine the proportion of casualties 
that originate from oppressed communities; however, it is reasonable to assume that some portion of 




One study demonstrated that terrorism in Spain reduced foreign direct investment by 
more than thirteen percentage points per year, translating into real net declines of 
nearly $500 million (Enders and Sandler, 1996).  In the Basque region, the gross 
domestic product decreased ten percentage points as a consequence of terrorist 
activities, in comparison to a synthetic control area (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003).  
In a cross-national analysis of 110 countries, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) 
determined that an increase in terrorism risk resulted in a decrease in foreign direct 
investment; a standard deviation increase in the former was related to a five percent 
decrease in gross domestic product. 
In more general terms, terrorism influences budgetary considerations, leading 
to a greater investment in military and security expenditures at the expense of 
necessary services, such as education and housing (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gupta et 
al., 2004, Sidal, 2008).  In the U.S. health sector, for example, an increasing amount 
of the budget is being allocated for bioterrorism research at the expense of more 
pressing and prevalent issues, such as substance abuse and infectious disease 
prevention (Sidel and Levy, 2003).  In 2002, funding was diverted from AIDS 
research campaigns and redirected for use in the creation of anthrax vaccinations 
(Sidel and Levy, 2003).  Along the same lines, defense spending has been steadily 
increasing over the past decade.  In 2011, the U.S. allotted 20 percent of the federal 
budget to defense and security and only two percent to education (Office of 
Management and Budget, 2013).  This is in direct contrast to public opinion, which 




A final consideration is the social and psychological consequences of 
terrorism for the constituents and the citizenry.  Living in areas of escalated conflict 
can impact levels of fear and life satisfaction.  In addition, counterterrorism measures 
can lead to the temporary suspension of basic rights or privileges, leading to 
resentment, frustration, and a lack of trust in government (Haque, 2002; Neria et al., 
2011).  In two separate studies, Frey and colleagues (2004, 2009) assessed measures 
of life satisfaction in areas of the European Union subject to terrorist activity, 
concluding that the effects of terrorism had a sizeable impact.  Abenheim and 
colleagues (1992) and Amir and colleagues (1998) assessed the psychological health 
of surviving victims of terrorist attacks in France and Israel, respectively.  Both 
analyses indicated that a non-trivial portion (18-30 percent) of the sample suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
As the previous paragraphs illustrate, the collective impact of terrorism on the 
constituents and general citizenry can be, to put it lightly, quite extreme.  This may 
amount to a general consensus amongst constituents and members of the citizenry 
that terrorist activity is unwelcome and undesirable, causing the public to adopt a 
punitive attitude towards those that engage in violent activities.  A poll conducted in 
the U.S. indicated that approximately half of the respondents, regardless of political 
orientation, supported the notion that the U.S. could kill citizens abroad if there was 
strong evidence that they were engaged in terrorism (Angus Reid, 2011a).  More than 
two thirds of Canadians and Britons celebrated the death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011 
(Angus Reid, 2011b). A large-scale survey in Australia in 2007 demonstrated that 




individuals with suspected links to terrorism (Roberts and Indemaur, 2009).  Polls 
conducted by the University of the Basque Country (2009), an area plagued by 
nationalist-separatist terrorist activity, indicated that members of the oppressed 
constituency abhorred violence and advocated non-violent dialogue and many 
outright rejected the activities of the local TO, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
While the public may form punitive opinions towards TOs, they may also 
choose to engage in violence in response to TO presence and activities.  In some 
regions, such as Pakistan and Iraq, members of the constituency and general public 
have chosen to take up arms in opposition of terrorist activities, meeting violence 
with violence (Freeman, 2008; The Hindu, 2013).  Active civilian-led campaigns to 
quash TOs can become prevalent in these high-conflict areas, as the citizenry 
organizes in protest of a TO presence.   
Such extreme responses as civilians arming themselves, paired with the 
economic and social consequences of terrorist action, illustrate the point that the 
constituency may not welcome the TO as an advocate. This suggests that TOs may be 
disadvantaged when a nonviolent advocate in the region campaigns for the shared 
constituency.  Put simply, given a choice, the desired constituency might abandon the 
TO in favor of the NGO because the latter uses nonviolent strategies that reduce 
harmful effects.  TO tactical methods can be ‘off-putting’ to a constituency and the 
presence of an attractive competitor, such as an NGO, may impede a TOs chances of 
winning the support of the constituency even further.  This suggests that the TO, for 




of convincing the oppressed community that the TO is a better ally than the NGO 
and/or with the goal of forcing the NGO to leave. 
Research Questions 
The previous sections have laid the foundation for a series of research 
questions.  While both TOs and NGOs arise to defend a minority or oppressed 
community, each relies on different types of tactics that might appeal to or repel those 
that they support.  The combination of scarce resources and the presence of a 
competitor suggest that NGO activity may impact TO activity.  Therefore, a key 
question of interest is whether a change in NGO activity is related to a change in TO 
activity.18  If NGOs become active in a region or with a TO constituency, does that 
impact TO activity?  If NGOs increase or decrease activity, does that also lead to an 
increase or decrease in TO activity?  Finally, if NGOs become inactive in a region, do 
TOs attack less often?  This dissertation will attempt to provide more detailed insights 
than currently exist on the relationship between NGO activity and TO activity in 
conflict areas.  The rational choice/deterrence and game theory models, outlined in 
the next chapter, provide a framework within which to form testable hypotheses about 
the directionality of these potential relationships. 
 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that there is, to this author’s knowledge, only one study that has attempted to 
answer this question.  Murdie and Stapley (2013) conducted preliminary analysis of the relationship 
between the annual count of NGOs around the world and the frequency of terrorist attacks using a time 
series model with the year as the unit of analysis.  Their results indicated that there was a positive 
relationship between the two measures over time, leading them to conclude that NGO proliferation can 
increase terrorist activity.  While this study is informative and serves an exploratory function, it raises 
more questions than it answers, such as: which NGO activities contribute to this positive relationship 




CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Framework 
 
As the previous chapter stipulated, NGOs and TOs may both arise to defend 
an oppressed community.  The two sets of organizations may share a constituency 
and similar goals but will deploy different tactics with varying levels of success.  
These organizations inherently compete with each other for scarce resources, 
including community support, attention, and means.  TO group survival may hinge on 
maintaining an uncontested and solitary presence in a conflict area.  As such, it may 
need to vie to maintain its base of support as NGOs move into and become active in 
its region.   
The following chapter provides the theoretical framework within which to 
examine this potential relationship between NGOs and TOs.  Beginning with a 
summary of the rational choice/deterrence model and followed with an introduction 
of a game-theoretic model, the chapter then outlines their assumptions and applies 
them to terrorist behaviors.  This process leads to hypotheses about the relationship 
between NGO activity and TO activity, which are presented at the conclusion of the 
chapter. 
Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Game Theory 
Rational choice/deterrence theory grew out of the propositions of early 
reformers such as Bentham and Beccaria.  Bentham ([1789] 1948) presented the 
principle of utility, stipulating that humankind was ruled by the two masters of 
pleasure and pain.  As such, humans were inherently self-interested and would 




likelihood of pain.  Beccaria (1764) authored a treatise addressing punishment within 
the criminal justice context; he advocated for a punitive system based on the 
principles of rationality, positing that punishment need only be swift, certain, and 
proportionate in order to deter behavior.  According to Beccaria, extreme punitive 
response was unnecessary and ineffectual.  In general, these early contributions laid 
the foundation for the concept of deterrence and rational choice.  Specifically, 
deterrence is premised on the assumption that humans are rational and self-interested; 
they will alter their behavior when threatened with appropriate punishment.  
Deterrence is a key component of rational choice, which posits that humans will 
weigh the costs and benefits of a given behavior, opting for a course of action that 
minimizes costs and maximizes benefits (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Cornish and 
Clarke, 1986).  Increasing the costs of a particular activity should deter the individual 
from engaging in it (see Nagin, 1998, for a review of deterrence research). 
Modern expressions of rational choice/deterrence theory often take an 
economic slant, focusing specifically on utility in a quantitatively expressed format 
(Becker, 1968).  Actors navigate their options by assessing the expected utility of a 
given act in light of a variety of measures of uncertainty.  There is, however, a great 
deal of inconsistency across people, as the individual actor will be influenced by her 
orientation to present and future, her attitudes towards risk, how well-informed she is 
about the costs and benefits, in addition to a host of other considerations (McCarthy, 
2002).  Despite these caveats, researchers have found that there is some predictive 
validity in employing an economic analysis of the maximization of utility (Crenshaw, 




Game theory is another addition to the rational-actor theoretical family.  Game 
theoretic-models recognize that rational decisions do not occur in a vacuum 
(McCarthy, 2002).  Specifically, game theory employs the use of mathematical 
models to analyze dynamics and resulting decisions/actions that occur between two or 
more parties (Enders and Sandler, 1995).  Key to the model is the recognition that one 
party’s potential action or strategy can alter the value of the choices available to the 
other party.  The assumption inherent in this model is that the actor or player is 
rational and intelligent; her actions are determined by considering the options 
available to the other player and the utility intrinsic in each choice (Myerson, 1991).19  
This can be a zero-sum game, which occurs when the losses or gains of one player 
balances the losses or gains of another player (e.g., if constituencies withdraw support 
from TOs in order to support NGOs) or a non-zero-sum game, which occurs when a 
loss or gain does not equal zero or is not balanced with the other player’s outcomes 
(e.g., when constituencies can support both NGOs and TOs) [Barron, 2013]. 
Applied within a terrorist context, a rational choice- and game-theoretic 
orientation would, therefore, suggest three key points: 1) terrorists are rational 2) they 
weigh the costs and benefits of terrorist action versus no action and 3) they consider 
the presence and prospective actions of their competitors.  In order for terrorist action 
to occur, the benefits of an attack must outweigh its costs, the benefits of attacking 
must outweigh the benefits of inaction, and the perceived utility is informed by the 
presence of competitors.  This can be expressed as a comparison of utility functions: 
u(terrorist action) > u(no action)                                  (1) 
                                                 
19 Intelligence refers here to the player’s knowledge of the game and ability to infer subjective 




The next sections will assess the validity of these assumptions in light of the 
research literature. 
Support for the Assumption that Terrorists are Rational 
Regarding the first assumption, terrorists have, at times, been presented by 
media and politicians as irrational, although this attribution usually refers to 
international rather than domestic terrorists (Merari, 2010; Powell, 2011; Richardson, 
2007).  For example, Senator Warner, following the September 11 attacks in 2001, 
stated “those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not 
rational and are not deterred by rational concepts” (cited by Atran, 2003: 1535).  In a 
similar vein, CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria suggested that Iranians were not 
“crazy” because “over the past decade, there have been thousands of suicide 
bombings by Saudis, Egyptians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Pakistanis, but not been 
a single suicide attack by an Iranian” (Zakaria, 2012).   
Caplan (2006), in contrast, notes that the reputation of irrationality is likely 
encouraged by the public conception that terrorist belief systems are improbable and 
extreme which, he argues, is not an indication of abnormality.20  In support, 
Crenshaw (1981, 1992) posits that terrorism is the expression of the deliberate and 
strategic choice of the rational group with legitimate goals seeking payoff; as such, 
psychopathology is not a motivating factor, nor highly prevalent, however unlikely 
the achievement of terrorist goals may appear in light of the methods chosen.  In 
addition, research has demonstrated that psychopathology is the exception, rather than 
                                                 
20 Caplan (2006) identifies three markers of rationality, including responsiveness to incentives, narrow 




the rule, in terrorism.21  Hassan (2001) interviewed approximately 250 terrorists, 
associates, and family members, determining that, in general, terrorists did not appear 
to display signs of abnormality.  Post and colleagues (2003) interviewed 35 Middle 
Eastern terrorists and found no indication of psychopathology or irrationality in the 
group.  Even amongst suicide bombers, the term martyrdom has been employed in a 
deliberate attempt to distance the suicidal act from the assumptions of 
psychopathology that are traditionally associated with suicidal tendencies and to 
recast it in the light of self-sacrifice and deliberation (Hoffman and McCormick, 
2004).  As Miller (2013) notes, the majority of the research community has rejected 
the position that terrorists are irrational, in light of this and other evidence.   
Support for the Assumption that Terrorists Weigh Costs and Benefits 
The second assumption, that terrorist weigh the costs and benefits of a given 
action, has elicited a fair amount of attention in the literature.  This research has 
tended to focus on the effects of policy on terrorist activity and a variety of 
considerations that influence the effectiveness of state-sanctioned action.  These 
studies, overall, provide support for the assumption that terrorists do weigh costs and 
benefits; specifically, policy measures designed to decrease or increase the 
attractiveness of given activities do appear to affect terrorist behaviors.   
Changes in policy that influence the utility function of a given activity tend to 
cluster around target-hardening, punitive measures, and conciliatory measures. Target 
hardening, a deterrent measure that aims at decreasing the chances of success, has 
been studied sparingly but with some rigor (see Lum et al., 2006, for a review).  
                                                 
21 The exceptions tend to be lone case studies, such as Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the 




Enders and colleagues (1990) assessed the effectiveness of the installation of metal 
detectors in airports on the frequency of skyjackings.  Their results indicated that, 
following installations in 1973, there was a significant decrease in skyjacking 
episodes.  This suggested that would-be skyjackers were influenced by the installation 
of metal detectors, perceiving this as a measure that would decrease chances of 
success.  However, results demonstrated a corresponding increase in assassinations 
and hostage-takings, indicating that individuals redirected their attention to less-risky 
methods of achieving their goals.  Dugan and colleagues (2005) also assessed the 
effectiveness of measures of increased apprehension in an airport setting, including 
metal detectors and increased security at passenger checkpoints.  Their results 
supported earlier studies indicating that increasing the perceived likelihood of 
detection served as a deterrent for non-terrorist hijacking attempts.  Enders and 
Sandler (1993) assessed the effectiveness of the fortification of U.S. embassies at 
three different periods of time.  Similar to the airport findings, their results indicated 
that fortification measures decreased attacks against U.S. interests, but increased 
assassinations. 
In addition to target hardening or decreasing the chances of success, 
deterrence measures may focus on raising the costs of a given action through punitive 
measures.  Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) assessed the effectiveness of 
military retaliatory strikes in Israel, concluding that unexpected retaliation led to a 
short-term decrease in terrorist incidents.  Dugan and colleagues (2005) evaluated the 
effectiveness of the imposition of strict hijacking laws in Cuba, concluding that an 




some punitive measures appear to be less effective (Nevin, 2003).  Analysis of British 
counterterrorism interventions demonstrated minimal success in deterring 
Republican-motivated strikes in Northern Ireland (LaFree et al., 2009).  Out of six 
interventions studied, including four aggressive military strategies, three interventions 
led to a backlash effect,22 two had no notable effect, and one had a marginally 
deterrent effect.  The authors suggest that intervention characteristics can undermine 
state legitimacy.  
Policy measures based on the rational choice model may also take the form of 
increasing the benefits of non-terrorist actions.  Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) 
assessed the effectiveness of such conciliatory government actions in comparison to 
the more traditional repressive government policy of raising the costs of terrorism.  
Their results indicated that repressive government action can lead to an increase in 
terrorist activity or a backlash effect.  In addition, they found that periods of high 
levels of conciliatory action led to a decrease in terrorist activity, while low levels 
were less successful.  The effectiveness of increasing the benefits of non-terrorist 
activity has not been tested extensively, but these early findings support the position 
that increasing the benefits of non-action may be just as relevant, if not more so, as 
increasing the costs of action or decreasing the likelihood of the success of action. 
This brief summary of key studies illustrates that the assumption that terrorists 
weigh the costs and the benefits of their actions is, for the most part, supported 
empirically.  While academics cannot know what terrorists are thinking, they can 
make inferences based on terrorist behavioral responses.  Whether target-hardening or 
                                                 
22 Backlash refers to an increase in terrorist incidents in response to policy implementation or 




increasing the threats of select punitive measures, these behavioral responses indicate 
that governments can influence terrorist decision-making through policy and practice.  
This supports the use of the rational choice framework for the prediction of terrorist 
activities.  The final assumption inherent in the theoretical model applied in this 
dissertation refers to the stipulation that terrorist organizations consider the actions of 
their competitors when selecting a strategy or course of action: this assumption is 
guided by the game theoretic model.   
Support for the Assumption that Terrorists Consider their Opponent’s Strategies 
Crenshaw (1987) stated that “terrorism is explained as the result of an 
organization’s struggle for survival, usually in a competitive environment” (13).  This 
quote suggests that terrorist groups are cognizant and responsive to the presence of 
competitors.  In regards to cognition, TO decision-making cannot be directly 
observed and, therefore, it is difficult to provide empirical support for the supposition 
that competitors play a role in a TOs selection of a course of action.  However, 
theoretical modeling suggests that TOs are cognizant of competitors, thus providing 
some hint to the factors that terrorists deem important.  In addition, evidence suggests 
that the TO will interpret the presence of a competitor as a zero-sum game or, 
specifically, that a gain for the competitor will equate to a loss for the TO.  As for 
responsiveness, case studies suggest that TOs not only consider the presence of 
competitors, but adjust behavior in order to undermine or eliminate the competition.  
Each of these will be addressed below. 
Given the fact that terrorist decision-making is not a process that can be 




factors deemed relevant to terrorist decision-making when faced with a competitor, 
particularly state actors and, to a lesser extent, rival organizations (e.g., Chlebik, 
2010; Sandler and Arce M., 2003).  The models serve as a guide to help identify and 
map out the considerations inherent in the decision-making process, and suggest 
several elements that inform terrorist actions.   Sandler and colleagues (1983) 
assessed state-TO negotiation processes around hostage-takings and concluded that 
TOs consider government concessions in previous events when selecting a course of 
action.  Lapan and Sandler (1988) posited that terrorist negotiations were informed by 
government credibility and reputation.  Additional researchers added considerations 
of opponent deterrence strategies and target selection informed by target 
attractiveness, the probability of success, and punitive response (Sandler and Arce 
M., 2003; Sandler and Lapan, 1988; Sandler and Siqueira, 2006).  Finally, researchers 
have concluded that terrorist actions are often guided by the desire to signal TO 
strength by engaging in terrorist attacks (Lapan and Sandler, 1993; Overgaard, 1994).  
Therefore, scholars have determined, through theoretical modeling, that TOs consider 
the history and reputation of a competitor, the probabilities of successes and failures 
in light of a competitors’ presence and response, and the competitors’ assumptions 
about the TOs own abilities.   
While theoretical modeling provides support for the hypothesis that a TO will 
consider the presence of a competitor and adjust its strategy in response, the nature of 
that strategy is informed by whether the TO considers the dynamic to be one of a 
zero-sum game (a gain for the competitor is loss for the TO, indicating that a rivalry 




for the TO, indicating that an alliance may be strategic).  Evidence suggests that TOs 
are guided by a perception of a zero-sum game.  Sandler and Siqueira (2009) present 
a theoretical model built around the TO perception that rival activities detract from 
TO resources and support.  Their model was specific to factions within an 
organization but can be extended to include rival organizations as well.  Mohammad 
(2004) applied this model in an explanatory fashion to escalating terrorist violence or 
the intensification of zero-sum terrorism cycle (IZSTC) in the Middle East, 
concluding that the expectation of terrorist perceptions of a zero-sum game when 
faced with rivalry has utility in explaining TO actions.  Weinberg and Richardson 
(2004) engaged in a similar analysis of the presence of third party rivals in escalating 
violence in Northern Ireland, suggesting that TOs perceive the presence of other 
organizations as a source of competition for resources, support, and attention.  While 
these studies suggest that TOs consider competitors and are locked in a zero-sum 
game, case studies provide further support for this supposition. 
The case studies demonstrate that different TOs that have altered their 
behaviors when faced with a competitor.  Shining Path (SL) and Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) provide a ready example of inter-group rivalry.  
Both TOs were radical communist organizations in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Ellenbogen, 1999).  Although SL was the largest and most successful TO operating 
in Peru at the time, SL viewed MRTA as a competitor, particularly given that the 
MRTA engaged in splashy operations, or “urban spectacular”, such as high-profile 
kidnappings (McCormick, 1992: 9). As a response to MRTA, SL altered its own 




loyalty of the urban poor.  In addition, SL would frequently attack MRTA positions in 
order to undermine or weaken the organization (McCormick, 1987).  Therefore, when 
faced with a competitor, SL adjusted its strategy in relation to the constituents and 
towards the competing TO. 
Along the same lines of competitor dynamics, the Irish National Liberation 
Army (INLA) formed as a breakaway group of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 
the 1970s (Shirlow et al., 2010).  The INLA was opposed to an IRA 1972 ceasefire 
and formed with the goal of continuing a political campaign but pairing it with an 
extremist militant presence.  The IRA viewed the INLA as a threatening faction and, 
in response, started a targeted campaign to eliminate INLA leaders and destabilize the 
group.  In 1977, the IRA assassinated the founder and leader of the INLA, Seamus 
Costello, successfully weakening the INLA.  Thus, similar to SL in Peru, the IRA 
perceived the INLA as a competitor and adjusted its strategy in order to eradicate the 
INLA. 
While the examples provided above indicate that a TO will respond to a TO 
competitor, Hamas activities during the Palestinian-Israeli peace process provide an 
example of TO response to non-TO competitors.  Between 1993 and 2001, Hamas 
attacks clustered around six major events integral to the peace process; these included 
such events such as the signing of peace accords, treaties, and agreements (Kydd and 
Walter, 2002).  Researchers suggest that the TO took advantage of the fear that each 
party carried to the negotiation process and carried out attacks in order to escalate 




attacks served the purpose of playing one competitor off another in an attempt to 
derail peace negotiations.   
This brief summary provides support for the application of game theory to 
terrorist activity.  Theoretical modeling suggests that TOs consider the presence and 
strategies of their opponents.  In addition, modeling and case studies indicate that the 
TO perceives the competition as a zero-sum game.  Finally, case studies illustrate that 
TOs will alter their strategies and behaviors in order to respond to perceived 
competitors.  The following section briefly presents some of the potential costs, 
benefits, and opponent considerations that may influence terrorist strategy and action 
selection. 
Potential Costs, Benefits, and Considerations included in the Utility Function 
Academics have identified a variety of potential benefits that are salient for 
the TO.23  Some of the most cited benefits include recruitment opportunities and 
increasing constituent support; these are highly significant requirements for the sake 
of group survival (Bloom, 2004; Crenshaw, 2001; Oots, 1989).  As such, terrorism 
can serve a direct and indirect recruitment and support-building function.  Whittaker 
(2001) and Wright (2006) note that large-scale attacks elicit immediate and direct 
responses from potential recruits.  A widely publicized terrorist attack may inspire 
individuals primed for radicalization to join a TO as they witness the impact a TO can 
have on the public and policy makers.  
                                                 
23 It is important to note that terrorist group members generally prioritize group success and survival 
over individual personal gain and, as such, the utility of a given action will be impacted by costs and 
benefits relevant to the larger group (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012).  Therefore, a TO model would be 




Some potential recruits, however, are more difficult to engage.  One way of 
eliciting support from these more difficult audiences is to incite anger directed 
towards a shared foe, such as the government (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).  
This tactic follows the logic that the constituency and the general public will become 
enraged with the government if the government uses violence and excessive control 
that affects the oppressed and the citizenry.  Nevin (2003) elaborates on this process, 
noting that TOs may stage terrorist events with the specific intention of eliciting a 
repressive response from state actors or opponents.  Depending on the nature of the 
repressive response (such as suspension of rights, oppressive military presence, and 
indiscriminate attacks), the responder’s action may enrage the public, leading to a 
willingness to support and join terrorist groups.   
A further benefit relates to the potential long-term impact that terrorism can 
have on policy change, particularly for conflicts rooted in nationalist or ethnic 
struggles (Lutz and Lutz, 2009).  As noted by Victoroff (2005), the terrorist activities 
of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) helped facilitate the creation of the Irish Free 
State in 1922.  During the 1980s, Hezbollah engaged in an active suicide bombing 
campaign, contributing to the withdrawal of foreign forces and facilitating Shia 
control of portions of Lebanese territory (Crenshaw, 2003; Hoffman, 2002).  
Academics have argued that the decolonization of areas such as pre-Israel Palestine 
and Cyprus following World War II are due, at least in part, to successful terror-based 
campaigns (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 2006).  In both Palestine and 
Cyprus, repeated terrorist attacks by Jewish militants made continued military 




success.  The area has been granted levels of autonomy by the government as a 
measure designed to weaken public support of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) 
[Shabad and Ramo, 1995].  These and other successes provide some indication that 
policy change can be achieved through the strategic application of political violence.   
In addition to the group-relevant benefits of terrorist activities, there are also 
many readily identifiable costs.  One consideration for the terrorist organization is the 
loss of members through death and the need to keep an active pool of new recruits; 
this is particularly salient for groups that use suicide volunteers.  The cost of loss of 
life may be too great for the individual to inspire volunteers and, to offset these 
perceived costs with an incentive; some groups offer generous death benefits to 
surviving family members (Caplan, 2006).24   
The TO may also consider the cost of diminishing power caused by waning 
numbers through the process of incarceration.  Le Vine and Salert (1996) assessed the 
effects of arrests on the incidents of terrorism amongst Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) members.  They concluded that arrests led to a robust and 
significant decline in terrorist activities, demonstrating a deterrent effect, or a shift in 
the willingness of the organization to sacrifice members.  Along similar lines, Ross 
and Gurr (1989) posit that a significant decline in Canadian terrorism in the 1970s 
was due to the deterrent effect that arrests and incarceration of Front de Libération du 
Québec (FLQ) members had on the organization.  
                                                 
24 It is worth noting, though, that for some groups, loss of life is a form of martyrdom or ultimate 
sacrifice, with the expectation that suicidal acts will result in community veneration and, in some 
cases, a glorious afterlife (Kruglanski et al., 2009; Pedahzur et al., 2003).  This can serve as a 




Another potential cost of terrorist action, and one that is central to this 
dissertation, is the resulting reduction in the level of constituency support, which can 
lead to the downfall of a terrorist organization (Flanigan, 2006).  Terrorist groups can 
lose public favor if their tactics are not strategic or effective, or if the backlash has 
consequences for the constituents (Dugan et al., 2008).  As mentioned previously, 
organizations will go to great lengths to increase public support, including inciting 
violent government response that would incense the oppressed community 
(McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008) and offering public services that are comparable 
or an improvement upon the services provided by the government (Flanigan, 2006).  
Hezbollah in Lebanon demonstrates how far groups will go to win public support 
from the constituents; this particular terrorist organization has developed a charity 
branch that provides health care, media, and credit programs, among other services, to 
the marginalized Shia population (Tavernise, 2006).  Hamas also carries out 
comparable activities in Palestine, offering aid, employment, educational and medical 
support (Levitt, 2004). 
In summary, there are a variety of group-specific costs and benefits that 
revolve around issues of campaign success and organizational survival.  These 
considerations may underlie many or all of the cost-benefits analyses that the 
organizational leaders or collectives engage in when considering future activities.  
These factors may also be weighted by recognition of the other key players that 
influence the likelihood of a given cost or benefit, such as state actors or, more 
relevant to the focus of this dissertation, potential competitors.  The choices available 




influence outcome decisions.  As outlined in the previous chapter, one of those 
potential competitors that may be salient to a TO when weighing the costs and 
benefits of a given course of action is the NGO.  The remainder of this chapter will 
focus on the hypothesized relationship between NGO activity and TO activity, within 
the rational choice and game-theoretic frameworks. 
Returning to the Research Questions and NGOs 
As this chapter and the previous chapter outlined, there are theoretically-
supported reasons to expect that NGOs matter to TOs.  NGOs have influence and 
power, they compete for media attention, funding, and the support of the 
constituency, and they can undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of a TO 
campaign.  TOs are rational bodies that weigh the costs and benefits of a given action 
or inaction; they are influenced by a variety of considerations, including the activities 
of a competitor.  Finally, there is evidence that the TO, when presented with a rival 
for constituent support, engages in a zero-sum game and adjusts its strategy in order 
to undermine the rival (Sandler and Siqueira, 2009).      
Given this dynamic, it is reasonable to predict that an NGO’s physical 
presence, whether temporary or permanent, in a given conflict area focused on an 
oppressed constituency shared by a TO will have an impact on TO activities.  It is 
also reasonable to hypothesize that NGO campaign content, particularly if it is 
focused on the harmful nature of TO activities or showing support for a shared 
constituency, may have a direct or indirect effect on TO activities.  In addition, 
competitive NGO service provision may also impact TO activity, as it liberates a 




coverage of NGO activity, may also have an impact, as NGOs and TOs vie for the 
attention and approval of the oppressed and international communities.  Applying the 
rational choice and game theory frameworks lead to directional hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between NGO and TO activity. 
For the sake of ease and transparency, the following hypotheses are crafted 
around a specific set of possible NGO characteristics and activities, while the TO 
activities are built around a set of potential responses.  Regarding NGOs, their 
activity can be measured in a variety of ways, including their physical presence 
(campaigning within the conflict area for a short period of time or establishing a 
permanent presence in a conflict area), the focus of their campaign (focusing 
exclusively on the well-being of the constituency through advocacy work or actively 
campaigning against the TO), service provision (providing competitive services), and 
media activity or coverage (a low presence or high presence in media coverage).  TO 
responses can be expressed in a variety of ways, including the characteristics of the 
attack (frequency) and the target (targeting the constituency, the oppressor, or the 
NGO).   
To elaborate, this dissertation follows in the footsteps of the World Bank and 
draws a distinction between campaigning NGOs and service provision NGOs (also 
called operational NGOs) (Willetts, 2002; World Bank, 2012).  These delineations are 
based on variations in function and goals.  Campaigning NGOs promote long-term 
change through advocacy work and lobbying efforts, while service provision NGOs 
provide short-term services, such as aid and community support, that are designed to 




other forms of classification based on such NGO attributes as geographical location, 
religious foundations, and volunteer- and donor-based staffing and funding (Vakil, 
1997), the simple dichotomy between campaigning and provision work is applied 
here. And, while some NGOs fall into both categories, the organizations selected for 
this dissertation here fall squarely into the campaigning category (Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International) or the service provision category (International 
Committee of the Red Cross).  The first and second sets of hypotheses refer 
specifically to campaigning organizations, while the third hypothesis refers to service 
provision organizations.  The fourth hypothesis refers to both. 
Campaigning NGO’s Physical Presence 
Campaigning organizations may have three readily-identifiable levels of 
proximity: 1) they may campaign for a constituency from afar, maintaining a 
presence in their home country exclusively and advocating from there, 2) they may 
campaign from afar, but send delegates to the conflict area for short periods of time, 
in order to bear witness and advocate on the ground, or 3) they may maintain a long-
term active campaign presence within the conflict area, usually through the 
establishment of an organizational office or clinic (Global Policy Forum, 2013).   
Rational choice and game theory would suggest that the level of TO activity 
would vary depending on the NGO’s proximity to and presence in the conflict area.  
Outbidding is a concept often applied to inter-group competition; outbidding implies 
that one group will up the ante in order to gain an advantage over or outbid another 
competing group (Bloom, 2006; Findley and Young, 2012).   Although this is 




and Walter, 2006), the same concepts can apply with TO versus NGO.  The logic is 
as follows: as NGOs become more active and entrenched in a conflict area, they 
become more salient and accessible to the constituency.  This can alter constituency 
response and allegiance to the TO as they are given the alternative option of the NGO 
as a new “hero” leading to a shift in support and resources (Kydd and Walter, 2006).  
As such, the TO may be required, for the sake of group survival, to raise the costs for 
the NGO of maintaining a presence in the conflict area.25  By deterring an NGO from 
maintaining local proximity, the TO might aim to eliminate the competition 
altogether, make the NGO seem less reliable than the TO, or emphasize that the NGO 
is an outsider (for international NGOs) and may vacate at any time (Bloom, 2006).  In 
addition, the TO may opt to decrease the harm they cause to the specific constituency 
or the general citizenry through target selection and attack type (Lilja, 2009).  By 
minimizing civilian collateral damages, the TO might aim to present itself as a less-
harmful option or a benevolent ally (Lilja, 2011).  Finally, the TO may choose to 
escalate activities against the oppressor that is negating the rights and freedoms of the 
constituency (Kydd and Walter, 2006).  This will demonstrate to the constituency that 
the TO is focused on the issue at hand and effective at targeting those responsible.   
 
                                                 
25 An example of this tactic can be found in the multiple attacks against international NGOs 
perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in November, 2011, in Somalia.  Following the attacks, Al-Shabaab stated 




Hypothesis 1A: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
NGOs.26 
Hypothesis 1B: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
the citizenry.27 
Hypothesis 1C: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
the oppressor. 
 
NGO Advocacy-Related Campaign Content 
In addition to the proximity of the NGO, the content of the NGOs campaign 
may also elicit a response from the TO.  There are two clear campaign foci that 
NGOs may employ.  Firstly, the NGO may campaign solely for the betterment of the 
constituency, focusing on the party responsible for depriving the citizenry of rights 
                                                 
26 It is logical to posit that the physical presence of a select NGO will increase attacks targeting that 
specific NGO.  However, the hypotheses included in this dissertation stipulate that the activities of one 
NGO can affect TO responses to all NGOs.  There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, the concept of 
general deterrence dictates that attacks targeting a single NGO will serve to deter other NGOs.  
Secondly, attacks against NGOs are rare events; it would be analytically questionable to include 
attacks against a single organization as an outcome variable, given that these may occur only once in 
several decades and, therefore, may only result in a single data point, depending on the time period of 
interest. 
27 As mentioned in previous chapters, it is important to note the distinction made here between the 
constituents and the citizenry.  Members of the constituency, for the purposes of this dissertation, are 
all members of the citizenry but not all members of the citizenry are members of the constituency.  
However, as mentioned in chapter one and two, terrorism can affect a constituency directly through 
targeted attacks and outcomes, or indirectly, through attacks and outcomes affecting the general 
citizenry, of which the constituents belong.  In addition, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
separate out attacks targeting the citizens from attacks targeting the constituents.  For these reasons, all 





and freedoms.  Secondly, the NGO may also perceive the activities of TOs as harmful 
to their shared constituents and, as a result, may focus some of their resources on 
attempting to change or eliminate destructive TO activities (Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, 2007).  The first scenario involves an advocacy-only 
campaign while the second scenario involves the NGO incorporating the TO in their 
campaign by adding an anti-TO component.   
A shift in campaign foci from no campaign to advocacy work or anti-terrorist 
work may elicit a response from a TO.  Regarding advocacy work, a shift from no 
advocacy to an advocacy campaign indicates an increasing interest on the part of the 
NGO in the well-being of the constituency.  This interest is a necessary component 
for constituency allegiance to an organization and, thus, may give the oppressed 
community an alternative to TO allegiance and support (Parker, 2011).  Meanwhile, 
incorporating the TO into an active campaign serves to vilify the group in the eyes of 
the public (e.g., Muslims against Terrorism, 2013).  If the constituency accepts this as 
the identity of the TO, the TO loses legitimacy and credibility as a defender of the 
oppressed (Parker, 2011).  As such, the TO will likely lose support of the local and 
the international community and, thus, their group survival and power will be 
threatened.   
Within the rational choice and game theory framework, it is predicted that the 
TO will alter activities in response to these different campaign foci.  Similar to the 
expected response to NGO proximity, the TO may choose to target the NGO in an 
effort to dissuade it from either campaign focus.  By this logic, if campaigning for a 




to shift campaign focus away from the TO or the constituents as a protective measure.  
In addition, the TO may escalate activities against the original antagonist, increasing 
the frequency of attacks.  In the case of advocacy work, this presents the TO as an 
effective ally and a viable alternative to NGO allegiance.  In the case of anti-terrorism 
campaign content, this may serve to shift focus back on to the main target, the 
oppressor, and away from the TO.  In addition, this could evoke a repressive response 
from the majority, serving to remind the constituency of the party responsible for 
their plight and eliciting a punitive response from the public.  Finally, the TO may 
decrease attacks against the citizenry in an effort, in the case of advocacy work, to 
present itself as benevolent and, in the case of an NGO anti-terrorism campaign, to 
undermine the new-found TO identity as an oppressor.    
 
Hypothesis 2Ai: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 
NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
NGOs. 
Hypothesis 2Aii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 
campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs. 
Hypothesis 2Bi: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 
NGO campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
citizenry. 
Hypothesis 2Bii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 





Hypothesis 2Ci: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 
NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
oppressor. 
Hypothesis 2Cii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 
campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
oppressor. 
 
NGO Service Provision 
As mentioned previously, not all NGOs actively campaign around a given 
issue or, if they do, it is the not the majority of their mandate or their effort.  Some 
NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), focus on 
service provision primarily, such as health care, education, counseling, and reuniting 
families.  It is posited here that these NGOs can elicit the same kind of response from 
TOs as campaigning organizations.   
Service provision can serve to alleviate the suffering of an oppressed 
constituency.  In areas where the main provider is the state or the oppressor, an 
alternative provider can solicit the support and favor of the affected citizenry by 
offering these same services (Flanigan, 2006).  In these cases, NGOs may garner 
allegiance from the public simply by offering an oppressor-free alternative.  
However, as mentioned previously, some established TOs, such as Hamas or 
Hezbollah, also offer oppressor-free social services and charitable support to 
members of a constituency (Levitt, 2004; Prusher, 2000).  This seemingly generous 




indebt an oppressed population to an organization, offset negative opinions about the 
TO stemming from their violent activities, and help the TO gain acceptance from the 
larger community (Flanigan, 2006).  In addition, providing services can be paired 
with advertising terrorist ideals to the citizenry, helping a TO gain political support if 
they serve a political function in a given region, or serving as a recruitment tool 
(Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009; Ly, 2007).   
As noted by Hasenfeld (1987), whether a client has access to services from 
elsewhere determines the amount of power that a provider has over that client.  In 
conflict areas, members of an aggrieved constituency may not have many options for 
social services, medical aid, and financial reparations.  A TO with capacity to provide 
these services unchallenged has a greater likelihood of winning the support of the 
public; however, if there are alternate service providers available, the TO loses power 
over the constituency (Flanigan, 2006; Murdie and Stapley, 2013).  As such, if an 
NGO that has the capacity to provide competing services were to take up residence in 
a conflict area, eliminating that competing organization would benefit the TO in its 
quest to gain public support.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that a TO would 
target the specific offending NGO in an attempt to deter it from maintaining a 
presence.  It is also reasonable to expect that the TO would target all NGOs in order 
to give the specific NGO the impression that NGOs, in general, are at risk.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing the physical presence of a service provision NGO 





NGO Media activity 
A final consideration relates to the coverage that the NGO receives from the 
media around a shared issue or constituency.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
media attention is posited to be integral to the survival and success of a campaign 
(Adamson, 2005; Frey and Luechinger, 2002; Fussey, 2011).  The volume and 
content of media coverage can influence the degree of importance an audience places 
on a given issue (Entman, 2004; Willnat, Graf, and Brewer, 2000; McCombs, 2013).  
Organizations may operate under the assumption that mass media coverage gives an 
impression of the effectiveness, popularity, and power of a group (Weimann, 1983; 
Weimann, 2004).  As such, media can be perceived as influencing such factors as the 
public and private support granted to the organization, as well as its recruitment 
potential and longevity.   
A substantive portion of NGO work is dedicated to capturing media attention 
through, amongst other measures, press releases and press conferences, country 
reports, and protests (Fenton, 2010; Josephson, 2013; Waisbord, 2011).  The level of 
success that an NGO achieves at capturing media attention can impact the attention a 
TO receives.  If an NGO has a significant coverage in the media, this may lead to a 
decreased focus on the TO in the media, due to limited space and limited perspectives 
(Zhu, 1992).  In addition, NGO media coverage may be indicative of its ability to 
present the version of the conflict that is compatible with its goals (Joachim, 2007).  
As such, NGO media activity may serve to undermine TO messaging and impact.   
Given the dynamics between organizational survival and success and the 




coverage of NGO activities.  The TO may seek to secure a place into the media 
headlines, displacing the NGO, by using tactics and activities that the media would 
find enticing, such as increasing casualties (Fussey, 2011).  As such, the TO is 
expected to increase the frequency of attacks, in a bid to capture attention.  In this 
case, it may not be strategic to shift focus towards or away from the constituency, the 
majority, or the NGO, but simply to focus on whatever is most likely to produce 
media headlines.   
 
Hypothesis 4: An increase in NGO overall media coverage will lead to an 
increase in the frequency of TO attacks. 
 
In summary, there are reasonable grounds, within the rational 
choice/deterrence framework, to expect that the presence of NGOs in a conflict areas, 
the content of their campaigns, their provision of services, and their media activity 
will have an impact on TO activity.  NGOs may influence the frequency of TO 
attacks, as well as the attack target.  The following chapter will present a qualitative 





CHAPTER 4: Countries, Terrorist Organizations, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations 
 
This chapter examines the countries included in this dissertation and the 
terrorist organizations that operate within their borders.  As mentioned in previous 
chapters, the three select countries are Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.  These 
countries are chosen for a variety of reasons.  They have high levels of terrorist 
activity with a great deal of variation; established terrorist organizations currently and 
historically operate within their borders; oppressed groups and the issues prompting 
terrorist activity vary across the countries; and, finally, preliminary data are available 
for all three counties.28  Algeria, as elaborated on below, is an exception to the 
oppressor/oppressed/advocate dynamic introduced in chapter two; TOs have 
occasionally championed the citizenry, but this is not a consistent trend.  Algeria is 
included for the sake of comparison with the countries that do have this dynamic. 
For each country, the most active TOs are summarized in this chapter.  Over 
the last three or more decades, Algeria has had three main TOs (the Armed Islamic 
Group [GIA], the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting [GSPC], and Al-Qa’ida 
in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb [AQLIM]) operating within its borders, and 
Turkey and Lebanon have each had one main active TO (Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
[PKK] and Hezbollah, respectively).   
                                                 
28 As described in chapter five, this dissertation uses precursor data for the Government Actions in 
Terror Environments (GATE) database.  GATE has collected or is currently collecting data on 11 




In addition to providing a background summary of the chosen countries and 
their prominent TOs, this chapter also provides information on the three international 
NGOs that are included in the study: Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights 
Watch (HRW), and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  The 
organizations are chosen for a variety of reasons, including their sheer size and 
reputation, their long history as active and effective organizations, their variety of 
tactics and goals, and their diversity in presence and activities within and between 
Algeria, Turkey, and Lebanon.  These characteristics increase the likelihood that the 
NGOs will catch the attention of TOs and, thus, elicit a response (Stapley, 2014).  
These organizations are prominent in the media, are vocal in their opposition of TO 
activity, and they are effective at soliciting membership and resources from affected 
communities and their supporters (Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Stapley, 2014).  
Finally, analysis indicates that these NGOs do elicit a response from TOs (Murdie 
and Stapley, 2013). 
Local NGOs may also share some of these characteristics and can serve an 
influential role (Stapley, 2014).  Therefore, local and unnamed human rights NGOs 
involved in campaigns focused on the conflict areas of interest are also included in 
the final analyses.  However, these groups are diverse, sometimes short-lived, and 
often unnamed in the media and, as such, a summary of their history and work is not 
provided here. 
Opening Observations 
Before summarizing the countries, NGOs, and TOs of interest, there are two 




oppressed that was introduced in chapters one and two: a hero arises in response to an 
oppressive group abusing an oppressed group.  While Lebanon and Turkey offer 
sound examples of this dynamic, particularly in reference to the Shia and Kurdish 
populations (elaborated on below), Algeria falls outside of this demarcation.  The 
general citizenry has been, at times, oppressed by both the government and the TOs; 
thus making them a constituency to only the NGOs and not the TOs.  To elaborate, 
the TOs operating within Algeria are reacting to ideological or institutional 
differences (e.g., the importance of an Islamic state and national and global jihad), not 
fighting for an oppressed population.  At specific times, the citizenry, which typically 
fills the role of the oppressed, has been intentionally targeted by a TO in a manner 
similar to what would be expected for an oppressor: the citizenry is seen as part of the 
problem.  Therefore, Algeria does not provide a defensible example of the 
TO/NGO/constituency relationship.  However, the inclusion of Algeria is deliberate 
and potentially beneficial; its inclusion allows for intra- and inter-group comparison 
and it functions as a control country.  In addition, the relationships between NGO and 
TO activity in Algeria can be compared to similar relationships in Lebanon and 
Turkey, where the constituency is firmly established.  These comparisons allow for a 
better assessment of the nuances of the hypothesized relationship between oppressor, 
oppressed, and the hero.  Specifically, returning to the basic tenets of game theory, if 
there is no shared constituency that creates a competitive dynamic between the NGO 
and TO, does the activity of the former have any relationship to the activity of the 
latter?  In sum, although the oppressor/oppressed dynamic does not apply when the 




influence in the absence of this dynamic, as well as a comparison with countries that 
follow a more traditional dynamic of oppression. 
A second observation refers to the selection of NGOs.  Recall that HRW and 
AI serve as active human rights or campaigning organizations, but ICRC stands out in 
that it is a humanitarian or service provision organization.  The inclusion of ICRC, 
particularly in light of the service role that Hezbollah plays in Lebanon, serves a 
unique analytical function.   Specifically, it allows for assessment of the influence of 
service provision organizations in areas where the local TO is filling a similar 
provision role, such as is the case in Lebanon.  Before providing an overview of these 
NGOs, the background and history of the chosen countries, their conflicts, and their 
TOs will be provided.  
Turkey, Kurds, and the PKK 
The roots of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey can be traced back nearly a 
century to the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Cornell, 2009).  After World War I 
(WWI), Mustafa Kemal, also known as Ataturk (the father of Turks), took office as 
president (Kucukcan, 2003).  Seeking a modern and united Turkey, Ataturk rejected 
the Sevres Treaty created by the Allies following WWI; adopting it would have 
reduced Turkey to one third its current size and created an independent Kurdish 
country (Phillips, 2008) or created a binational state (Kucukcan, 2003).  Instead, 
Ataturk rallied the citizenry and eventually succeeded in replacing the Sevres Treaty 




new Republic of Turkey.29  The Lausanne Treaty ensured that minority status was 
determined by religious, rather than ethnic, characteristics and it stipulated that the 
population would need to assume a civic national identity based on being Turkish.  
The expectation was that Kurdish people would adopt a Turkish identity (Cornell, 
2009). 
In 1925, the Kurdish people rebelled, seeking an independent state; but they 
were quickly suppressed (Phillips, 2008).  Over the next 15 years, there were 18 
revolts across the country, leading to a draconian response from the state (Kucukcan, 
2003).  Kurdish language was banned, as was cultural expression and Kurds in select 
areas were deported to other areas of the country.  Kurdish identity was forcibly 
removed and they became “mountain Turks” (Ozcelik, 2006: 136).   
In the 1950s, the tides shifted slightly and Kurdish identity came to the 
forefront again. Through increased access to education, the rise of a multi-party 
system, and shifts in traditional ties, a subset of Kurdish intelligencia arose and 
became active in political spheres, allying with the left-leaning Turkish Labor Party 
(TLP), the first party to acknowledge the existence of Kurds (Ozcelik, 2006).  
However, the emphasis within the TLP and the elites was on integration, rather than 
autonomy or separation; this emphasis persevered throughout the Cold War.  During 
that time, the Kurdish regions of the country became the most impoverished and 
underdeveloped regions in the country, riddled with civil strife and neglected by the 
state (Barkey, 1993; Cornell, 2009).  
                                                 
29 The Republic of Turkey was built on six principles, including: republicanism, reformism, populism, 




In the 1960s and 1970s, radical student groups rallied in opposition to the 
activities of the Turkish government (Barkey, 1993).  The Kurdistan Worker’s Party 
(PKK) formed in 1978 as an offshoot of one of these early radical groups (Ergil, 
2000).  The PKK, originally driven by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, focused primarily 
in its first few years on the need for a proletarian revolution (Phillips, 2003).  By the 
time of its first violent attack in 1984, the PKK had shifted its attention to the creation 
of a Kurdish state, recognizing this as the first necessary step in the establishment of a 
greater Kurdistan (Ozcelik, 2006).  Led by a near cult-like personality, Abdullah 
Öcalan, the PKK embarked on a long and violent 30-year campaign to gain Kurdish 
cultural recognition, autonomy and, at times, independence. 
The PKK demanded allegiance from the Kurds, stipulating that a failure to 
support the organization was an expression of loyalty to the Turkish state (Phillips, 
2003).  This created some level of disillusionment amongst the citizenry (Cornell, 
2009).  In addition, members of the PKK would often target Kurdish elites, including 
teachers, doctors, and businesspeople, causing a further divide between the 
organization and the people (Criss, 1995; Phillips, 2003).  However, the 
government’s response to the TO, described below, helped win public favor for the 
PKK.  
In response to attacks targeting state representatives, such as government 
figures, military personnel, and state buildings, the government implemented martial 
law in several Kurdish areas in the late 1980s, declaring a state of emergency.  
Military operations were initiated and intensified, some including death squads, and 




included an uninvolved citizenry.  In addition, the government implemented a policy 
that forcibly displaced villagers thought to be providing shelter or support to the 
PKK; nearly 400,000 villagers were evacuated.  Further restrictions were placed on 
the Kurdish identity, including publications, language, and broadcasts (Ozcelik, 
2006).  The government-led activities solidified support for the PKK in opposition to 
the government (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997; Cornell, 2009).30 
Beyond civilian allegiances, the PKK was problematic for Turkey for a 
variety of reasons.  In addition to promoting violence and contributing to civil strife, 
the activities of the PKK and the state response to the TO also compromised Turkey’s 
position within the international community (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997).  Although 
Turkey had aspirations to become a member of the European Union, the conflict 
made Turkey an unattractive prospect (Ozcelik, 2006).  In addition, the state-led 
response to the PKK that resulted in the deaths and displacement of thousands of 
citizens violated international human rights expectations, souring relationships with 
neighbors and western nations.  Finally, the conflict devastated the Turkish economy, 
impacting tourism, foreign investment, and internal stability.  By the 1990s, Turkey 
was hard-pressed to eliminate the PKK with whatever means possible. 
In a move to attack the PKK at its heart, the Turkish government turned its 
attention to Öcalan.  Öcalan had previously fled to Syria, an ally of the PKK, in 
response to military crackdowns and had been conducting operations from there 
(Phillips, 2003).  Turkey threatened to suspend Syrian access to water supplies from 
                                                 
30 Not long after the formation of the PKK and the state crackdown, international human rights and 
humanitarian NGOs took an active interest in the Kurdish plight, prompted mainly by the actions of 





the Euphrates River unless Syria designated the PKK as a terrorist organization and 
committed to handing Öcalan over to the Turkish government; Syria complied with 
the designation.  Öcalan fled Syria and was eventually captured in Nairobi and 
handed over to Turkish security in February of 1999 (Ergil, 2000).  He was convicted 
of treason and sentenced to death in June of 1999.   
Once captured, Öcalan modified the PKK campaign considerably (Kline, 
2004).  In immediate response to his arrest, PKK members and Kurdish citizens 
protested across Europe, attacking embassies, engaging in self-immolation and 
hunger strikes, hostage-takings, and suicide bombings (Ergil, 2000; Phillips, 2003).  
However, in August of 1999, Öcalan, in an unexpected move, demanded that the 
PKK shift its focus from the militant to the political.31  Specifically, he called for the 
withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey,32 stipulating that the organization should 
desist in armed attacks, and he commanded that senior members surrender to Turkish 
authorities (Marcus, 2007).  PKK members complied.   
Over the next several years, the PKK limited its militant activities, but 
maintained an active presence in training camps in Iraq (Marcus, 2007).  Under 
pressure from the international community, Turkey eliminated the death penalty and, 
by default, commuted Öcalan’s sentence to life imprisonment.  The Turkish 
government also began making some concessions regarding the Kurdish dilemma, 
although the pace and content were unsatisfying to the Kurdish people and the PKK.  
Kurdish-language broadcasting was permitted, but took several years to implement; 
                                                 
31 Some sources speculate that this call for a shift in focus and tactics was actually part of a bartering 
process between Ocalan and the Turkish government as Ocalan attempted to suspend his death 
sentence (Marcus, 2007). 
32 The PKK maintained training camps in Iraq; Ocalan commanded that the PKK withdraw to these 




the same applied to Kurdish-language classes.  In addition, Kurdish-friendly political 
parties were disbanded, under the charge that they had links to the PKK.  In 2004, in 
frustration of the minimal political concessions granted the Kurds and in a move to 
reassert PKK-relevance, Öcalan released a statement calling for an end to the 
ceasefire. 
Following Öcalan’s suspension of the cease fire, attacks perpetrated by or 
affiliated with the PKK escalated, coming to a peak in 2012 (Tezcur, 2012).  To the 
surprise of the international community, Öcalan called another ceasefire in March of 
2013 and, once again, commanded that the PKK withdraw from Turkey (Letsch, 
2013).  The months between Öcalan’s proclamation and the writing of this 
dissertation have been laden with tension, as the Turkish government is slow to 
demonstrate further concessions to the Kurdish people and the PKK is reluctant to 
withdraw. 
Lebanon, the Shia, and Hezbollah 
Lebanon has a long history rooted in religious clashes and conflicts.  During 
the 19th century, the Maronite Christian population emerged as the favored 
community, above the Druze (a Shia branch), Sunni, and the Shia populations 
(Makdisi, 1996).  The Maronites, along with support from the minority Druze elites, 
succeeded in gaining European support for a system of community delineation based 
on religion, rather than region or kinship; these sects were called taifas.  These 
religiously-orientated divisions would continue to maintain legitimacy throughout 




Grand Liban, later to become Lebanon, was created in 1920, following the 
end of WWI and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Makdisi, 1996).  The Maronites 
continued to hold a place of prominence, while the Sunni population overtook the 
Druze community as next in a position of power.  The Republic of Lebanon, under 
French rule, was formed in 1926 and officially granted the majority of power to the 
Maronites; the new constitution mandated that confessional groups or taifas would be 
represented proportionately in government (Saab and Ranstrop, 2007).  This was 
further codified in the National Pact of 1943, which granted Lebanon independence 
from France; the Pact stipulated that future presidents would be Maronite, prime 
ministers would be Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament would be Shia (Makdisi, 
1996). 
Following independence, Lebanon was gripped by sectarian tension.  Muslims 
were becoming demographically favored over Christians and secular groups were 
motivating politically, demanding change (Saab and Ranstrop, 2007).  The religious 
elites were reticent to incorporate these perspectives and representatives into the 
political system for fear that it would result in a radicalized Muslim nation.  In 
addition, regional development was inequitable and portions of the population, mostly 
Shia, were sinking deeper into a state of disadvantage and poverty.  In response to 
these conditions, students and workers began protesting in the 1970s, calling for civil 
rights and privileges, and militant activity began to crop up (Makdisi, 1996).  In 1975, 
Lebanon sunk into civil war that persevered until 1990 (Barak, 2007). 
The civil war was based on a sectarian divide as a mostly rightist Christian 




On this backdrop, Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978, then again in 1982, taking up 
active occupation of the southern parts of the country, traditionally the Shia regions, 
for the next 18 years (Murden, 2000).  The invasion was carried out for a number of 
reasons, including creating a security or zone between Israel and Lebanon-based 
Syrian and/or Palestinian adversaries.  This period of conflict was devastating for the 
country; casualties were estimated to be around 150,000, hundreds of thousands of 
people were displaced, and approximately one third of the population fled the 
country; the majority of these victims came from the Shia community (Barak, 2007). 
While the Shia community was the poorest community in Lebanon, they were 
also the fastest growing.  In an attempt to gain a foothold in the government, Musa al-
Sadr formed the first Shia political party, the Harakat al-Mahroumin (the Movement 
of the Dispossessed) in the early 1970s (Haddad, 2006).  The party included a 
military wing called Amal, which focused on challenging the political elite through 
the use of violence (Bazzi, 2007).  Amal also targeted Israeli forces in the south, 
leading to heavy retaliation (Haddad, 2006).  The fighting destabilized the Shia 
constituency even further, causing them to relocate en masse to the impoverished 
southern suburbs of Beirut, also known as the “misery belt” (23).  In 1978, al-Sadr 
disappeared and Amal shifted focus to advocating for a democratic pluralism or 
integration into a larger Islamic nation, although it continued to engage in some 
militant activities. 
Hezbollah, also known as the Party of God, was founded in Iran in the late 
1970s (Haddad, 2006).  Established as an extremist Islamic organization, it was 




(Schbley, 2000).  Hezbollah became active in Lebanon in the 1980s, in response to 
the Israel occupation and the plight of the Shia community (Haddad, 2006).  Its 
effective use of political violence and strong leadership was appealing to the Shia 
community and Hezbollah grew quickly in size as its constituency increased, 
populated by the dispossessed and the impoverished.  As advocates for the oppressed 
and a movement of the disadvantaged, Hezbollah engaged in a low-level war with 
Israel that continued throughout the civil war and the signing of the Taif Accord and 
beyond (Murden, 2000).33     
The Lebanese civil war, which led to near total state collapse, drew to a close 
in 1990, following the signing of a new National Pact, the Taif Accord (Makdisi, 
1996).  Crafted by Syria and Saudi Arabia, the Accord recognized the Syrian 
relationship with Lebanon, codifying Syria’s role as the guarantor of security (Atlas 
and Licklider, 1990).  In addition, it stipulated that militias disarm and dismantle, 
with the exception of Hezbollah, which was recognized as a legitimate national 
resistance movement serving to oppose Israel occupation (Bazzi, 2007).34  Further, 
the Accord validated the pre-existing political structure based on confessional 
affiliation, requiring that political offices be occupied by representatives of the 
Maronite, Sunni, and Shia communities, although it granted more political power to 
the Sunni community, at the expense of the Maronites (Atlas and Licklider, 1990; 
Murden, 2000).  While the Accord was opposed on several fronts, leading to high-
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occupation, the plight of the Shia people, and the TO response prompted human rights and 
humanitarian NGOs to becoming involved from afar and on the ground.  This is outlined further 
below. 
34 It is important to note that Hezbollah was considered a terrorist organization by several nations at the 
time of the Taif Accord and continues to be labeled a terrorist organization by several large governing 




casualty inter-Maronite skirmishes, the Accord was signed into law in September, 
1990.  By 1991, Beirut had been demilitarized and the existing militias had turned in 
their weapons, with the exception of Hezbollah. 
Hezbollah continued a low-level war with Israel following the signing of the 
Accord, (Norton, 2007).  In 2000, following 18 years of violent confrontations and 
outright opposition, Israel withdrew from Lebanon, vacating the “zone of 
domination” that it had held in the southern region of the country (Murden, 2000: 34).  
With the end of the civil war and the removal of Israeli threat, Hezbollah underwent a 
transformation, maintaining a militant branch, but also shifting resources towards the 
formation of a political and a social services branch (Haddad, 2006; Flanigan and 
Abdel-Samad, 2009).  While Hezbollah had begun providing social services to the 
Shia community early in its existence, it had not played an active political role until 
Israeli withdrawal (Flanigan and Abdel-Samad, 2009).  By 2006, Hezbollah had 
established itself as a key political player and social service provider, taking a 
prominent role in the government and eclipsing services offered by the state in 
impoverished regions of the country (Flanigan, 2006).  Not only did Hezbollah gain 
legitimate political control of portions of southern Lebanon, but it became a member 
of the Lebanese Cabinet in 2005 (Bazzi, 2007).  In addition, large portions of the 
population, particularly the Shia community, looked to Hezbollah as their primary 
provider of health, education, and social services, including everything from 
compensation for material loss from natural disaster to a financial credit or lending 




services branches took prominence, its militant branch faded from the spotlight until 
July of 2006. 
On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah led a cross-border attack and abducted two 
Israeli soldiers with the intention of exchanging them for prisoners (Norton, 2007).  
This led to a retaliatory attack by Israel, prompting 34 days of warfare between 
Hezbollah and Israel.  More than a thousand people were killed and more than a 
million civilians displaced in the conflict, which officially ended with a ceasefire on 
August 14, 2006 (Kattan, 2006).  The 34-day war served as a reminder that 
Hezbollah, while politically and socially benevolent, still had the capacity and the 
resources to engage in large-scale and destructive militant activity.   
Algeria, the Islamic State and Citizenry, the GIA, GSPC, and AQLIM 
Modern conflict in Algeria began with the French occupation of the country in 
1830 (Toth, 1993).  Centuries of Islamic identity and practices were abruptly 
displaced under French control, leading to decades of civilian unrest and growing 
discord.  Following WWI, the citizenry engaged in a variety of political protests; the 
government responded by implementing stricter laws and enforced them through 
military crackdowns, contributing to civilian deaths and further citizen distrust 
(Ageron and Brett, 1997).  Radical elements of the population began to collaborate 
around the use of political violence in response to French colonial rule and military 
oppression.  These underlying tensions came to a head in 1954, when Algerians 
launched an attack on the French on All Saints Day, leading to the beginning of the 
Algerian War for Independence (Horne, 2006).  The following eight years were 




radical opposition.  A cease fire was eventually declared in 1962, shortly followed by 
Algerian independence from France (Harmon, 2010).   
The National Liberation Front (FLN) formed from the anti-French liberation 
movement and, upon French withdrawal, took power as the new fledgling 
government (Harmon, 2010).  The FLN, although underscored with some Islamic 
ideals, advocated a secular-nationalist agenda, crafted after Nasser’s one-party model 
from Egypt (Botha, 2008).  As such, Algeria became a one-party system with power 
concentrated in the military elite.  The Islamic population objected to the secular 
policies advocated by the state and chafed under military rule.  In 1982, the Armed 
Islamic Movement (MIA) was formed by discontented Islamists willing to engage in 
political violence.  However, MIA activity dissipated following the assassination of 
the MIA leader, Bouyali, in 1987 and, more importantly, government concessions in 
1988 (Harmon, 2010).  In October of 1988, the FLN acquiesced to public demand, 
allowing for multi-party elections.   
In 1989, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the first Islamic political party, was 
founded (Zouine, 2002).  In 1990, the FIS won municipal elections and, in 1991, won 
the majority of the first round of legislative elections, gaining 188 seats in the 
National People’s Assembly, in contrast to the 15 seats won by the FLN (Harmon, 
2010).  Unwilling to allow for such a blatant victory and reticent to surrender a 
secular state, a military junta took control, effectively preventing the FIS from 
winning the elections.  Over the next few months, the military banned the FIS, 
incarcerated its leaders, overthrew the President, and detained thousands of civilians 




In response to repressive military rule, radical groups within the FIS and 
beyond turned to violence and, in 1992, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was founded 
as an umbrella to the different militant factions arising in the battle for a multi-party 
Islamic state (Hafez, 2000).35  The GIA was established under the mandate that 
armed jihad was the only way to successfully acquire the desired Islamic nation.  This 
stipulation created a rift between the GIA and the FIS; the latter advocated for 
political reform (Filiu, 2009).  In addition, the GIA, although originally focused on 
the military regime, declared war on the civilian population in 1994. The GIA 
condemned the citizenry for not engaging in jihad and labeled them infidels and 
“supporters of apostates” (Hafez, 2000: 587).  In response to the GIA’s extremist 
views, in 1994, the FIS formed its own armed branch, the Islamic Salvation Army 
(AIS), declaring that armed jihad was one way, but not the only way, of achieving an 
Islamist state, thus allowing for political reform (Filiu, 2009).  It also publicly 
condemned the strategy of targeting civilians and succeeded in recruiting some 
members of the GIA to its own forces (Hafez, 2000).  To counter, the GIA began 
targeting the AIS and the next several years were marked by an overall increase in 
violence, as well as an increase in attacks against civilians and amongst militant 
groups.    
Attacks against civilians and inter-group fighting undermined the credibility 
of GIA and, in 1995 and 1996, several jihadi groups severed ties (Hafez, 2000; 
Laremont, 2011).  In 1997, the AIS declared a ceasefire and the government 
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larger, more developed TOs were forming.  However, access to Algeria was extremely limited and 
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responded by creating an amnesty program for militants that met certain criteria.  By 
2000, the AIS had disbanded and several GIA militias had agreed to comply with the 
ceasefire.  This was, however, not the end of the armed jihad in Algeria.  Out of the 
remnants of the GIA arose the Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC) 
[Filiu, 2009]. 
In 1998, the GSPC was founded with an explicit commitment to avoid civilian 
casualties and focus exclusively on the military junta (Filiu, 2009).  Bin Laden and 
Al-Qa’ida expressed approval for GSPC policies relating to civilian targets, 
introducing an opportunity for dialogue between the two groups.   By 2000, the GSPC 
had adopted the Al-Qa’ida goal of global jihad, in addition to GSPC’s early objective 
of national jihad (Harmon, 2010).  Over the next several years, the GSPC began to 
expand operations into the Sahelian neighboring nations and, due to a change in 
leadership, began to target civilians again.  The United States invasion in Iraq in 2003 
and the perceived success of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s response helped solidify ties between 
Al-Qa’ida and the GSPC and, in 2007, GSPC officially joined forces with Al-Qa’ida, 
becoming Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) [Filiu, 2009].  
This marked a turning point in campaign focus, as global jihad took priority over 
national jihad and attacks shifted to incorporate Al-Qa’ida-typical tactics, such as 
suicide bombings (Cristiani and Fabiani, 2011).   
AQLIM continues to operate in Algeria in present time.  It has three strategic 
objectives, including the overthrow of the Algerian government (national jihad), the 
creation of an operational base in the Sahel region, and the targeting and overthrow of 




2011).  AQLIM seeks to achieve its strategic goals through the targeting of symbols 
of government and military oppression, although collateral damages often include 
civilians (Filiu, 2009).  The number of active members is estimated to be 
approximately 1000, led by an Algerian native called Droukdel, but coordinated 
through a central shura council (La Sage, 2011).  The organization is also known for 
its involvement in the drug trade and for a variety of kidnappings for ransom, 
although these activities are conducted for the sake of group survival rather than 
political change.  These dalliances aside, the crux of AQLIM is armed jihad 
(Laremont, 2011). 
Following a number of highly dramatic and successful attacks on the heels of  
its inception in 2007, including attacks on the United Nations and Constitutional 
Court, the frequency of AQLIM attacks and the number of casualties resulting from 
those attacks have dropped perceptibly, minimizing the influence the organization has 
on national considerations (Laremont, 2011).  In addition, AQLIM has not reached its 
promised capacity in relation to its international footprint.  Specifically, one aspect 
that made AQLIM an attractive addition to the Al-Qa’ida family was its ability to 
operate beyond its borders; this is one area that the organization has not succeeded 
(Cristiani and Fabiani, 2011).  While AQLIM has carried out attacks in other nations 
and continues to target international targets within its border, it has not flourished in 
the Sahel region, nor has it successfully solicited membership from other Islamist 
groups operating in the region.  Despite these issues, AQLIM remains the dominant 




Amnesty International (AI) 
AI was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson, a British lawyer and recent 
Catholic convert (Buchanan, 2002).  Benenson was inspired by a newspaper article 
about two Portuguese students imprisoned for raising their glasses, as a protest 
against the Salazar regime, in a toast to liberty in a restaurant in Lisbon (Scoble and 
Wiseberg, 1974; Snyder, 2012).  He published an opinion piece reflecting on it in the 
Observer on May 28, 1961, titled “The Forgotten Prisoners”; in it, he profiled six 
prisoners that had been imprisoned for their religious or political beliefs and he 
advocated for an “Appeal for Amnesty, 1961” (Snyder, 2012).  The Forgotten 
Prisoners article was reprinted in media outlets around the world, leading to an 
unexpected outpouring of support for Benenson’s appeal (Buchanan, 2002). 
In response to the positive reaction, Benenson assembled a collective of 
intellectuals and lawyers that committed to launching a campaign focused on drawing 
attention to the plight of prisoners of conscience (Buchanan, 2002).  In July of 1961, 
the collective, comprised of individuals from several European countries and the 
United States, met in a restaurant in Luxembourg to discuss the future of the 
campaign.  They established a volunteer workspace in Benenson’s law office in 
London and devised the “Threes Network” (Amnesty International, 2013).  The 
Threes Network required that each national group select or adopt three prisoners from 
diverse regions and political backgrounds on which to focus efforts.  Efforts, at this 
early stage, entailed writing letters to governments, prisoners, and their families, and 
providing relief support (Hopgood, 2006; Snyder, 2012).  The goal of the letter-




networks would also serve as observers for their adopted prisoners, traveling to areas 
of incarceration to research and report human rights abuses. 
The organization was officially named Amnesty International and its statutes 
were formalized at a second meeting in 1962 in Belgium (Buchanan, 2002).  It was 
determined that AI would focus exclusively on those who had been incarcerated for 
their political or religious beliefs (Snyder, 2012).  The organization was dedicated 
primarily, in those early years, to prisoners in the German Democratic Republic (East 
Germany), Czechoslovakia, Ghana, and Rhodesia.  Within several years, AI had 
expanded considerably to include several other countries and, by 1967, it consisted of 
550 independent branches operating in 18 countries.  Collectively, six years after its 
inception, the organization had adopted approximately 2,000 prisoners and had 
facilitated the release of nearly 300 prisoners (Amnesty International, 2013).36  Each 
branch continued to operate under the Threes Network model and their primary 
method of promoting change continued to be letter-writing campaigns and fact-
finding missions (Snyder, 2012). 
Over a fifty-year period, AI expanded its mandate to include campaigns 
dedicated to draft resisters, the death penalty, torture, political killings, aboriginal 
suppression, refugees’ rights, women’s rights, child soldiers, the arms trade, and 
countering terror with justice (Amnesty International, 2013).  AI received 
consultative status from the United Nations and the Council of Europe in 1967, was 
granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977 and, more recently, became a consultant for 
the Organization of African Unity (Amnesty International, 2013; Scoble and 
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Wiseberg, 1974).  It broadened its focus to include social, economic, and cultural 
rights, committing to protect all freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Clark and McCann, 1991).  By 2011, it had played an integral role in 
the Declaration on Torture, the creation of the International Criminal Court, the 
International Bill of Rights, and a United Nations resolution for a moratorium on the 
death penalty (Amnesty International, 2013).  With three million members in 150 
countries, including Algeria, Turkey, and Lebanon, the AI had grown to be the 
world’s largest human rights organization. 
AI has had an active presence in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey for several 
decades.  The organization first became involved in Algeria in 1992, sending 
delegates on fact-finding missions until May of 1996, when it was denied access 
(Amnesty International, 2003).  Continuing to campaign from afar, the organization 
maintained an active watch on the Algerian conflict, through press releases and 
country reports, until it was granted access again in 2000; this access proved to be 
temporary, as it was suspended again until 2003.  AI’s attention in Algeria has been 
on civilian deaths and disappearances perpetrated by the state and by militant groups, 
torture, and women’s rights.  The organization’s primary form of campaigning in 
Algeria consists of fact-finding missions through delegate visits, press releases, 
country reports, and letter-writing campaigns.   
AI began work in Lebanon and the surrounding region in 1985 (Khayyat, 
2000).  It received permission from the Lebanese government to open an office in 
Beirut in May of 2000.  For purposes of safety and security, the campaign focus in the 




regional issues.  Meanwhile, AI groups in the surrounding region, such as Tunisia, 
Kuwait, and Morocco, as well as AI international, spearheaded Lebanon-specific 
campaigns.  AI’s attention in Lebanon has been directed towards state- and militia-
perpetrated violence against civilians, particularly the Shia communities, rights of due 
process, illegal detentions and war crimes, and, more recently, refugees’ rights 
(Amnesty International, 2013). 
AI began campaigning in Turkey in the late 1970s, briefly opening an office 
before closing it again following a military coup in 1980 that led to the incarceration 
of thousands of political activists (Turkish Daily News, 2002).  Between the 1980s 
and the early 21st century, AI restricted its onsite activities to sporadic delegates’ 
visits.  Eventually, the organization petitioned for, was denied, petitioned again, and 
finally received permission to re-open an office in Istanbul in 2002.  Unlike Lebanon, 
the AI Turkey office does campaign on local, as well as regional, issues (Amnesty 
International, 2012).  The main method of promoting change in Turkey is through 
letter-writing campaigns, lobbying the government, street protests, media releases, 
and country reports.  The core areas of focus in Turkey include ethnic and cultural 
rights, particularly for the Kurdish people, state-perpetrated violence, women’s rights, 
the death penalty, and refugees’ rights.  AI continues to maintain an active presence 
in Turkey, as it does in Lebanon and Algeria. 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
HRW was founded in 1978 under the name of Helsinki Watch (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013).  Its formation was partially in response to the signing of the Helsinki 




modifications in return for Soviet commitment to comply with certain humanitarian 
expectations, including obligations to recognize and protect freedom of thought and 
expression, religion and communication, and observance of international agreements 
concerning human rights (Montgomery, 2002).  The Accord prompted the formation 
of several human rights organizations within and beyond Soviet borders, motivated 
by the intention of holding Moscow accountable for the stipulations contained in the 
Accord.  Moscow responded with force, arresting, imprisoning, exiling, and deporting 
members of the growing dissident movement.  Andrei Sakharov, a nuclear-physicist-
turned-activist, was one of the recipients of targeted Soviet response; he was 
internally exiled, prompting his 1978 appeal for international support.   
Robert Bernstein, the head of Random House, developed an acquaintanceship 
with Sakharov and, in the mid-1970s, he met with Sakharov in the Soviet Union to 
discuss publishing Sakharov’s memoirs (Montgomery, 2002).37  In 1978, Bernstein 
responded to Sakharov’s appeal for support, launching the Helsinki Group.  He 
sought membership from establishment elite, successfully giving the fledgling 
organization a high degree of influence and respectability. 
Bernstein was not the only one to respond to the appeal for international 
support.  Parallel watch groups sprang up in countries like The Netherlands, Norway, 
and France.  Bernstein began endeavoring to unite the various groups into a singular 
international Helsinki movement (Montgomery, 2002).  His efforts came to fruition in 
September of 1982; representatives of 18 countries met in Bellagio, Italy, to officially 
formalize and launch the Helsinki Human Rights Committee.  Over the next several 
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years, the organization broadened its parameters to include Americas Watch, with a 
focus on the developing conflict in Central America; Asia Watch, monitoring the 
human rights issues arising from Burma, North Korea, and Vietnam; Africa Watch, 
with particular attention to sub-Saharan Africa; and, finally, Middle East Watch, in 
1989, with an emphasis on activities in Algeria, Israel, Syria, and Iraq (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013).  The various “Watch Committees” were formally recognized as 
Human Rights Watch in 1988. 
The next several decades were marked by a change in campaign content as 
HRW expanded to incorporate a variety of different human rights foci.  Issues 
included, but were not limited to, child soldiers, sexual and domestic violence, 
refugees’ rights, women’s rights, sectarian conflict and ethnic cleansing, terror tactics, 
and health (Human Rights Watch, 2013).  HRW’s early tactics were mainly 
comprised of “naming and shaming” state actors through direct dialogue and media 
coverage (Hafner-Burton, 2008).  Over time, HRW diversified its tactical spectrum to 
include on-site monitoring and research, crafting reports documenting human rights 
violations, lobby work, and social organizing (Human Rights Watch, 2013).     
Many of HRW’s tactics and strategies proved to be successful.  
Organizational accomplishments included membership in the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines and the implementation of the Ottawa Treaty, prohibiting the use 
of landmines (Human Rights Watch, 1999).  In recognition of the importance of this 
victory, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1997 (Human Rights Watch, 2013).  HRW also played a key role in the treaty 




the Fund for Free Expression, which administers support to authors who were 
persecuted for their work (Thomas and Beasley, 1993).  By 2014, HRW had 
approximately 400 staff members, including researchers and country experts, with 
active campaigns in 90 nations, including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
HRW’s activities in Algeria and Lebanon began with the formation of Middle 
East Watch in 1989.  Algeria was given early priority over Lebanon by the fledgling 
Watch Committee; emphasis on Algeria was the result of the death of 500 civilians 
following a riot and a repressive government response (Montgomery, 2002).  The 
organization began intensive monitoring of the Algerian government and the violent 
Islamist groups active at the time, sending its first delegate in 1990 to lobby and 
research allegations of abuse (Human Rights Watch, 1990).  Over time, HRW formed 
Algeria-specific campaigns around electoral transparency, censorship, and Islamist 
attacks against civilians resulting in death, torture, and disappearances (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013). 38   
Early interest in Lebanon was restricted to the Syrian-occupied portions of the 
country (Human Rights Watch, 1990).  The first few years following the inception of 
Middle East Watch was devoted to monitoring Syrian forces within Lebanon and  
civilian detention, disappearances, and torture.  HRW was denied access to the 
conflict areas, and monitoring and research consisted primarily of witness testimony 
and one unofficial visit to Syria.  HRW made its first official visit to Lebanon in 1992 
and, by 1993, had shifted focus to state crackdowns on freedom of press and freedom 
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of assembly, as well as Israeli and Hezbollah conflicts and resulting civilian 
casualties (Human Rights Watch, 1994).  By the mid-1990s, HRW’s focus on 
Lebanon became overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but took priority 
again by the beginning of the 21st century (Human Rights Watch, 2002).  Tactics 
included lobbying the government, receiving testimony, field research, observing 
state activity, and outreach.  In 2006, HRW opened an office in Beirut and, in 2010, it 
launched a Beirut Committee, bringing together experts with a focus on local issues 
(The Daily Star, 2010). 
HRW interest in Turkey arose before its activities in Lebanon and Algeria.  
Turkey was one of the nations that the Helsinki Watch group was committed to 
monitoring.  In keeping with the Helsinki theme of state accountability, HRW 
focused its early attention on government abuses in Turkey, particularly in relation to 
freedom of expression and assembly, torture, and illegal detention of Kurds (Human 
Rights Watch, 1989).  By 1990, HRW had conducted its first set of delegates’ visits 
with a shifted focus on the living conditions and treatment of the Kurdish people 
(Human Rights Watch, 1990).  Campaign parameters broadened over the next several 
years to include terror-related activities, counter-terrorism measures, forced civilian 
evacuations, and women’s rights.  Tactics included lobbying, meeting with prisoners 
and evacuees, field research, and soliciting international support.  HRW continues to 
maintain an active presence in Turkey, as it does in Lebanon and Algeria. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
The ICRC has its early roots in the Franco-Austrian war.  In 1859, Henry 




Solferino, Italy (Eboe-Osuji, 2006).  Noting the minimal attention given to the 
wounded combatants, Durant responded by organizing local residents in an effort to 
provide impartial medical aid.  Following the war, Durant appealed to European 
political and military leaders to coordinate the provision of impartial aid to injured 
combatants.  The Geneva Society for Public Welfare responded to the appeal in 1863, 
forming a committee of five individuals titled the “International Committee to Assist 
the War Wounded” (Hutchinson, 1996).  In October of 1863, the Committee 
convened a conference in Geneva, attended by 16 countries and several organizations.  
The conference concluded with the drafting of a set of resolutions relating to the 
operation of the Committee chapters, their neutrality and impartiality in providing 
medical aid, and their interactions with ‘belligerent’ armies.39  It also presented 
several recommendations to governments, including extending patronage to medical 
workers, declaring neutrality for medical personnel, and adopting a uniform sign and 
flag with the red cross to mark medical activity.   
The Committee convened a second conference in 1864 with the goal of 
converting the recommendations from the first conference into a binding convention 
(Eboe-Osuji, 2006).  Fifteen European countries and the United States were 
represented at the conference and their efforts formalized into the Geneva Convention 
treaty of which twelve of the attendees signed off on; the remaining countries had not 
been granted the authority to do so from their governments.  The Convention ratified 
the early recommendations of the International Committee, codifying a variety of 
articles referring to neutrality and practices in conflict areas (Hutchinson, 1996). The 
first Geneva Convention treaty was eventually signed by 57 countries, including the 
                                                 




Ottoman Empire, although this signatory was received only after the International 
Committee agreed that the Red Cross emblem suggested in the Convention be 
replaced by a Red Crescent in Muslim countries (Eboe-Osuji, 2006). 
Following on the heels of the successful Convention, the Committee formally 
changed its name to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1875 
(Hutchinson, 1996).  National Red Cross committees or societies began forming in 
countries around the world and the ICRC gained repute and popularity.  In 1901, 
Durant was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, although he no longer held a position of 
authority with the ICRC (Libaek, 2003).  As this award indicated, the ICRC had 
gained international renown; however, it was not until WWI that the organization 
fully demonstrated its merit.   
During WWI, the ICRC provided medical and financial support to combatants 
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013).  It also facilitated communication 
between soldiers and their families and participated in the exchange and release of 
thousands of soldiers (Libaek, 2003).  The ICRC monitored compliance with the 
Geneva Convention, reporting violations to the offending country, visited prisoner 
camps to observe conditions, and took a position of protest against the use of 
chemical weapons.  WWI marked a turning point for the ICRC, expanding the 
parameters of its expected activities beyond providing medical aid and further 
augmenting its importance in areas of armed conflict.  Following WWI and later 
conflicts, the Geneva Convention was modified to incorporate conditions concerning 
the use of chemical weapons, treatment of sea- and air-based armed forces, civilian 




1917, the ICRC was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize, to be followed by a second and 
third Prize during and after WWII (Libaek, 2003).   
Following WWII, the ICRC established seven fundamental principles that 
guided and continues to guide its activities and the activities of the various Red Cross 
and Red Crescent societies; these principles include universality, humanity, 
impartiality, independence, unity, neutrality, and volunteerism (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 1995).  Its mandate to participate extends to armed 
conflicts between and among nations and its responsibilities include providing 
medical care for armed combatants and civilians, observing compliance with the 
Geneva Convention, protecting civilians, locating missing persons, monitoring the 
conditions of prisoners of war, codifying international humanitarian law, and acting 
as an intermediary between warring groups (Forsythe, 1997; International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 2014).  The organization is careful to delineate its activities from 
those of human rights organizations and the politicized activities of advocacy work; 
the ICRC is explicit in its humanitarian-only function, ensuring a position of 
neutrality upon which the organization was founded (Sayapin, 2009; Studer, 2001).  
One hundred and fifty years after its foundation, the organization is recognized as the 
largest humanitarian movement, with a current or historical presence in every nation 
in the world, including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
ICRC began its activities in Algeria during the 1954-1962 War of 
Independence (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2013).  During that time, 
the organization focused primarily on visiting prisoners in Algeria and aiding 




prisoners was suspended in the 1990s, but was reinstated in 1999 (Amnesty 
International, 2003).  ICRC has maintained a steady presence in the country since that 
time, opening a delegation40 in Algiers in 2002 and an office and physical 
rehabilitation center in Rabouni in 2007 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 
2013).  ICRC activities in Algeria consist mainly of visiting detainees incarcerated in 
prisons and police stations to ensure humane treatment, as well as documenting 
violations and providing recommendations of suggested improvements to authorities.  
In addition, ICRC and the local Red Crescent Society affiliate provide first aid and 
assist in the reunification of families.  Finally, they work with the Algerian 
government to implement international human rights law, serving as advisors and 
experts.   
ICRC’s work in Lebanon is similar to its activities in Algeria.  It opened a 
delegation in Beirut in 1965, an office in Tyre in 1977, and an office in Achrafieh and 
Jounieh in 1978 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2008).  With the 
exception of a temporary suspension of activities due to continuing threats to the 
safety of its delegates between 1988 and 1989, the ICRC has maintained a steady 
presence in the country for 45 years.  During that time, the organization has focused 
on providing medical aid to the recipients of violence stemming from armed conflicts, 
as well as visiting detainees in order to observe the conditions of imprisonment and 
facilitate communication between prisoners and their families (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2013).  The organization has facilitated the repatriation 
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reside indefinitely in a conflict area serving as observers and representatives of the organization.  A 
delegation differs from an office in that a delegation is not a static construct rooted in geography with 
administrative parameters; instead, a delegation is a defined by dynamic tasks and responsibilities 




of Lebanese nationals living in Israel, as well as restoring family ties severed by 
armed conflicts.  More recently, ICRC, along with its local affiliate, the Lebanese 
Red Cross Society, has assisted in the transfer and care of Syrian refugees fleeing the 
recent conflict in Syria.   
ICRC’s presence in Turkey began much later than its activities in Lebanon 
and Algeria. In 2003, with the permission of the Turkish government, the 
organization opened a temporary mission in Ankara with the primary goal of 
supporting ICRC work in Iraq (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010).  Its 
limited Turkey-specific efforts entailed serving as advisors of international 
humanitarian law for the Turkish government and military forces and engaging in 
local education campaigns.  The mission closed in 2012 at the request of the Turkish 
government; the Iraqi situation had evolved to a point that the Turkish government 
felt it no longer required a geographically-proximate ICRC presence (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 2012).  Any continued dialogue with the Turkish 
government is maintained through the Geneva office, as ICRC no longer has a 
presence in the country.   
Next Steps 
This chapter provided a brief summary of Lebanon, Turkey, and Algeria and 
the NGOs and TOs that operate within their borders.  Although this was far from an 
exhaustive review, the goal was to present a qualitative look at the oppressors, the 
oppressed, and the advocates that manifest in the three nations of interest, in order to 
provide the reader with a cursory introduction to the context upon which the potential 









CHAPTER 5: Data and Methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the data and methodology that are used to examine the 
relationship between NGO activity and TO activity.  The section begins with a 
summary of the hypotheses, followed with a review of the dependent variables, the 
frequency of terrorist incidents, and the dataset, the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), from which the dependent variables are acquired.  This is followed by an 
introduction to the main independent variables, NGO campaign content, NGO activity 
in the media (media coverage), NGO service provision, and NGO physical presence 
in conflict areas, and the sources that are used to create this set of variables, including 
precursor data to the Government Actions in Terror Environments (GATE) dataset, 
media searches, and website searches.  The chapter also provides an outline of the 
control variables that are included in the analyses, along with a summary of their 
sources, including the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, 
the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Polity data, and the Center for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).  
The section concludes with a description of the statistical models and analyses that 
are used to test the hypotheses introduced in chapter three and summarized below.   
Revisiting the Hypotheses 
Recall that there are several specific sets of hypotheses that are addressed in 




in an area occupied by an active TO.41  The hypotheses presented below reflect the 
expectation that the physical presence of a campaigning NGO will be threatening to 
the TO and will result in an increase in targeted attacks against the NGO in an effort 
to deter it from maintaining a physical presence.  It is also hypothesized that attacks 
against the oppressor will increase as the TO attempts to present itself as a more 
effective ally to the constituents.  In addition, it is hypothesized that attacks against 
the citizenry will decrease, as the TO attempts to present itself as a less-harmful ally. 
Hypothesis 1A: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
NGOs. 
Hypothesis 1B: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
the citizenry. 
Hypothesis 1C: An increase in physical presence of a campaigning NGO 
within a conflict area will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
the oppressor. 
The second set of hypotheses refers to the content of the NGO campaign 
work. Specifically, NGOs may focus on the oppressor and the constituents 
exclusively or may incorporate a focus on the TO into their campaign message.  A 
                                                 
41 As mentioned in a previous chapter, it is important to maintain a distinction between a campaigning 
NGO and a service provision NGO.  While there are organizations that serve both purposes, this 
dissertation focuses on NGOs that fall exclusively into one category over the other.  Campaigning 
organizations focus on providing long-term changes in order to eliminate an issue, while provision 
organizations provide short-term services that temporarily alleviate an aspect of a larger issue (e.g., 
such as providing medical services, therapeutic services, food and supplies, versus attempting to 
change policy or government practices, which is the purview of campaigning organizations).  The first 
and second sets of hypotheses refer specifically to campaigning organizations (Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International, and local human rights organizations), while the third hypothesis refers 




campaign focus on the oppressor and oppressed community serves to inform the 
constituents that there is a new potential ally and benefactor available.  This can 
threaten the TO if the citizenry chooses to support the NGO over the TO.  In addition, 
a campaign focus on the TO can be perceived as threatening by the TO, since it 
would serve to vilify the TO and compromise the legitimacy of the TO in the eyes of 
constituents.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that an increase in NGO attention focused 
on the oppressed community or the TO will lead to an increase in attacks targeting 
NGOs as a means to deter NGOs from actively campaigning.  Further, it is 
hypothesized that the TO will increase attacks against the oppressor, in an attempt to 
shift attention back to state or military and to present itself as an effective competitor 
for community allegiance.  Finally, it is hypothesized that attacks against civilians 
will decrease, in an attempt to counter any new-found public identification of the TO 
as an oppressor, in the case of anti-terrorist campaign, or to present itself as 
benevolent, in the case of an advocacy campaign.     
Hypothesis 2Ai: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 
NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting 
NGOs. 
Hypothesis 2Aii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 
campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting NGOs. 
Hypothesis 2Bi: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 





Hypothesis 2Bii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 
campaign will lead to a decrease in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
citizenry. 
Hypothesis 2Ci: An increase in NGO focus on constituent advocacy within the 
NGO campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
oppressor. 
Hypothesis 2Cii: An increase in NGO focus on TO activity within the NGO 
campaign will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the 
oppressor. 
An additional hypothesis addresses the physical presence of NGO service 
providers. Many TOs offer resources and aid to the constituents, which serves the 
purpose of making the citizenry beholden to the TOs, offsetting any reference to the 
TO as a harmful force, and soliciting community support.  In countries where TOs do 
offer services, NGOs that provide similar services can release a population from their 
dependency on a TO.  In countries where the TO does not provide services, the 
presence of a provision NGO can still serve to sway public opinion, as the 
constituents develop a dependency on the NGO.  Therefore, it is hypothesized that the 
physical presence of a NGO service provider will increase attacks targeting NGOs as 
the TO attempts to deter the NGO from maintaining a presence. 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing the physical presence of a service provision NGO 
will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the NGO. 
The last hypothesis refers to the overall presence of the NGO in the media.  




support depends on preserving a public presence.  Given that media headlines are 
limited in number, this can create a competitive dynamic for attention.  As such, it is 
hypothesized that NGO presence in the media will increase the frequency of TO 
attacks as the TO vies for media attention. 
Hypothesis 4: An increase in NGO media activity will lead to an increase in 
the frequency of TO attacks. 
Separate models are run for each of the sets of hypotheses and for each 
country; each model incorporates the specific outcome variables that are relevant to a 
given hypothesis.  These models are summarized further in the remainder of the 
chapter (and are available in Appendix A), along with the sources of data and the 
variables that are used to test these hypotheses and the analytical method that is 
appropriate for the research questions posed in this dissertation. 
Dependent Variables: The Global Terrorism Database 
The dependent variables employed in this dissertation include the frequency 
of terrorist incidents overall and for specific target types, as captured by the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD).  The GTD is the largest and most comprehensive 
incident-based terrorism dataset in the world.  It provides data from 1970 through to 
201342 and currently reports on more than 125,000 global incidents, including both 
within- and between-country attacks.  The GTD consists of more than 120 variables 
providing information about the location and date of the incident, the targets and 
perpetrators involved, the weapons used and outcomes of the incident, as well as the 
motives underlying the attack (LaFree, 2010).  The GTD is open source and readily 
                                                 





available through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (START) located at the University of Maryland (UMD).43 
The GTD consists of four generations of data collection, also known as GTD 
I, II, III, and IV; the generations denote periods of collection that are facilitated by 
different parties.44    Collection efforts historically and currently involve content 
searches of open source newspapers and other media sources from around the world, 
along with searches of government and military reports (for a detailed summary of 
collection techniques, see LaFree et al., 2014).   
The operational definition of terrorism shifted slightly between the GTD I and 
GTD II, as did the variables included in the dataset.  The GTD I was based on the 
following definition of terrorism: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184).  Although the GTD I erred on the 
side of inclusivity, acts perpetrated by the state were excluded, as were acts of 
violence between guerilla groups and the military.  The GTD II sought to preserve the 
original GTD I data while also improving upon the quality of the data and rigor of 
data collection methods moving forward.  A set of criteria were developed that 
mirrored the original definition but included additional parameters.  There were two 
levels to the criteria; the first level consisted of three criteria that must be met for 
inclusion into the GTD, while the second level consisted of three additional criteria, 
                                                 
43 http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 
44 GTD I includes data from 1970 through to 1997 and was collected by the Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Services (PGIS) [LaFree and Dugan, 2007].  GTD II covers data between 1998 and 2007 
and was collected by the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS).  GTD III was 
collected by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) and includes 2008 data through to 
the end of October of 2011 (LaFree, 2010).The separation of the four generations of data collection is 
not a publically recognized practice; however, GTD researchers use this delineation as a method of 




of which at least two must be met to warrant inclusion.  The first level criteria 
include: 
1. “The incident must be intentional—the result of a conscious 
calculation on the part of a perpetrator.” 
 
2. “The incident must entail some level of violence (including violence 
against property) or the threat of violence.” 
 
3. “There must be sub-national perpetrators.” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 
188)45 
 
The second level criteria include: 
1. “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or 
social goal.” 
 
2. “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than 
the immediate victims.” 
 
3. “The action must be outside of the context of legitimate warfare 
activities; that is, the act must be outside the parameters set by 
international humanitarian law.”  (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 188). 
 
While the shift from the GTD I to the GTD II was marked by several large 
changes, the shift from the GTD II to the GTD III did not substantively alter the data 
set.  The transition between the GTD III and the GTD IV also did not entail 
substantive changes to the content of the data, although data collection methods were 
dramatically altered (Jensen, 2013).  Specifically, collection efforts were moved in-
house to be conducted by START researchers.  While incidents continued to be 
identified through media sources, the sheer volume and diversity of the media sources 
                                                 
45 It is important to note that this definition ignores state-based terrorism.  While it is unlikely that state 
attacks would be influenced by NGO activities, applying this definition eliminates the option of 




ballooned.  Previous generations of GTD collection had entailed targeted searches of 
well-known media sources and news aggregators; the fourth generation entailed 
downloading more than a million articles a day, then using filters to limit the pool of 
potential sources to a few thousand promising candidate sources containing reference 
to specific terrorism-related terms (LaFree et al., 2014).  Casting the net wide and 
then narrowing it had a notable effect on the data; incidents increased perceptibly 
between the legacy data and in-house collection efforts.  The amount of increase that 
is due to legitimate spikes in terrorism versus data collection methods is unknown.   
The Global Terrorism Database within the purview of the research question 
Use of the GTD data requires that several key coding decisions be made 
concerning the years to be included in the analysis and the potential recoding of data; 
these decisions revolve around overcoming potential data weaknesses and ensuring 
that the final dataset is well-equipped to address the primary research questions.  First 
and foremost, the analysis is restricted to the years 1987 through to 2011, depending 
on the country of interest.  At the time that data were being collected for this 
dissertation, the 2012 GTD data were not yet released to the public.  While the data 
could have been included later, they were excluded from this dissertation because it is 
unclear whether the increase in measured attacks in 2012 reflects TO activity or net-
widening.46  In addition, 2012 data are missing values for several key control 
variables discussed later in this chapter; at the time of writing this, many data 
collection agencies had only released values up to and including the end of 2011. 
                                                 
46 The last two months of 2011 data were collected in-house at START as well; however, these 
collection efforts extended only as far as collecting the media sources, not locating original incidents.  
The incident listings for these two months originated from the same collection agencies as were 




The years that are included in the analysis differ across countries, as they are 
determined by the availability of the data.  Lebanon and Turkey have the longest 
periods of analysis, beginning in June of 1987.  Although it is ideal to begin analysis 
several years earlier in Lebanon (to capture the effects of Israeli interests taking up 
residence in the country) and Turkey (to capture the full extent of PKK activity from 
the first attack onwards), the Reuters archive, a major contributor to the independent 
variable, is unavailable prior to June, 1987.   
While the Reuters archives are available between mid-1987 and 1990 for 
Algeria, the Algerian analysis begins with the 1991 data because, prior to 1991, the 
terrorism incident data are unreliable.  The years between 1982 and 1988 in Algeria 
were marked by sporadic civil conflict, yet the GTD reports zero attacks meeting 
terrorism-related criteria.47  This is likely due to coding error by PGIS; subsequent 
retroactive media searches conducted by this author failed to produce reliable event 
data that could be used to supplement the dataset.  In addition, several control 
variables are missing Algerian values for years prior to 1990.  Finally, the 1989-1990 
period was a relatively quiet period in Algeria, as the first multi-party elections were 
undertaken.  It was not until the military junta took control in 1991 that violent 
conflict appeared again.  Given that the conflict in the 1980s is missing in the GTD 
and it is unclear whether the lack of incidents in 1989 and 1990 are due to limited 
data collection or to a period of calm, analysis is restricted to the years of conflict that 
appear to be well captured in the GTD.  Therefore, analysis is limited to 1991 through 
                                                 
47 A watershed moment in Algerian civil conflict was the bread riots of October, 1988, when the public 
began attacking government symbols (Botha, 2008).  The government was forced to declare a state of 
emergency and responded with force.  The GTD does not currently report a single incident for this 
period of conflict.  However, these missing incidents have been identified and will be added to the 




to 2011; additional media searches provided by this author support the trends and 
numbers reflected in the GTD data for these years.48 
It should also be mentioned that 1993 is excluded from the analysis because 
START researchers were never given the incidents from that year from Pinkerton 
Global Intelligence Services (PGIS), the company that collected the GTD I data.  It is 
likely that PGIS lost those cases during an earlier office move.  Researchers 
employing the GTD dataset have argued the merits of attempting to find ways to 
supplement these 12 months of data, but that has yet to happen.  As such, this author 
follows in the footsteps of others by removing the year from analysis, setting that 
period of time as missing (see, for example, Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). 
A further issue with any large dataset is the potential impact of missing 
values.  Fortunately, the terrorist incident variables selected for this analysis are 
relatively complete.  There are no missing values for date or country.  There are, at 
first glance, a number of attacks that have an unknown target; however, this is 
substantively different from a missing value.  As in most cases, this indicates the 
discovery of an explosive device in a public area; in these incidents, coding the attack 
as having an unknown target does not indicate missing info but, instead, that there are 
more than one potential targets.   
Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the GTD is an ideal dataset with 
which to examine terrorism-related relationships.  There are very few missing values 
in the variables of interest, the extensive timeframe of the dataset allows for several 
decades of analysis for all three countries, and the measures are appropriate to 
                                                 




examine several facets of terrorist activity.  The variables included are listed in Table 
1 and are briefly summarized below. 
GTD variables 
This dissertation uses a monthly unit of analysis.  The primary outcome of 
interest is the frequency of attacks or the count of the number of attacks in a given 
month.  Several of the hypotheses are structured around particular targets.  In order to 
assess the impact of NGO activity on terrorists’ targeting specific entities (for 
example, the oppressor/state/military), specific groupings of target types that are 
relevant for each hypothesis are created and monthly counts of attacks targeting these 
groupings are coded.  The original GTD data contains 22 potential target types; these 
are recoded into the following categories: the state/oppressor, the oppressed, and the 
competitor.  Incidents that include military, police, or government (general or 
diplomatic) as a target type are included in the oppressor/ state variable.  Incidents 
that include NGOs as a target type are included in the competitor /NGO variable.  
Finally, incidents that target private citizens and property are included in the 
oppressed /civilian variable.49  Incidents directed towards other targets are omitted 
from all models, other than the model addressing hypothesis four (the potential 
                                                 
49 It should be noted that several target types included in the GTD overlap, particularly in relation to 
the private citizens and property target type (LaFree et al., 2014).  For example, an attack on a business 
or educational institution may also be an attack on civilians.  If there are civilian casualties, this will be 
included in the coding strategy and, thus, will be included in the dependent variable measuring attacks 
targeting civilians.  However, if there are no civilian casualties, the incident will not include a civilian 
target type and, as such, will not be included in the civilian analysis.  This coding decision is 
appropriate if, for example, the TO targeted a business or educational institution in order to target 
corporate interests or undermine western education, but becomes problematic if the TO is actually 
targeting the patrons of the school or business.  Unfortunately, in many cases, it is nearly impossible to 
differentiate these TO targeting choices from media sources alone and any attempt to infer terrorist 
intentions may be arbitrary.  As such, for the sake of simplicity, incidents that do not include a given 
target type will not be included in the dependent variables used for this dissertation even though the 




relationship between all NGO media coverage and all TO attacks). The dependent 
variables included in the models are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Dependent variables and definitions 
Variables     Definition 
 
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO physical presence 
Number of attacks - state Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, 
government, and military 
Number of attacks - civilians Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians 
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
 
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO campaign content 
Number of attacks - state Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, 
government, and military 
Number of attacks - civilians Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians 
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
 
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO service provision 
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
 
Dependent variables for models addressing NGO media activity 




There are several observations and decisions concerning target type that 
should be noted.  Specifically, determining the target of an attack can be a difficult 
endeavor, given the complexity inherent in this determination (LaFree et al., 2014).  
The intended target and the affected victim may not be one and the same and the 
former may not be readily identifiable.  As such, media will report on those affected 
by an attack and not necessarily those targeted by an attack.  Therefore, the coded 
target type will, in some cases, fail to capture the intended recipient. The potential 
discrepancy between target and victim may also be indicative of a diffusion of 
conflict, as TOs lash out at available targets, rather than strategic ones. 
In a similar vein, there are often multiple targets included in a single incident 




example, will include three target types: religious institutions, private citizens, and 
military.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from media sources the 
intended target for these multi-target incidents.  Oftentimes, prioritizing one target 
type over another in a coding strategy is arbitrary and subjective.  As such, this 
dissertation takes advantage of the fact that the GTD records as many as three target 
types for each incident.  With the exception of the variable measuring the frequency 
of all attacks, the remaining dependent variables (attacks targeting the state, civilians, 
and NGOs) are coded as 1 if any of three target types coded for a given incident 
includes one of the types of interest.  This results in the possibility that an incident 
may be coded twice for two separate variables (e.g., the mosque attack would be 
included in the attacks targeting the state variable and the attacks targeting civilians 
variable); however, over counting is not an issue given that no model includes more 
than one of these variables at a time. 
An additional coding decision stems from the difficulty of isolating subgroups 
from the citizenry at large.  While it is hypothesized that NGO presence and 
campaigning activity will decrease attacks that directly affect members of an 
oppressed constituency, it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate those attacks that 
targeted only members of that group from attacks targeting the general population.  In 
addition, there is unavoidable overlap between the constituents of terrorism and the 
general citizenry.  Members of the constituency in domestic conflict are often also 
members of the citizenry and attacks targeting the citizenry can have direct and 
indirect impacts on the constituents.  Therefore, members of the general public 




One additional consideration relates to the inclusion of all terrorist incidents, 
regardless of TO attribution.  Specifically, the hypotheses tested in this dissertation do 
not apply to TOs that are not defending a constituency.  Therefore, the inclusion of all 
TO attacks, regardless of group affiliation and constituency-orientation, can introduce 
measurement error.  With that acknowledgement in mind, this dissertation does 
incorporate all attacks, regardless of group affiliation.  There are several points that 
can be made to justify this decision.  The first point speaks to the inclusion of attacks 
that have no TO affiliation.  Specifically, about half of the attacks in Lebanon and 
about one third of the attacks in Turkey are not attributed to a TO. 50  The decision 
made by this author is, in the face of uncertainty, to practice inclusivity.  Terrorist 
attacks are rare events and, as such, the exclusion of attacks that cannot be attributed 
to a particular group dramatically narrows the number of attacks eligible for analysis.  
More importantly, of the incidents that do have group affiliation, the overwhelming 
majority of these are attributed to the TOs outlined in chapter four, their affiliates, or 
other TOs that operate in support of a constituency.  This suggests a high likelihood 
that attacks with unknown perpetrators also follow this trend.51 
The second point speaks to the inclusion of attacks perpetrated by TOs other 
than those listed in chapter four.  The decision to include these stems from the 
observation that most of the attacks captured in the GTD in these countries during the 
period of interest are attributed to TOs that are directly linked to constituency 
                                                 
50 Given that Algeria is included specifically because it violates the TO-constituency dynamic, this 
discussion will focus exclusively on Lebanon and Turkey. 
51 As a sensitivity test, in addition to models that includes all incidents, a second set of analyses are run 
in Lebanon and Turkey using a dataset that excludes all incidents perpetrated by undisclosed attackers.  
In Lebanon, attacks targeting civilians become too rare to analyze quantitatively.  Any notable results 




campaigns.52  In Lebanon, for example, approximately 500 attacks between 1987 and 
2011 are attributed to a TO.  Approximately 300 of those are attributed to Hezbollah 
while the bulk of the remainder are attributed to other TOs that defend the same or 
similar constituencies, such as the 16 January Organization for the Liberation of 
Tripoli and Amal.  The remaining attributions, for the most part, provide generic 
characteristics only, such as “Palestinians” and “extremists”.  Given the decision to 
practice inclusivity in the face of uncertainty, these incidents are included.  
Specifically, these generic attributions do not rule out the possibility that the TO was 
defending a constituency.   
In contrast, in Turkey there are small subsets of incidents that are attributed to 
non-generic TOs that are not historically oriented around a constituency.  However, 
these particular TOs have periodically allied with a constituency-driven TO, which 
casts doubt on the assumption that their activities are free from consideration for an 
oppressed minority (Cline, 2004; Leezenberg, 2003). Of the approximately 1600 
attacks that are attributed to a TO, more than three quarters are attributed to the PKK 
or Kurdish activists and the remaining one quarter are attributed to a variety of 
Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups, such as Dev Sol and a later iteration of Dev 
Sol known as Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Cephesi (DHKP/C).  While these latter groups 
are not normally wedded to a particular constituency, they have allied with the PKK 
and carried out attacks in partnership and support of the Kurdish campaign, 
particularly in the 1990s when they were most active (Cline, 2004; Leezenberg, 
                                                 
52 An additional set of analyses are conducted in Lebanon and Turkey that only include incidents 
perpetrated by a known TO that advocates for a constituency.  In Lebanon, attacks targeting civilians 




2003).  As such, it is defensible to keep these incidents in the analysis, given that they 
may have been prompted by a temporary allegiance to the Kurdish constituency. 
Primary Independent Variables 
The independent variables of interest, measures of NGO activity, are culled 
from a variety of sources, including precursor data for Government Actions in Terror 
Environments (GATE) database, targeted media searches, and NGO website searches.  
NGO activity is broken down into four separate components: 1) campaign content, 2) 
physical presence, 3) service provision presence, and 4) media activity (media 
coverage).  Recall that a distinction is being drawn between these four measures of 
activity and the impact they are predicted to have on TO activity.  These measures tap 
into unique constructs; NGO campaign content is a measure of NGO interest in the 
shared constituency and/or in the TO as an oppressor, physical presence is a measure 
of an NGO’s temporary or permanent proximity to a conflict area,53 and media 
activity is a measure of media coverage focused on the NGO and, as such, a measure 
of an NGO’s ability to dominate the public’s attention.  Finally, service provision 
presence is a measure tapping into the presence of a service provision organization.  
Populating these variables consists of searching for information on all four measures 
within each month in the media sources and websites summarized below. Regarding 
campaign content, particular attention is paid to the subject matter of the NGO 
campaign message and whether it focuses generally on improving the quality of life 
                                                 
53 All NGO physical activity is assumed to be temporary unless there is evidence of the establishment 
of functional long-term infrastructure, such as an office.  Fortunately, a search of a sample of media 
sources (see footnote 39 for a description) indicates that media sources are detailed about the nature of 
the physical activity (e.g., “delegates visited”, “the group established an office”, or “ICRC set up a 
clinic”.  In addition, country and activity reports available on NGO websites provide detailed accounts 
of the physical activities of the NGO in the country of interest; these reports serve a primary function 




for the constituent through advocacy work and/or criticizing the oppressor, or focuses 
specifically on criticizing the TO.54  Regarding physical presence in a given country, 
particular attention is paid to whether the presence of a campaigning NGO is 
temporary or permanent.  Along a similar vein, service provision is a measure of the 
active temporary or permanent presence of a service provision NGO in a conflict 
area.  Finally, media activity is the accumulation of all media stories that are 
prompted by the NGO in relation to the country of interest, regardless of content.  
These variables, their definitions, and their sources are summarized in Table 2. 
Reuters archives (precursor to the GATE data) 
The GATE database is a comprehensive collection of variables relating to 
state response to TOs and to their constituents or sub-state actors (Dugan and 
Chenoweth, 2013).  GATE currently provides public data on government actors and 
actions within Israel between 1987 and 2004.  The primary investigators and a team 
of research assistants are actively gathering data on a variety of additional countries, 
including Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey; the data for these countries spans from June, 
1987, through to the end of 2012.  The GATE data is collected from sources available 
through the Reuters archives. 
GATE researchers, as part of their data collection process, downloaded all 
lead sentences from the Reuters archives that included the key words Algeria*, 
                                                 
54 While campaign content and physical presence are often integrally intertwined, they are independent 
constructs.  An NGO may be present in an area but not be actively campaigning for a given 
constituency.  Along the same lines, an NGO may be actively campaigning but not maintain a physical 
presence in a region of interest.  HRW, for example, rarely makes country visits and only has a 
permanent presence in 18 countries; however, it has active campaigns advocating for citizen security 
and safety in more than 100 countries.  On the other hand, many western-based NGOs have offices 
and, thus, physical presence, in countries that are not often a target of the NGO campaigning activity 




Table 2.  Primary independent variables (monthly measures) and definitions 
Variables     Definition 
 
Primary independent variables for models addressing campaigning NGOs’ physical presence 
(Reuters, LexisNexis, NGO websites) 
Human rights NGO physical presence - 
temporary 
NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1)  
Human rights NGO physical presence – 
permanent  
NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
 
Primary independent variables for models addressing NGO campaign content (Reuters, LexisNexis, 
NGO websites) 
Human rights NGO campaign content - 
advocacy 
Pro-constituent campaign work in a given month (0,1) 
Human rights NGO campaign content – 
anti-TO criticism  
Anti-TO campaign work in a given month (0,1) 
 
Primary independent variables for models addressing NGO service provision (Reuters, LexisNexis, 
NGO websites) 
ICRC presence - temporary55 NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
ICRC presence – permanent56   NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
 
Primary independent variable for models addressing NGO media activity (Reuters, LexisNexis) 
All media activity NGO prominence in the media coverage about the 




Leban*, and Turk*.  A lead sentence is the opening sentence of a written document 
that serves to provide a summary of the remaining material while also grabbing the 
reader’s attention.  Lead sentences provide an efficient and reliable way of accessing 
the content of a given article (Dabaj and Gumus, 2012).  In this case, the set of lead 
sentences were extracted to a text file and then passed on to this author.   
The text file is searched for key words relating to NGOs including: human 
rights, humanitarian, civil rights, social justice, activis*, NGO (case sensitive), 
                                                 
55 It is important to note that an NGO may have a temporary and a permanent presence in any given 
month.  Using ICRC as an example, the NGO may maintain an active office in one area of a country, 
yet engage in visits to other conflict-ridden areas of the country.  Both are hypothesized to elicit a 
response from a TO. 
56 In Algeria, this variable is a count variable of the number of offices/clinics open in a given month.  It 
is a dichotomous variable for Lebanon and Turkey.  There is not enough information available to 




governmental, Amnesty International, Red Cross, Red Crescent, ICRC, Middle East 
Watch, protest, and watchdog.57  Relevant articles are then coded in two waves.  The 
first wave consists of looking for sentences that cite NGOs directly and relate to their 
campaign activities; this is for the purposes of coding the NGO campaign content 
variable.  The second wave consists of identifying articles that refer to the movement 
of NGOs, delegates’ visits, and office openings and closures; this is for the purposes 
of coding NGO physical presence in the country of interest.  Examples of distinct sets 
of sentences are as follows:  
Amnesty International accused Algerian government security forces on 
Thursday of widespread torture and urged the authorities to shed light on the 
fate of hundreds of reported missing people.  (NGO campaign content 
advocating for the citizenry) 
 
Human rights group Amnesty International condemned Moslem rebels in 
Algeria on Tuesday, accusing them of continued human rights abuses on a 
wide scale.  (NGO campaign content critical of the TO) 
 
Three members of Amnesty International arrived in Algiers on Tuesday on the 
first visit by a foreign human rights group to violence-torn Algeria in five 
years. (NGO temporary physical presence) 
 
Finally, all measures of campaign content are used to create an overarching 
measure of media reports directly referencing the work of NGOs in the conflict area; 
                                                 
57 Search terms were selected from a multi-stage process.  The author downloaded all articles that 
included one of the three NGO names and one of the three terms Algeria*, Leban*, and Turk* from 
LexisNexis.  The search was restricted to a sample of articles published between January 1, 2014, and 
March 31, 2014.  The articles were skimmed and duplicates and irrelevant articles were discarded.  
Relevance was determined by whether the article was discussing NGO activity in the country of 
interest.  This resulted in a collection of 22 articles that provided information on either campaign 
activities or physical presence in the body of the article. The body of the article was then compared to 
the lead sentence and the final list of key terms was created from the lead sentence.  Key terms were 
restricted to common nouns referring to NGOs.  The list included any terms that were used in the lead 
sentences of three or more relevant articles.  Three articles appeared to be a reasonable benchmark of 
inclusion; anything less than that would have produced extremely broad search terms, such as meeting 
and group.  It should be noted that common verbs were also collected; these are referenced in 
Appendix 2 and are used for coding the campaign content variable.  Application of these ‘action terms’ 




this is for the purposes of coding NGO media activity in the country of interest.  
Media activity is a variable constructed from the physical presence and campaign 
content variables.  It is a sum of the dummy values of the following measures: 
campaign content (general support of the constituents and specific criticisms of the 
TO) for HRW, AI, and local NGOs, as well as temporary physical presence of HRW, 
AI and ICRC in a given month.  The values on the scale can range from a low of 0 
(all of the other variables are coded as 0) to a high of 9 (all dummy variables are 
coded as 1).  It is important to note, however, that some of the data points captured in 
the campaign content variables do not come from media sources but originate, 
instead, from NGO websites.  These data points are excluded from the media activity 
variable, since information available through an NGO website is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis.   
Articles that cite NGOs or make reference to their active campaign content are 
coded for several variables including: a) whether the cited NGO is one of the two 
campaigning groups of interest (HRW or AI) or an unnamed or local human rights 
NGO b) whether the content of the NGO citation is in reference to advocacy work 
and general support for the constituency (which can include criticizing the oppressor 
on behalf of the constituents) or c) is in reference to harmful TO activities.58  Articles 
                                                 
58 The decision to code a lead sentence as 1 for the campaign content variable is determined by the 
presence of several key action terms.  An action term is the verb used in a sentence where the NGO is 
the primary subject (e.g., HRW demanded…).   As described in a previous footnote, this author created 
a sample of three months of full articles from LexisNexis that were searched for content and relevance.  
A list of all key action terms included in the articles was created and separated into two groups: neutral 
and advocacy/criticism.  Reuters lead sentences are reviewed and campaign content coded 1 if the 
sentence contains one or more of the advocacy/criticism action terms.  The recipient of the action term 
determines whether campaign content is in general support of the constituency or specifically critical 
of the TO.  If a Reuters lead sentence contains only a neutral action term, the full body of the article is 
located and a search conducted for an advocacy action term.  If no term is found in the complete 




that reference NGO physical presence in the country of interest are coded if they are 
one of the two campaigning NGOs (AI or HRW) or the service provision NGO 
(ICRC) of interest to this dissertation and coding captures whether the presence is 
temporary (a fact-finding mission or a delegates’ visit) or permanent (establishing an 
office or clinic).   
While the Reuters lead sentences provide a good first step towards 
establishing NGO campaign content, media activity and physical presence in the 
countries of interest, they are limited.  There are two significant shortcomings to the 
Reuters data: it potentially overlooks the content of local papers which, arguably, may 
have as large an impact on local TO activity, and they are restricted to lead sentences 
only, potentially masking substantive material in the body of an article that is 
excluded from the lead sentence.  Measures are taken to overcome both of these 
shortcomings. 
Other data sources 
Reuters is a reputable source that is recognized as one of the largest 
newswires in the world; however, it tends to focus on the stories that have a national 
or international audience in order to appeal to its client base (Dewland, 2010).  As 
such, it is possible that a search of more localized media sources would produce 
additional references to NGO activity in the media.  In order to address this 
possibility, additional search strings are run on LexisNexis59.  LexisNexis provides 
access to both large and small media sources, including numerous localized sources 
                                                 
59 Factiva is the media search engine that provides access to Reuters.  LexisNexis is selected in place of 





that are region-specific.60  In order to limit the sheer number of potential sources, the 
search is restricted to newspaper sources between 1987 and 2011; this eliminates 
court documents, company profiles, and law reviews.  The search strings that are used 
are similar to those cited above, including reference to a country and the series of 
descriptors listed previously.   
While a general LexisNexis search serves to supplement the Reuters data 
regarding NGO activity, a more targeted LexisNexis search can also help overcome 
some of the shortcomings of the Reuters data.  Specifically, it is possible that the 
Reuters lead sentences mask potentially substantive material captured in the body but 
not captured in the first line of the article.  Therefore, Reuters’ articles with 
suggestive lead sentences that do not contain enough information to warrant coding 
are isolated and located.  An example can be found in the following lead sentence:  
Algeria has approved the opening of a branch of the London-based human 
rights organization Amnesty International which said its priority there was to work 
for the abolition of capital punishment.   
The sentence suggests that AI will be establishing a permanent presence in 
Algeria, but does not provide enough information to determine the timeline.  This 
article and others like it are located, the content of the complete article are scanned, 
and, if the material is found to be relevant, the data are coded accordingly.  However, 
as the sentence cited above illustrates, some articles require even further follow-up; in 
this AI/Algeria example, the author succeeded in tracking down the complete article.  
The body of the article suggested a potential timeline but confirmation of the time 
                                                 





that an office was established is still necessary.  This final confirmation can be 
accomplished through NGO website searches. 
As a last measure, the websites of the three NGOs are scoured thoroughly for 
information pertaining to press releases (for all three NGOs) and country reports (for 
HRW and AI).61  These are reviewed for content and, if appropriate, coded for 
inclusion.  While these releases and reports often describe NGO physical activity, 
including delegate visits to conflict areas and the establishment of temporary and 
permanent offices, additional content searches of the websites are conducted in order 
to identify NGO physical movements not captured in the releases and reports.  These 
searches indicate that the information found on the websites is less reliable or 
unavailable in the earlier years.  While all three NGOs appear to have publically-
accessible rich archive data that provides physical activity data points (country visits 
and the establishment of offices) dating back to 1987 and beyond, country reports and 
press releases appear to only be available from the early 1990s to present time for 
HRW and mid-1990s to present time for AI.  Given that these are only a supplement 
to the Reuters and local media data, this is less of a concern than if they were the only 
source of measures of NGO activity.  
Control Variables 
In addition to the dependent and independent variables summarized above, a 
variety of control variables are included in the analyses in order to minimize the 
possibility of omitted variable bias.  Exclusion of key variables that are related to 
both NGO and TO activity could produce biased results.  The control variables 
                                                 




chosen for the model are selected because previous research has demonstrated that 
they influence terrorist activity and could be linked to NGO activity.  These variables 
include social and economic indicators (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 
2008), governance measures (Campos and Gassebner, 2013; Krueger and Laitin, 
2008), demographics (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008), the number of 
active TOs in a conflict area (Nemeth, 2013), and natural disasters (Berrebi and 
Ostwald, 2013; Fisher, 2014).   
The majority of the control variables are provided by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database.  Unfortunately, the WDI only provides 
annual data on key indicators for Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.  Therefore, it should 
be noted that the model controls for yearly fluctuations in specific variables, rather 
than monthly fluctuations.  These will likely lead to smaller standard errors than if 
monthly data were included, indicating the possibility of Type I error.  However, 
there are no reliable monthly counts that cover the years included in the analyses, 
leaving annual data as the best option available for the models.62 
The first set of control variables sourced from the WDI describes country 
demographics.  This includes a continuous measure of urban population, or the 
percentage of the total population that is concentrated in an urban center, as well as a 
continuous measure of population density, which assesses the average concentration 
of citizens per square kilometer of habitable land.  An additional continuous variable 
measuring population growth is incorporated into the models; this measure reports 
the change in population in relation to the previous year.  These measures are 
included for several reasons.  Firstly, an increase in and concentration of the 
                                                 




population indicates the potential for an increase in offenders and targets, as well as a 
greater likelihood that the two will overlap (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  This can 
impact the frequency of terrorist attacks.  Secondly, population growth can lead to 
environmental degradation and resource depletion (Preston, 1996).  In addition, 
research has demonstrated that overcrowding can increase aggression; it can lead to 
competition for limited resources on an individual and aggregate level (Ramirez, 
2003).  Therefore, population measures may indicate a worsening situation for an 
oppressed constituency as communities vie for land use and political favors, capturing 
the attention and influencing the activities of both TOs and NGOs. 
The next set of WDI indicators includes economic variables.  Economic 
fluctuations can indicate instability in the market and limited employment 
possibilities, as well as a devaluation of investments and assets.  While circumstances 
such as these can impact a population at large, communities that are already 
experiencing displacement and economic insecurity will lack the resources that can 
serve as insulation against financial fluctuations.  Therefore, economic losses can 
indicate that an oppressed constituency, often members of the impoverished class, is 
experiencing further deprivation.  Advocacy organizations, including both TOs and 
NGOs, may increase their activities in defense of a disadvantaged group in such 
circumstances.  In support of these speculations, research has demonstrated a 
relationship between shifts in economic security/stability and terrorism (Gassebner 
and Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008).  In addition, providing relief and alleviating 
economic hardship holds a place of prominence in many NGO campaigns (Welch, 




included for GDP.  This is a continuous variable of the gross domestic product per 
capita of a given country in current (2012) U.S. dollars.63  In addition, unemployment, 
an indicator of the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed, is included; 
however, data is only available for Turkey and, therefore, the variable is excluded 
from the Algeria and Lebanon models. 
Population health is an additional area of concern.  Within a country, changes 
in public health over time can indicate shifts in industrialization, access to medical 
and nutritional services, and the introduction or cessation of an epidemic.  
Disadvantaged groups often experience the brunt end of industrial shifts, limited 
access to health care and poor conditions that facilitate that spread of disease and 
illnesses.  Research has demonstrated that health measures can influence the 
likelihood of terrorist attacks (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011), while it can also 
attract the attention of humanitarian organizations that provide medical services and 
other forms of service provision.  Therefore, several proxies are sourced from the 
WDI that measure birth and life expectancies.  A continuous measure of infant 
mortality rate, as measured per 1,000 lives, is included in the models, as is life 
expectancy at birth, or the average life span in number of years.  
A final set of WDI control variables relating to military presence and 
expenditures are included in the analysis.  A continuous measure assessing the 
percentage of the gross domestic product dedicated to military expenditures is 
                                                 
63 GDP values for 1987 are not available for Turkey and Lebanon.  Given that the analysis began in 
July of 1987, this equates to six missing data points for each country.  Although it would be ideal to 
replace these missing values with the average between 1986 and 1988, 1986 values are also not 




included, as is a measure of the percentage of military personnel in the labor force.64  
Within the context of this dissertation, these are particularly salient variables, given 
that the military is often seen as the oppressor of a given constituency.  Increases in 
the percentage of military personnel and in expenditures dedicated to the military can 
indicate a growth in the presence of the perceived oppressor or can aggravate 
outstanding grievances concerning the resources that a given nation will grant to its 
military branch, often at the expense of services offered to the general public.  In 
support of this supposition, research has demonstrated a positive relationship between 
proxies for military activity and subsequent terrorism (Gassebner and Luechinger, 
2011).  In addition, many NGOs have active campaigns that focus on increasing the 
resources committed to social services through reductions in military expenditures, on 
behalf of disadvantaged communities (Today’s Zaman, 2010).  Therefore, an increase 
in military personnel and costs can motivate NGOs and TOs to take action. 
A proxy for governance characteristics is also included in the models for all 
three countries.  This measure is provided by the Political Instability Task Force 
(PITF) Polity data.  The Polity data allows for a measure of democratic orientation, 
or the determination whether a country is more autocratic versus more democratic 
(Marshall et al., 2009).65  The Polity scores range from -10, indicating a fully 
autocratic country, to +10, indicating a fully democratic country.  The rationale for 
inclusion of this variable is simple; autocratic leadership can have a destabilizing 
                                                 
64 The military personnel variable is missing values between 1987 and 1990 for Lebanon and Turkey.  
Given that the analyses for both countries begin in mid-1987, this results in two and a half years of 
missing data.  In order to address this, the average value for the next three years (1990-1992) is 
calculated and inserted as a replacement for the missing values.  
65 The democratic orientation variable is dropped from all Lebanon models due to missing values 
(more than fifty percent of the values are coded as missing).  It is not missing any data for Turkey or 




effect on social structure (Vugt et al., 2004).  As such, the citizenry can experience 
social unrest, loss of rights, services, and freedoms, and a diminished or unpredictable 
quality of life.  Such instability can incite civilian revolt, as well as international 
attention and patronage directed towards the impacted citizenry. In support of this, 
studies have shown that regime characteristics can impact terrorist activities, 
increasing TO attacks and fatality counts (Campos and Gassebner, 2013; Krueger and 
Laitin, 2008).  In addition, responding to adverse regime orientation or political 
instability is central to the work of both human rights and humanitarian organizations 
(Torres and Anderson, 2004). 
Natural disasters may also impact both TO and NGO activities.  Natural 
disasters can devastate a population, leading to a variety of social and economic ills, 
health problems, and damages.  Researchers note that the brunt of natural disasters 
tends to fall on nations that are already economically or politically unstable and that 
the aftermath of a disaster can further aggravate this instability (Cavallo and Noy, 
2010).  For the reasons mentioned previously, including access to health care, a lack 
of financial buffer, and a failure on behalf of the state to serve the interests of all the 
citizens equally, disadvantaged communities may bear the burden of a catastrophe.  A 
failure on behalf of the state to respond to the needs of an oppressed community can 
incite a response from TOs (Fisher, 2014), while the devastation of a community in 
the aftermath of a disaster can capture the attention of an NGO.  In support of these 
postulations, Berrebi and Ostwald (2013) assessed the relationship between natural 
disasters and terrorism in 170 countries over a 38-year period.  They determined that 




differed for domestic and transnational terrorism. They concluded that natural 
disasters can leave a governing body vulnerable and open to transnational terrorism, 
while poor government response following a disaster can incite a population to 
respond violently, creating an opportunity for domestic terrorism to flourish. 
Regarding NGOs, there are numerous service provision groups that operate solely in 
response to disasters, offering aid and relief to the impacted citizenry (the ICRC, for 
example, is well-known for disaster relief work).  In order to control for the potential 
influence of disasters on both NGO and TO activity, monthly data is sourced from the 
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), sponsored by the Center for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).  A dichotomous variable is created for whether 
there is a natural disaster in any given month.  Natural disasters could include 
geophysical, meteorological, hydrological, climatological, and biological events; the 
more common events appear to be earthquakes, floods, and storms.  If a natural 
disaster spanned more than one month (as in the case of an epidemic or a drought), all 
relevant months are coded as witnessing a natural disaster. 
The models also include a measure of the number of active TOs in a given 
year; this is included as a control for inter-group competition.  Specifically, studies 
have shown that an increase in the number of TOs can facilitate inter-group 
competition that is related to increased violence (Nemeth, 2013).  In addition, an 
increase in TOs can draw the attention and focus of NGOs as more TOs may be an 
expression of increased social unrest on the behalf of an oppressed community or 




order to address this potential dynamic, the number of active TOs variable is included, 
which consists of a count of the number of unique TOs listed each year in the GTD. 
Additional control variables included in the analysis are a set of GTD 
collection generation variables. This ensures that changes in the collection period and 
method have a minimal impact on the resulting analysis.  Specifically, two dummy 
variables are created for GTDI and GTDIII, with GTD II as a reference category.  
These variables are coded as 1 if the period of interest coincides with a particular 
collection period.   
Two sets of additional dichotomous variables are included in country-specific 
models in order to control for the TO-specific characteristics unique to that country.  
These include a set of dummy variables addressing the shifts in TO-attitudes towards 
civilians in Algeria and a dummy variable that serves to control for the period of TO-
state negotiation that occurred following Öcalan’s arrest in 1999 in Turkey.  In order 
to justify the inclusion of these variables, a brief summary of both country- and TO-
specific dynamics is necessary. 
As summarized in chapter four, Algerian TOs have, at times, rallied for the 
civilian population and, at times, against it.  Between 1990 and 1994, the TOs neither 
sought to protect nor to punish the general population.  However, in 1994, the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA), the primary TO in Algeria at the time, declared war on the 
civilian population in response to the perceived failure of the citizenry to engage in 
national jihad.  Other groups objected to this position, leading to several years of 
inter-group conflict, which began to dissipate in 1997 with the declaration of a 




former GIA] made a commitment to protect the citizenry in its fight against the 
military junta and, eventually, its campaign for global jihad.  These periods can be 
loosely separated into three time-dependent samples: January of 1991 through to June 
of 1994 (no civilian orientation), July of 1994 through to August of 1998 (an anti-
civilian orientation), and September of 1998 through to present time (a pro-civilian 
orientation).66  Therefore, in order to control for the influence of civilian orientation, 
two dummy variables are included in the Algeria models, including an anti-civilian 
orientation and a pro-civilian orientation variable (no civilian orientation is the 
reference category). 
In regards to Turkey, 1999 through to 2002 was a period of exceptional 
circumstances for terrorist campaigns.  Specifically, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was captured in February of 1999, imprisoned, 
and sentenced to death.  His sentence was eventually commuted to life imprisonment 
in August of 2002.  During this period, Öcalan used his organization’s activities as a 
method of negotiation and, at different points, called on the PKK to increase and 
decrease its attacks in order to support his own legal and political mediation process.  
In order to adjust for this, a variable controlling for the period of negotiation 
beginning in the summer of 1990 and ending in the beginning of 2002 is included in 
the Turkey models.  A summary of these and other control variables are included in 
                                                 
66 January, 1991, is selected simply because it is the first month of analysis included in any Algerian 
model and it should be noted that TO ambivalence towards the citizenry predates the beginning of 
1991.  In July, 1994, the GIA released its first set of demands directed towards the citizenry with the 
threat of violence if the citizenry failed to comply.  In September of 1998, the founder of the newly-
formed GPSC released his first of a set of statements regarding protecting and defending the citizenry 




Table 3 and an exhaustive summary of the variables included in each model is 
available in Appendix A. 
Table 3.  Control variables and definitions 
Variables     Definition 
 
Control variables  
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (annual, 
continuous) 
Unemployment (Turkey only) Percent of the labor force without employment 
(annual, percentage) 
Urban population Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, 
percentage) 
Population density Average number of citizens per square kilometer of 
land (annual, continuous) 
Population growth Percent change in the population size from previous 
year (annual, percentage) 
Infant mortality rate Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous) 
Life expectancy at birth Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous) 
Military expenditures Percent of the gross domestic product spent on 
military expenditures (annual, percentage) 
Military personnel Percent of military personnel in the labor force 
(annual, percentage) 
Democratic orientation (Algeria and 
Turkey only) 
Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation 
(annual, scale) 
Natural disaster Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1) 
Number of active TOs Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, 
count) 
GTD generation (I and III) GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1) 
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro 
and anti) 
Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 
0,1) 




The primary question of interest to this dissertation is whether the activities of 
NGOs at time one (t) will have a relationship to the activities of TOs at time two 
(t+s).67  In order to address this research question, the models included in this 
dissertation incorporate a series of count variables measuring terrorist activity over 
successive (monthly) time points, or time series data.  The use of count variables and 
                                                 
67 In these models, s represents the number of lags.  While most models include a one month lag, there 




time series data narrows the choice of analytical methods considerably.  The models 
presented in this dissertation employ autoregressive Poisson regression (ARP) as the 
primary analytical method.  This selection is informed by two key considerations, 
primarily overdispersion and autocorrelation.  In regards to the former, terrorism is a 
rare event and, thus, is modeled best with a Poisson distribution.  However, the 
Poisson distribution is a single parameter model and is subject to overdispersion 
(Heinen, 2003).  As for autocorrelation, time series data are not collected randomly 
and, as such, suffer from dependency in the error terms.   ARP, fortunately, corrects 
for both overdispersion and autocorrelation.  
It is worth noting that, while the use of time series data indicates that there 
will be dependency in the error terms, there are also theoretical justifications to 
expect autocorrelation and, thus, to require an analytical model that corrects for it.   
Specifically, both rational choice theory and game theory place an emphasis on the 
importance of past actions shaping present activities, specifically the previous 
successes and failures of both terrorist and competitor actions and strategies (Enders 
and Sandler, 1995; Nemeth, 2013).  As such, we would expect that error terms at t 
would influence t+s. 
Given the reasons cited above, the omission of yt as a predictor in the models 
can lead to biased standard errors.  Therefore, the ARP method is appropriate to test 
the research questions and resulting hypotheses presented in chapter three.  While 
ARP is suitable, a secondary option is the negative binomial (NB) regression with 
lagged dependent variables.  This method is also used in this dissertation in order to 




The ARP regression is written as follows: 
Log(E(yt+s))＝β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀     (2) 
where y  is the monthly count of terrorist attacks, t indicates the 
measurement is for the current month, and t+s indicates the measurement is 
for s months following the current month (s may be one or two months later, 
depending on the model).  The logistic distribution function at time point t is 
captured by αt, where αt= log(β1 NGO activityt + β2 controlst), while αt ◦ y 
presents the autoregressive term.  The 𝜀 is the error term, which is assumed to 
be a Poisson distribution with mean λ > 0. 
Recall that there are eight hypotheses in total.  The first set of 
hypotheses references an NGO’s physical presence in an area of interest, 
which may be temporary or permanent. 
1a) Log(TerrorismNGOt+s)=   β0 +  αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log(β1 NGOphysicalpresencet + β2 controlst) 
H1a: β1 > 0 
1b) Log(TerrorismCivilianst+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log(β1 NGOphysicalpresencet + β2 controlst) 
H1b: β1 < 0 
1c) Log(TerrorismOppressort+s)=   β0 +  αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log( β1 NGOphysicalpresencet + β2 controlst) 




The second set of hypotheses refers to TO responses to NGO 
campaign content.  Campaign content may be operationalized as advocacy 
work or anti-terrorism work.  These models read as follows: 
2a) Log(TerrorismNGOt+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log(β1 NGOcampaigncontentt + β2 controlst) 
H2a: β1 > 0 
2b) Log(TerrorismCivilianst+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log(β1 NGOcampaigncontentt + β2 controlst) 
H2b: β1 < 0 
2c) Log(TerrorismOppressort+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log( β1 NGOcampaigncontentt + β2 controlst) 
H2c: β1 > 0  
Two additional hypotheses are a) increasing NGO service provision will lead 
to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks targeting the NGO and b) an increase in 
NGO media activity will lead to an increase in the frequency of TO attacks.  These 
models are as follows: 
3) Log(TerrorismNGOt+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log( β1 NGOservicest + β2 controlst) 
H3: β1 > 0 
4) Log(Terrorismt+s)=    β0 + αt ◦ yt +𝜀 
where: αt= log( β1 NGOmediapresencet + β2 controlst) 




An additional analytical consideration is the lag in time between the 
primary independent variables and the outcome variables.  The appropriate lag 
time is assessed using a variety of measures and the most conservative lag is 
applied.68  For many of the models, this lag time is limited to one month, although 
several models require a lag time of two months.  This decision is supported by 
the literature on terrorism that indicates terrorist attacks require, at a minimum, 
two to six weeks of planning before successful execution (Brym and Araj, 2006; 
McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008).  As such, NGO activity that takes place in a 
given month is more likely to incite a TO response in the following month or two.   
In summary, the data used for this dissertation come from a variety of 
sources, including the GTD, EM-DAT, GATE precursor data, and the WDI.  
These sources are supplemented with searches of media sites and NGO sites.  The 
data are analyzed using an autoregressive technique that assumes a Poisson 
distribution, corrects for autocorrelation, and allows for an overdispersed 
variance.  The following chapter will present the results from the analyses. 
 
                                                 
68 Potential lag times are assessed through use of the Durbin-Watson test in STATA, as well as the 
insertion of multiple lags or autoregressive terms in the models in order to see where significance is 




CHAPTER 6: Results 
 
This chapter presents the results for the models outlined in chapter three and 
summarized in Appendix A.  The section begins with a description of the summary 
statistics for TO and NGO activities in each of the three countries of interest.  This is 
followed by a review of the model results as they pertain to each of the hypotheses 
presented in chapter three.   
Summary Statistics for Algeria  
Terrorist activity in Algeria is measured with four different variables: overall 
terrorist attacks69, attacks targeting civilians, the state, and NGOs.  The distribution 
for each of these variables is summarized in Table 4 and the descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 5.   
All four measures of terrorist activity are count variables.  In regards to 
overall terrorist attacks, this measure has a minimum of zero incidents per month for 
eight out of 240 months or approximately three percent of the observed months.  
Overall attacks have a maximum of 63 attacks for one month out of 240 months or for 
approximately 0.4 percent of the observations.  The average number of overall attacks 
is approximately 11 attacks in a given month, with a standard deviation of 8.37, 
demonstrating a good deal of variation.  Overall attacks are skewed to the right.  
Nearly 50 percent of the monthly observations record 14 or fewer attacks while 90 
percent of the observations report fewer than 21 incidents. 
                                                 
69 As noted in previous chapters, overall attacks include attacks targeting state, civilians, and NGOs, 





Table 4.  Distribution of terrorist activity in Algeria70 













         
0 8 3.33 43 17.92 32 13.33 237 98.75 
1 7 2.92 43 17.92 23 9.58 3 1.25 
2 9 3.75 36 15.00 35 14.58 0 0.00 
3 15 6.25 35 14.58 24 10.00 0 0.00 
4 12 5.00 14 5.83 24 10.00 0 0.00 
5 12 5.00 12 5.00 20 8.33 0 0.00 
6 16 6.67 14 5.83 24 10.00 0 0.00 
7 14 5.83 6 2.50 9 3.75 0 0.00 
8 12 5.00 7 2.92 12 5.00 0 0.00 
9 14 5.83 3 1.25 5 2.08 0 0.00 
10 15 6.25 8 3.33 8 3.33 0 0.00 
11 19 7.92 3 1.25 6 2.50 0 0.00 
12 6 2.50 3 1.25 3 1.25 0 0.00 
13 12 5.00 2 0.83 2 0.83 0 0.00 
14 10 4.17 0 0.00 1 0.42 0 0.00 
15 5 2.08 1 0.42 1 0.42 0 0.00 
16 7 2.92 0 0.00 3 1.25 0 0.00 
17 8 3.33 2 0.83 4 1.67 0 0.00 
18 6 2.50 1 0.42 1 0.42 0 0.00 
19 7 2.92 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 
20 1 0.42 1 0.42 2 0.83 0 0.00 
21 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
22 4 1.67 1 0.42 1 0.42 0 0.00 
23 4 1.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
24 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
25 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
26 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
27 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
28 2 0.83 1 0.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 
29 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
30 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
31 1 0.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
32 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
33 2 0.83 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
34 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
35 1 0.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 
 
                                                 
70 The distribution results reported in Table 4 are truncated at 36 incidents; however, there are 
additional single observations of overall attacks at 38, 48, and 63 incidents.  Attacks targeting civilians 





Table 5.  Summary statistics of all variables included in Algeria models 
Algeria variables Measurement Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
 
Dependent variables      
Terrorist attacks Count 10.933 8.37 0 63 
Attacks targeting civilians Count 4.100 5.77 0 51 
Attacks targeting the state Count 4.758 4.36 0 22 
Attacks targeting NGOs Count 0.012 0.11 0 1 
 
Independent variables 
     
All NGO media activity Count 0.866 1.10 0 5 
Human rights NGO media 
activity advocating for the 
constituents  
Count 0.566 0.84 0 3 
Human rights NGO media 
activity criticizing TOs  Count 0.112 0.36 0 2 
Human rights NGO 
temporary presence in a 
conflict area  
Count 0.079 0.27 0 1 
Human rights NGO 
permanent presence in a 
conflict area  
Count 0.000 0.00 0 0 
Humanitarian NGO 
temporary presence in a 
conflict area  
1/0 0.108 0.31 0 1 
Humanitarian NGO 
permanent presence in a 
conflict area  
Count 0.637 0.77 0 2 
 
Control variables      
GDP per capita Continuous 
(divided by 
10,000) 
0.254 0.12 0.142 0.527 
Urban population Continuous 62.801 6.18 52.867 72.865 
Population density Continuous 13.607 1.27 11.291 15.855 
Natural disaster 1/0 0.170 0.37 0 1 
Democratic orientation Scale -1.350 2.99 -7 2 
Population growth Continuous 
(percentage) 1.708 0.32 1.306 2.461 
Infant mortality Continuous 28.195 7.52 17.8 40.9 
Life expectancy Continuous 69.101 1.12 67.003 70.751 
Military expenditures Continuous 
(percentage) 3.230 0.67 1.231 4.345 
Military personnel Continuous 
(percentage) 2.80 0.54 1.69 3.41 
GTD generation 1 1/0 0.300 0.45 0 1 
GTD generation 3 1/0 0.150 0.35 0 1 
Number of active TOs Count 2.091 0.89 1 4 
Anti-civilian orientation 1/0 0.667 0.47 0 1 
Pro-civilian orientation 1/0 0.208 0.40 0 1 






Attacks targeting civilians have a minimum of zero incidents for 43 months or 
approximately 18 percent of the time and a maximum of 51 attacks for one month or 
approximately 0.4 percent of the time.  The average number of attacks targeting 
civilians is four incidents in a given month and the standard deviation is 5.77.  This 
demonstrates adequate variation in the variable.  Attacks targeting civilians are highly 
skewed to the right with nearly 90 percent of monthly observations reporting nine or 
fewer incidents. 
The state attacks variable has a minimum of zero incidents for 32 months or 
approximately 13 percent of the time and a maximum of 22 attacks for one month or 
approximately 0.4 percent of the time.  The average number of attacks targeting the 
state is five incidents in a given month and the standard deviation is 4.36, 
demonstrating variation in the dependent variable.  Attacks targeting the state are also 
highly skewed to the right; 90 percent of the monthly observations reported 10 or 
fewer incidents. 
Attacks targeting NGOs are extremely rare.  Out of 240 observed months, 
nearly 99 percent or 237 months record no incidents.  There is only one attack per 
month for the remaining three months.  The average number of incidents per month, 
therefore, is extremely small (.01 attacks) as is the standard deviation (0.1).  As will 
be discussed in the latter half of this chapter, this limited variation makes quantitative 
analysis with this dependent variable problematic. 
Similar to TO activity, NGO activity is operationalized as a series of unique 
variables designed to address the research question and subsequent hypotheses.  The 




physical presence of a human rights or campaigning NGO, such as AI or HRW, is 
predicted to have on terrorist incidents in a conflict area.  An additional hypothesis 
relates to the impact that the physical presence of a service provision NGO, such as 
ICRC, will have on TO attacks (hypothesis three).71  Physical presence is separated 
into two measures: temporary presence (a delegation visits an area) and permanent 
presence (an organization establishes an office or clinic).   For service provision 
NGOs (ICRC), temporary and permanent presence measures are operationalized as 
dichotomous variables indicating whether ICRC has a physical presence (1) or 
physical absence (0) in a conflict area during the observed month.72 For human rights 
organizations, the presence measure is a scaled variable with a minimum value of 0 
and maximum value of two.  This variable includes the physical activities of both AI 
and HRW and, thus, is given a value of two when both NGOs are in the area in the 
same month. 
In regards to a temporary presence, human rights organizations are 
temporarily on site for 19 out of 240 months or for eight percent of the time.  At no 
point do HRW or AI have a temporary presence in the same month.  ICRC has a 
temporary presence for 26 months or 11 percent of the observed months.  Results 
                                                 
71 This hypothesis relates to the temporary and permanent presence of a service provision organization 
and subsequent attacks targeting NGOs.  While the latter is too rare to justify quantitative analysis, a 
qualitative comparison can be made.  However, there is also value in assessing the quantitative 
relationship between the activities that service provision organizations engage in and attacks targeting 
civilians and the state.  These assessments do not relate directly to a given hypothesis but can serve to 
determine if service provision organizations have a different impact on TO activities than do 
campaigning organizations. 
72 It is important to note that NGOs can maintain both a permanent and a temporary presence in a 
country in any given month; this statement is premised on the assumption that maintaining a 
permanent presence (i.e.: the existence of an office space or clinic) is substantively different from 
visiting a conflict area (i.e.: visiting a prisoner or refugee camp).  While the former indicates a base of 
operations that allows the NGO to maintain a permanent existence, the latter is a measure of 
organizational contact with oppressed communities and the general citizenry.  Therefore, NGOs may 
maintain a permanent presence for decades yet still elicit diverse responses from a TO due to their 




regarding temporary presence in Algeria should be interpreted with caution given that 
temporary visits are relatively rare. 
Algeria is unique in relation to the permanent presence variable in the sense 
that the state was reluctant to allow NGOs to establish a permanent office within the 
country during the period of interest.  Neither AI nor HRW maintain a permanent 
presence during the observation period, although it is unknown if this was due to a 
lack of organizational interest or state resistance.   ICRC, however, was permitted to 
establish both offices and clinics over the period of study and the dates of these 
institutional achievements are well documented.  Therefore, ICRC’s permanent 
presence in Algeria is operationalized as the number of active offices and clinics in 
operation in a given month.  Results indicate that this count ranges from a minimum 
of zero for 131 months or approximately 55 percent of the observed months to a 
maximum of two permanent sites for 44 months or approximately 18 percent of the 
observations.  The average number of permanent sites in operation in any given 
month is 0.67 with a standard deviation of 0.77.   
A second set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c) relates to the content 
of an NGO’s campaign: whether the organization is advocating for the constituency 
and/or directly criticizing the TO in a given month.  It is important to note that NGOs 
may engage in both forms of campaign work in a given month and, as such, these two 
different campaign foci have been separated into two variables in order to assess the 
impact of specific and unique content.  These two variables incorporate the campaign 




organizations.73  A value of zero indicates that there is no human rights campaign 
activity focused on the constituents or the TO in a given month, while a value of three 
indicates that HRW, AI, and local NGOs were all campaigning in a given month.74  
ICRC is not a campaigning organization and, therefore, data was only collected on 
AI, HRW, and local NGOs.   
Results indicate that human rights NGOs do not engage in advocacy work for 
149 out 240 months or 62 percent of the time.  At least one NGO is advocating 24 
percent of the time, two are advocating approximately nine percent of the time, and 
all three groups are advocating approximately four percent of the time.  As for anti-
TO campaign content, human rights NGOs do not engage in this campaign activity 
for 217 months or approximately 90 percent of the time.  At least one NGO engages 
in it eight percent of the time, while two NGOs employ this kind of content 
approximately two percent of the time.  It does not appear that all three NGO groups 
engage in anti-TO work in the same month. 
The last hypothesis (hypothesis four) addresses the relationship between 
measures of all media activity and the frequency of all terrorist attacks.  The media 
variable is a cumulative value for media activity of local NGOs, HRW, AI, and 
                                                 
73 This latter group (local and unnamed NGOs) captures media reports that reference human rights 
NGO activity that is attributed to an NGO other than AI or HRW.  Approximately 92 percent of the 
data points refer specifically to local NGOs while the remainder refers to NGOs that are referenced 
without being named (these are cross-checked with AI and HRW activities and all observations that 
bear a resemblance to AI or HRW and, thus, may be referring to either NGO, are eliminated from the 
dataset in order to avoid double-counting of the same incident of NGO activity).  Given the prevalence 
of local NGOs in this group, the grouping is referred to as local NGOs, although there is a small 
unnamed component. 
74 Separate analyses are also conducted on each of the human rights NGO groups to tease apart the 
nuances of these relationships.  Interesting results are commented on and included in the Appendix.  
However, the main analysis uses a campaign content variable that includes all three groups.  This is 
due to the fact that the effect of the activities of one NGO can mask the effect of another NGO and, 




ICRC, including both measures of campaign content, as well as temporary presence.75  
Thus, the minimum value for this scaled variable is 0 (there is no reported media 
activity in a given month) and the maximum possible value is nine (the temporary 
presence of all human rights and humanitarian NGOs are reported in the media in the 
same month that advocacy and anti-TO campaign activity is reported in the media).  
Results indicate that there is no media activity for 117 out of 240 months or 
approximately 49 percent of the time.  The maximum reported value for media 
activity is five and this is reported for three months or for slightly more than one 
percent of the reported observation periods.76  This variable is skewed to the right 
with a monthly average of 0.86 and a standard deviation of 1.10.   
Summary statistics for the control variables included in the Algeria models are 
summarized in Table 5.  The next section will present the descriptive statistics for the 
Lebanon dataset. 
Summary Statistics for Lebanon 
Similar to Algeria, terrorist attacks in Lebanon are measured by four count 
variables, including all terrorist attacks, attacks targeting civilians, the state and, 
lastly, NGOs.  A summary of the distribution of these variables is reported in Table 6 
and descriptive statistics for these and other variables included in the Lebanon 
analyses are reported in Table 7.  
                                                 
75 All observations that are sourced directly from NGO websites are removed from this variable.  
Given that permanent presence indicators were all collected from NGO websites, this variable has been 
excluded from Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey media activity variables.   
76 A score of 1 occurs in 69 months, a score of 2 is reported in 35 months, a score of 3 is present in 10 





Table 6.  Distribution of terrorist activity in Lebanon 













         
0 89 31.56 200 70.92 124 43.97 275 97.52 
1 50 17.73 48 17.02 72 25.53 7 2.48 
2 24 8.51 22 7.80 26 9.22 0 0.00 
3 14 4.96 7 2.48 22 7.80 0 0.00 
4 25 8.87 4 1.42 10 3.55 0 0.00 
5 16 5.67 0 0.00 6 2.13 0 0.00 
6 8 2.84 0 0.00 8 2.84 0 0.00 
7 9 3.19 0 0.00 5 1.77 0 0.00 
8 7 2.48 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
9 6 2.13 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
10 5 1.77 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
11 9 3.19 1 0.35 1 0.35 0 0.00 
12 4 1.42 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
13 4 1.42 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
14 1 0.35 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
15 3 1.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
16 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
17 3 1.06 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
18 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
19 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
20 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
21 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
22 2 0.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
      
 
 
The measure of all terrorist attacks reports a minimum of a zero incidents for 
89 out of 282 observed months or approximately 32 percent of the time.  The 
maximum number of attacks is 22 incidents which are reported for two separate 
months or approximately one percent of the time.  The average number of attacks 
reported in any given month is 3.59 and the standard deviation is 4.51, demonstrating 
some variation in the measure.  This variable is skewed to the right with 90 percent of 





Table 7.  Summary statistics of all variables included in Lebanon models 
Lebanon variables  Measurement Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
 
Dependent variables 
     
Terrorist attacks Count 3.539 4.51 0 22 
Attacks targeting 
civilians 
Count 0.496 1.05 0 11 
Attacks targeting the 
state 
Count 1.592 2.53 0 17 
Attacks targeting NGOs Count 0.024 0.15 0 1 
 
Independent variables 
     
All NGO media activity  Count 0.957 1.31 0 9 
Human rights NGO 
media activity 
advocating for the 
constituents 
Count 0.609 0.81 0 3 
Human rights NGO 
media activity criticizing 
TOs 
Count 0.117 0.41 0 3 
Human rights NGO 
temporary presence in a 
conflict area 
Count 0.127 0.35 0 2 
Human rights NGO 
permanent presence in a 
conflict area 
count 0.751 0.83 0 2 
ICRC temporary 
presence in a conflict 
area 
1/0 0.102 0.30 0 1 
ICRC permanent 
presence in a conflict 
area 
1/0 0.996 0.05 0 1 
 
Control variables      
GDP per capita Continuous 
(divided by 
10,000) 
0.478 0.23 0.101 0.914 
Urban population Continuous 85.331 1.68 80.901 87.247 
Population density Continuous 334.505 57.43 260.859 428.425 
Natural disaster 1/0 0.011 0.10 0 1 
Population growth Continuous 
(percentage) 1.983 1.36 -0.190 4.844 
Infant mortality Continuous 17.780 6.79 8.3 30.7 
Life expectancy Continuous 74.409 3.24 69.390 79.558 
Military expenditures Continuous 
(percentage) 4.795 1.43 1.187 7.979 
Military personnel Continuous 
(percentage)  6.191 1.22 4.586 8.243 
GTD generation 1 1/0 0.404 0.49 0 1 
GTD generation 3 1/0 0.159 0.36 0 1 
Number of active TOs Count 3.659 4.25 0 15 






The variable measuring attacks targeting civilians indicates a minimum of 
zero attacks for 200 out of 282 months or for approximately 71 percent of the 
observation period.  The highest recorded number of incidents in a given month is 11 
attacks which is observed for one month or 0.35 percent of the time.  The average 
number of attacks per month is 0.49 and the standard deviation is 1.05, demonstrating 
some variability.  Attacks targeting civilians is highly skewed to the right with nearly 
90 percent of the observation months reporting one or fewer attacks.   
A third variable measuring TO activity is attacks targeting the state.  This 
count variable reports a minimum of zero attacks for 124 observation months or 44 
percent of the time.  The maximum number of attacks is 17 incidents in a given 
month which occurs for one out of 282 months or 0.35 percent of the time.  The mean 
number of attacks is 1.59 and the standard deviation is 2.53, indicating some variation 
in the dependent variable.  Attacks targeting the state are highly skewed to the right 
with 90 percent of the 282 observation months reporting four or fewer attacks.   
The last TO activity variable is attacks targeting NGOs which, similar to 
Algeria, appears to be an extremely rare event.  Approximately 97.5 percent of the 
observation months or 275 out of 282 months report no attacks targeting NGOs.  
Only seven months or approximately 2.5 percent of the time period of study records a 
single attack targeting an NGO.  The average number of attacks per month is 0.02 and 
the standard deviation is 0.15.  As will be discussed further in the chapter, the rarity 
of these kinds of attacks makes quantitative assessment problematic. 
NGO activity is captured by the same set of variables as is used for the 




physical presence in a conflict area, campaign content advocating for the constituency 
and criticizing the TO, and overall media activity.  Physical measures are either 
dichotomous (humanitarian NGOs) or count (human rights NGOs).  Regarding the 
human rights NGO temporary and permanent presence measures, if either AI or 
HRW are present in a given month, the variable is coded as one and if both are 
present, the variable is coded as two.  Overall media activity is a cumulative value of 
the campaign content values and temporary presence values (as captured in the 
media) for AI, HRW, local NGOs, and ICRC. 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and hypothesis three address the temporary and 
permanent physical presence of an NGO in a conflict area; the first set refers to 
campaigning NGOs, such as AI and HRW, and hypothesis three refers to service 
provision organizations, such as ICRC.  In regards to temporary presence, or the 
presence of a delegation, human rights NGOs do not have a presence for 248 out of 
282 observed months or for approximately 88 percent of the time.  At least one 
human rights organization has a temporary presence for 32 months and both AI and 
HRW have a temporary presence for two months.  ICRC has a short-term presence in 
conflict areas for 29 months or ten percent of the 282 months of interest.77   
As mentioned previously, NGOs can maintain both a permanent and a 
temporary presence in any given month (this statement is premised on the assumption 
that the existence of an office space is substantively different from visiting a conflict 
                                                 
77 As noted in the Algeria summary, the only hypothesis relating to ICRC is addressing the relationship 
between service provision presence and attacks targeting NGOs.  However, attacks against NGOs are a 
rare event and, thus, unsuitable for quantitative analysis.  Instead, a qualitative assessment will be 
presented of the relationship between these two variables.  In addition, although this does not relate to 
a specific hypothesis, the relationship between service provision presence and other attacks will be 
assessed.  These results will be compared with similar results for campaigning organizations in order to 




area).  ICRC illustrates this point.  It maintains a permanent presence for 281 out of 
282 observation months or 99.6 percent of the period of study78.  While this makes 
quantitative analysis highly problematic, it does not eliminate the value of assessing 
ICRC’s visits to areas hosting oppressed communities such as refugee and prisoner 
camps.   Therefore, the analysis will only assess ICRC’s temporary presence and not 
its permanent one.  Human rights NGOs, on the other hand, only have a permanent 
presence for 140 months or slightly less than 50 percent of the 282 months of study, 
with one NGO present for 68 months, or 24 percent, and both NGOs present for 72 
months, or 26 percent of the period.  Therefore, Lebanon models include both 
temporary and permanent presence variables for human rights NGOs. 
The next set of hypotheses (hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c) refers to the predicted 
impact of campaign content on TO activity.  Campaign content is measured by two 
separate count variables; these variables measure whether, in a given month, a human 
rights NGO a) advocated for the citizenry or b) criticized a TO.  Given that ICRC is 
not a campaigning organization, it is not included in the data collection efforts; 
however, AI, HRW, and local NGOs are included.   
In regards to advocating for the constituency, results indicate that at least one 
or more NGOs are engaged in advocacy work for approximately 44 percent of the 
study period.  One group is engaged for 86 months or 30 percent, two groups 
advocate for 28 months or 10 percent, and all three groups are in engaged in advocacy 
work for 10 months or approximately three percent of the time.  As for anti-terrorism 
campaign work, this occurs with less frequency than constituent advocacy work.  
Human rights organizations only engage in anti-terrorism work for 26 months or 
                                                 




approximately nine percent of the period of interest.  At least one group focuses on 
TOs for 21 months, two groups for three months, and all three groups for only two 
months.   
Hypothesis four predicts a relationship between all NGO media activity and 
all terrorist activity.  The media activity variable is a cumulative value of the 
campaign content variables and temporary presence variables for a maximum 
possible value of nine (this maximum occurs if media sources report local NGOs, 
HRW, and AI engaging in advocacy and anti-TO work during the same month, as 
well as AI, HRW, and ICRC reporting a temporary presence in a given month).  
Results indicate a highly skewed variable; 132 months report no media activity, 88 
months record a score of one, and 34 months are coded with a score of two.79  A 
maximum of nine is reported for one month.  The expected value of any given month 
is 0.957 with a standard deviation of 1.31. 
Descriptive summaries for the control variables included in the Lebanon 
analysis are included in Table 7.  The next section focuses on the summary statistics 
for the TO and NGO activity variables included in the Turkey analysis. 
Summary Statistics for Turkey 
Terrorist activity for the Turkey analysis is measured in a manner similar to 
Algeria and Lebanon.  The concept is operationalized as four separate count 
variables: overall attacks, attacks targeting civilians, attacks targeting the state, and 
attacks targeting NGOs.  The distribution for each of these variables is summarized in 
Table 8 and summary statistics are reported in Table 9.   
                                                 
79 A score of three is reported for 13 months, a score of four for eight months, a score of five for three 




Table 8.  Distribution of terrorist activity in Turkey80 













0 47 16.67 141 50.00 91 32.27 276 97.87 
1 43 15.25 57 20.21 56 19.86 6 2.13 
2 32 11.35 33 11.70 37 13.12 0 0.00 
3 26 9.22 21 7.45 28 9.93 0 0.00 
4 28 9.93 11 3.90 9 3.19 0 0.00 
5 16 5.67 6 2.13 9 3.19 0 0.00 
6 7 2.48 4 1.42 4 1.42 0 0.00 
7 11 3.90 3 1.06 7 2.48 0 0.00 
8 2 0.71 1 0.35 7 2.48 0 0.00 
9 5 1.77 2 0.71 3 1.06 0 0.00 
10 5 1.77 0 0.00 3 1.06 0 0.00 
11 3 1.06 1 0.35 4 1.42 0 0.00 
12 8 2.84 1 0.35 1 0.35 0 0.00 
13 5 1.77 1 0.35 2 0.71 0 0.00 
14 3 1.06 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
15 3 1.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
16 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
17 4 1.42 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
18 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
19 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
20 2 0.71 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
21 1 0.35 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
22 2 0.71 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
23 1 0.35 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
24 0 0.00 0 0.00 3 1.06 0 0.00 
25 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
26 4 1.42 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
27 3 1.06 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
28 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
29 1 0.35 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
30 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 0.71 0 0.00 
31 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
32 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
33 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
34 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.35 0 0.00 
35 1 0.35 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
36 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
37 3 1.06 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
38 2 0.71 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 
 
                                                 






Table 9.  Summary statistics of all variables in Turkey models 
Turkey variables  Measurement Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
 
Dependent variables      
Terrorist attacks Count 7.730 12.46 0 84 
Attacks targeting civilians Count 1.301 2.04 0 13 
Attacks targeting the state Count 3.755 6.52 0 42 
Attacks targeting NGOs Count 0.021 0.14 0 1 
 
Independent variables 
     
All NGO media activity  Count 1.244 1.06 0 4 
Human rights NGO media 
activity advocating for the 
constituents 
Count 0.843 0.84 0 3 
Human rights NGO media 
activity criticizing TOs Count 0.071 0.26 0 1 
Amnesty International permanent 
presence in a conflict area 1/0 0.404 0.49 0 1 
Human rights NGO temporary 
presence in a conflict area Count 0.290 0.49 0 2 
ICRC temporary presence in a 
conflict area 1/0 0.039 0.19 0 1 
ICRC permanent presence in a 
conflict area 1/0 0.372 0.48 0 1 
 
Control variables      
Urban population Continuous 64.254 4.16 55.15 71.409 
Population density Continuous 81.428 8.43 66.484 94.926 
Natural disaster 1/0 0.258 0.43 0 1 
Democratic orientation Scale 7.553 0.82 7 9 
Population growth Continuous 
(percentage) 1.488 0.18 1.239 1.936 
Infant mortality Continuous 33.427 15.58 12.9 64.1 
Life expectancy Continuous 69.362 3.65 62.787 74.540 
Unemployment Continuous 9.127 1.83 6.5 14 
Military expenditures Continuous 
(percentage) 3.261 0.65 2.283 4.142 
Military personnel Continuous 
(percentage)  3.201 0.56 2.300 3.959 
GTD generation 1 1/0 0.404 0.49 0 1 
GTD generation 3 1/0 0.170 0.37 0 1 
Number of active TOs Count 4.127 2.56 0 9 
Negotiation period 1/0 0.146 0.35 0 1 
      
 
 
The overall terrorist attacks variable has a broader range in Turkey with a 




approximately 17 percent of the period of study.  The maximum number of attacks in 
a given month is 84; this is reported for one month only or .03 percent of the observed 
period.  The average number of expected attacks in any given month is 7.73 with a 
standard deviation of 12.46, demonstrating a good deal of variation.  The distribution 
is heavily skewed to the right with 90 percent of the months reporting 22 or fewer 
attacks.  Unlike other countries, there appears to be several outlier values for this 
variable in Turkey.81  
Attacks targeting civilians are relatively scarce in contrast to overall attacks.  
Fifty percent or 141 of the observation months report no incidents.  The maximum is 
13 incidents reported for one month only or 0.3 percent of the observation period.  
The average number of attacks targeting civilians in a given month is 1.30 and the 
standard deviation is 2.04, demonstrating necessary variability.  This measure is 
heavily skewed to the right with approximately 90 percent of the observation months 
reporting three or fewer incidents.   
Attacks targeting the state are more frequent than attacks against civilians.  
The minimum reported value is 0 attacks for 91 months or 32 percent of the study 
period.  The maximum value is 42 attacks for one month or 0.3 percent of the 282 
observed months.  The mean value is 3.75 attacks in a given month with a standard 
deviation of 6.52, showing a great deal of variability in the dependent variable.  As 
appears to be the case with all of the dependent variables, attacks targeting the state 
are heavily skewed to the right with some outlier values.  More than 90 percent of the 
observation months report 10 or fewer attacks. 
                                                 




Similar to Algeria and Lebanon, the independent variables included in the 
Turkey models include measures of physical presence, campaign content, and overall 
media activity.  Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, and hypothesis three all predict relationships 
between the physical presence of an NGO and subsequent TO activity.  The first set 
of hypotheses refer to campaigning/human rights organizations (AI, HRW, and local 
NGOs) while hypothesis three refers to service provision/humanitarian organizations 
(ICRC).  For human rights organizations, the temporary physical presence variable is 
a count variable of the number of NGOs in the area in a given month with a 
maximum value of two if AI and HRW are both present.  In regards to the permanent 
presence measure, HRW does not have a permanent physical presence during the 
period of interest but AI does and, therefore, the human rights permanent presence 
variable is a dichotomous variable measuring whether AI is present (1) or absent (0) 
in a given month.  For service provision NGOs, the physical presence variable is 
operationalized as a dichotomous variable measuring whether ICRC, in a given 
month, has a temporary presence in a conflict area and a second dichotomous variable 
measuring whether the NGO has a permanent presence in the form of an office or 
clinic in any given month.82   
In regards to temporary presence, human rights NGOs report a temporary 
presence for 77 out of 282 months or approximately 27 percent of the time.  One 
NGO is present for 72 months and both AI and HRW are present for five months.  
ICRC has a temporary physical presence in conflict areas for 11 months or four 
percent of the time period.  As for permanent presence, both AI and ICRC have 
similar patterns of permanent presence in Turkey.  AI has an established office space 
                                                 




for 114 months or 40 percent of the period of study, while ICRC has an office or 
clinic in operation for 105 or 37 percent of the 282 months of interest.   
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c refer to the impact that campaign content may have 
on TO activity.  Similar to Algeria and Lebanon, campaign content is captured by two 
separate count variables: whether human rights NGOs are a) advocating for the 
constituents or b) criticizing the TO.  The count of each measure includes data on 
HRW, AI, and local NGOs.  The value of the variable reflects the number of groups 
reporting the particular kind of campaign content with a possible maximum of three.  
Results indicate that human rights organizations engage in advocacy work 
approximately 59 percent of the time with one group engaged in advocacy work for 
106 months or 38 percent of the time, two groups advocating for 51 months or 18 
percent, and all three groups advocating for 10 months or approximately three percent 
of the period of interest.  While advocacy work is relatively common, anti-terrorism 
work is rare.  Human rights organizations report anti-terrorism work for only 20 
months or approximately seven percent of the period of study and at no point are AI, 
HRW, and local NGOs engaged in anti-terrorism work in the same month.   
The final hypothesis, hypothesis four, is focused on the relationship between 
all NGO media activity and all terrorist attacks.  Similar to Lebanon and Algeria, the 
media activity variable is a cumulative total of the campaign content and temporary 
presence variables with a maximum possible value of nine.  The minimum value of 
media activity is a score of 0 which is present 28 percent of the time or for 78 months 
out of 282 observations months.  Although the highest score possible is nine, the 




only or for approximately two percent of the period of study.  The variable is skewed 
to the right with a score of one occurring in 107 months, a score of two for 53 
months, and a score of three for 38 months.  The average expected score in any given 
month is 1.244 and the standard deviation is 1.067. 
The control variables included in the Turkey models are summarized in Table 
9.  In addition, this chapter includes a section that briefly summarizes and compares 
the control variables within and across the countries.  Before moving on to the 
controls, a brief comparison of the distributions of the primary independent and 
dependent variables between countries is undertaken.  Comparing variables across 
countries provides contextual background that can influence confidence in model 
results. 
Dependent and Independent Variables across Countries 
This section will provide a brief overview of the similarities and differences in 
the distributions and trends of NGO and TO activities between Algeria, Lebanon, and 
Turkey.  This is followed by a snapshot summary of the control variables, both 
within- and between-countries.  Identifying variations within- and between-countries 
provides a premise upon which to determine how differences in country models may 
be due, to some extent, to differences inherent in the activities and context of the 
specific country. 
Figure 1 presents the annual average of monthly counts of terrorist attacks in 
the three countries of interest.  All three countries display different trends in overall 
TO attacks.  As the figure illustrates, Algeria is subject to an increase in overall 




and relatively stable pattern for the remainder of the assessment period.  Lebanon also 
has relatively higher levels of terrorism in the 1990s, but the trend declines until a 
brief spike in 2008.  Turkey, on the other hand, increases in overall attacks until the 
mid-90s, then declines, with the exception of a brief spike in 1999.  One notable 
characteristic is the differences in annual averages of overall attacks between the 
countries.  With the exception of the spike in the early 1990s, Turkey maintains a 
relatively low attack average, as does Lebanon.  Algeria, on the other hand records 
































































Figure 1.  The annual average of monthly TO attacks. 
 
Breaking these overall attacks into specific target types reveals some 
interesting patterns.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the increase in attacks in the early 
1990s in Algeria is driven by attacks targeting the state while the spike in 1997 is 
almost exclusively attacks targeting civilians.  Lebanon’s increase in attacks in the 




by state targets.  Turkey’s trends also appear to be driven, in large part, by attacks 
targeting the state; civilian attack numbers are notably small.  This indicates that, 
while TOs in Algeria fluctuate in their targeting choices, Turkish and Algerian TOs 
have less variability. 
 
Figure 2. The annual average of monthly attacks targeting civilians and the state in 
Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
 
Looking next at NGO activity, as presented in Figure 3, overall media activity 
follows a trend similar to TO activity in Algeria.  There is fluctuations in NGO media 
activity in the early-1990s, a spike in the later-1990s, then a gradual and subtle 
decline.  Lebanon presents a different picture: while terrorism is higher in the 1990s 
and then declines in the 2000s, media activity fluctuates but remains relatively low 
through the 1990s and most of the 2000s.  The spike in TO activity in the late 2000s 
is matched by a similar spike in NGO media activity.  Turkey media activity differs 




relatively steady presence, with the exception of a slight decline in the mid-2000s.  
These distributions indicate clear differences in NGO media activity across countries. 
 
Figure 3.  The monthly media activity score averaged per year for Algeria, Lebanon, 
and Turkey.83 
 
In addition to media activity, on-site temporary presence also shows a good 
deal of variability between and within countries.  Figure 4 displays the number of 
months per year that NGOs visited conflict areas within the three countries.  In 
regards to Algeria, human rights NGOs made the majority of their visits throughout 
the 1990s, with only a few visits in the early and late 2000s.  ICRC, in contrast, only 
visited once in the early 1990s, not visiting again until the late-1990s, at which point 
the NGO engaged in five years of near-continuous visits.  Between 2005 and 2010, 
ICRC only visited conflict-areas in Algeria twice.  In Lebanon, human rights NGOs 
                                                 
83 It is important to remember the media variable is a cumulative value for media activity of local 
NGOs, HRW, AI, and ICRC, including both measures of campaign content, as well as temporary 
presence.  Thus, the minimum value for this scaled variable is 0 (there is no reported media activity in 
a given month) and the maximum possible value is nine (human rights NGOs and humanitarian NGOs 





made sporadic visits throughout all decades of analysis with no discernable pattern.  
ICRC demonstrates little variation as well, visiting relatively consistently throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s.  Finally, in Turkey, while human rights NGOS visited with 
some regularity, there were notable spikes in presence in the mid-1990s, around 2000, 
and from 2005 onwards.  ICRC visits, on the other hand, were few and far between, 
although they are relatively spaced with no obvious clustering.84 
 
Figure 4.  Number of months per year that NGOs visited conflict areas in Algeria, 
Lebanon, and Turkey. 
 
In regards to campaign content, each country again displays a unique trend, as 
presented in Figure 5, which reports the number of months per year that NGOs 
                                                 
84 Comparing the permanent presence of NGOs within and between countries would be ideal; however, 
given that there is great deal of variability in whether an NGO had a permanent presence within a 
given country during the period of interest, comparison is difficult.  Therefore, the comparison will be 




engaged in advocacy or anti-TO campaign work.  In Algeria, advocacy work is 
clustered in the early and late 1990s and in the latter half of the 2000s.  In Lebanon, 
the main clusters of advocacy work are in the late 1990s and late 2000s. Turkey 
shows a great deal of advocacy work throughout the entire period, although it is less 
consistent in the 2000s.  In regards to anti-TO campaign content, this activity is more 
prevalent in the 1990s in Algeria and relatively limited in the 2000s, with the 
exception of a spike around 2003.  Anti-TO work is very rare in Lebanon, although 
the majority of activity is clustered in the years following 2005.  Finally, criticism 
direction towards the TO is also rare in Turkey and appears to have three peaks: the 
early 1990s, the late 1990s, and the late 2000s. 
 
Figure 5.  Number of months per year that NGOs engaged in advocacy or anti-TO 
campaign work in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
 
These distributions indicate a level of variability in NGO presence, campaign 




interest.  This mirrors the variability shown in TO activity between countries.  In 
essence, NGO and TO activity demonstrate notable differences across countries.  This 
is important because it rules out the possibility that TO or NGO trends are global and, 
thus, driven by factors not easily measured on a national level.  Comparisons of the 
control variables indicate wherein some of those country-specific factors may lie.   
Control Variables within and across Countries 
As summarized in chapter five, there are 12 control variables incorporated 
into all models, including measures relating to economic stability (GDP per capita), 
population concentration and growth (urban population, population density, and 
population growth), citizen health (infant mortality and life expectancy), military 
presence and prevalence (military expenditures and military personnel), natural 
disasters, data collection generations (GTD generation one and three), and TO group 
competition (number of active TOs).85  This section will present brief overarching 
observations about the trends of these variables within and between countries. 
Figure 6 presents the trends of the different control variables in each 
country.86  As is clear from the individual graphs, there is a great deal of variability 
between countries and within countries over time.  GDP, urban population, 
population density, life expectancy, and infant mortality follow similar trends in the 
three countries of interest with the first four trending upwards and infant mortality 
                                                 
85 There are six additional control variables that are incorporated into select models, including a 
measure of democratic orientation (not available for Lebanon), unemployment rate (only available for 
Turkey), dummy variables for pro- and anti-civilian orientation (only available for Algeria), and a 
dummy variable for negotiation period (only available for Turkey). 
86 The only variables not included are the GTD generation variables and the natural disasters measure.  
Trend comparison has little value for these dichotomous variables. In regards to natural disasters, 
however, it is worth noting, however, that Algeria reported natural disasters for 41 out of 240 months, 
while Lebanon only reported three disasters during the 282 months of interest.  Turkey, on the other 




trending downwards.  Despite these similarities in trends, there are some notable 
differences between countries.  Specifically, it is interesting to note the difference in 
mean values of population density and urban population; the graphs indicate that 
Lebanon is a great deal more densely populated in comparison with Turkey and 
Algeria.  GDP also behaves differently for Turkey; Figure 6 illustrates more 








Figure 6.  Distribution of control variables in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey. 
 
The remaining control variables, including population density, military 
measures, and the number of active TOs, show a great deal of variability within and 
between countries; there are no notable overall trend similarities for all three 




mirror each other while Lebanon presents unique trends not replicated in the other 
countries.  Algeria and Turkey show similar trends for military expenditures, 
population growth and, to some extent, military personnel, while Lebanon fluctuates 
unpredictably.  All three countries oscillate a great deal in the number of TOs active 
in a given year.   
The graphs included in Figure 6, therefore, suggest two main observations: 
there is variability in within-country characteristics over time and there are 
differences between countries in these same characteristics.  These observations 
support the expectation that comparisons within and between countries need to take 
into account these contextual and time-dependent factors when assessing the 
relationship between NGO activity and TO activity.  They also support the 
supposition that differences in the country models will reflect observed differences.  
The next three sections will present model results for each of the three countries of 
interest.   
Main Findings: All Countries 
The following sections will present and describe the relationships between 
NGO activity and TO activity within each country.  Before delving into those details, 
an overview of the general findings is reported here.  Table 10 summarizes these 
findings and presents the predicted and observed relationships within each country. 
Hypothesis one predicts that an increase in campaign-oriented NGO presence, 
both temporary and permanent, will result in a decrease of attacks targeting civilians 
and an increase in attacks targeting the state.  As is shown in Table 10, there is only 




Table 10. All hypotheses, predicted relationships, and observed relationships 
Dependent 
variables 
Primary independent variables and predicted 
relationship (+ or -) 
Observed relationship (+ or -) 
and observed significance 
Algeria Lebanon Turkey 
Attacks 
targeting 




NGO temporary presence (-) -  * + - 




NGO temporary presence (+) + - - 











NGO temporary presence (-) + + - 




NGO temporary presence (+) - + + 
NGO permanent presence (+) + N/A + 
Attacks 
targeting 




NGO advocacy (-) + + + 




NGO advocacy (+) +  ‡ - - 
NGO criticism (+) + +   + 
All attacks Media activity (hypothesis 4) All NGO media activity (+) +  ‡ - - 
 
or permanent, does not appear to influence attacks targeting the state in the manner 
predicted for any of the three countries.  In contrast, results indicate that there is some 
support for the impact of NGO presence on attacks targeting civilians.  Temporary 
presence is significantly related to a decrease in attacks targeting civilians in Algeria, 
while permanent presence is marginally related to a decrease in attacks targeting 




of the potential influence of advocacy versus service provision organizations.  ICRC-
specific results do not provide any further support for hypothesis one, nor do these 
results suggest significant differences in TO responses to humanitarian versus human 
rights NGOs. 
Hypothesis two addresses the potential relationship between NGO campaign 
content, both advocacy work and anti-TO work, and TO attacks targeting civilians 
and the state.  This set of hypotheses predicts that both forms of campaign content 
will decrease attacks targeting civilians and increase attacks targeting the state.  Table 
10 results indicate that there is little support for this hypothesis across countries.  
Contrary to expectations, campaign content of any kind appears to have a positive 
relationship with attacks targeting the civilians.  In regards to attacks targeting the 
state, only advocacy work in Algeria appears to be marginally related. 
Hypothesis four predicts a positive relationship between media activity and 
the frequency of terrorist attacks.  As reported in Table 10, there is marginal support 
for this hypothesis in Algeria only.  There does not appear to be a consistent 
relationship in Lebanon or Turkey.   
It is interesting to note that, although there is very little support in the various 
models for any particular hypothesis, Table 10 indicates that the majority of 
significant relationships are found in Algeria, followed by Lebanon.  The Turkey 
models do not provide support for any of the hypotheses.  
Results for Algeria 
The next few sections present results for the Algeria-specific model.  As an 




TO attacks and NGO activity within Algeria over the time period of interest.  In order 
to present a digestible visual aid, data points represent quarterly measures (3 month 
increments).  TO attack data points report the number of attacks over the three month 
period, while the NGO data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO 
activity is present. As the figure illustrates, there is no easily identifiable pattern 
between any particular NGO activity and TO activity.  The nuances of these 
relationships will be elaborated upon in the following sections.   
 
Figure 7.  Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly 
periods in Algeria. 
 
Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence 
As mentioned previously, hypothesis one states that increases in the physical 
presence of an NGO will be related to increases in attacks targeting NGOs and the 




to human rights organizations, results from ICRC are also included to serve as a 
comparison between campaigning and service provision organizations.  As mentioned 
previously, the only physical presence measure for AI and HRW is temporary 
presence.  Full model results are presented in Table 11 and 12.   
Table 11. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Algeria 
Human rights NGO conflict-area presence 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 








presence   N/A/  N/A/ 
GDP -21.6410** (6.490) N/A 
-3.3237 
(4.401) N/A 
Urban population 2.0099‡ (1.137) N/A 
-3.2686* 
(1.280) N/A 
Population density -1.7668 (4.512) N/A 
-2.3943 
(3.931) N/A 









Population growth 1.8933 (1.986) N/A 
7.8828*** 
(1.583) N/A 
Infant mortality 2.2591** (0.854) N/A 
-0.8690 
(0.845) N/A 









Military personnel 1.1639*** (0.312) N/A 
-0.9134** 
(0.341) N/A 
GTD generation 1 0.5869‡ (0.323) N/A 
0.6500 
(0.550) N/A 
GTD generation 3 -2.8565** (1.065) N/A 
0.6056 
(0.790) N/A 


















     





Table 11 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
temporary presence of human rights NGOs in Algeria and attacks targeting the state 
and civilians.  The first thing to note is that there appears to be a significant 
relationship between temporary presence and attacks targeting civilians.  The 
estimated coefficient (𝜷=-0.4964) can be interpreted as an incident rate ratio of 0.88, 
or a decrease of 0.88 terrorists incidents targeting civilians per month (p<.05), 
holding all else constant.87 88  The second thing to note in Table 11 is the coefficient 
for temporary presence and attacks targeting the state; while the coefficient is positive 
and, thus, is in the predicted direction, it does not achieve significance in the model.   
In addition to attacks targeting the state and civilians, hypothesis one also 
addresses the potential relationship between the presence of campaigning 
organizations and attacks targeting NGOs.  Given that attacks targeting NGOs are an 
extremely rare event in Algeria, quantitative analysis is not possible.  However, there 
are some limited conclusions that can be drawn from graphing the frequency of both 
variables.  Figure 8 presents annual measures of presence and TO activity.89  As is 
clear in Figure 8, there appears to be no support for the hypothesis that there is a 
relationship between human rights NGO presence and attacks targeting NGOs.  There 
are only three reported attacks against NGOs in Algeria during the period of interest 
                                                 
87 The incident rate ratios (IRRs) are reported for significant relationships.  IRRs are calculated as an 
exponentiated coefficient value.  Before exponentiating the coefficient, the coefficient can be 
interpreted as such: with a one unit change in NGO activity, the difference in the logs of the TO 
activity is expected to change by the coefficient estimate.  In the case of temporary presence and 
attacks targeting civilians, the coefficient indicates that, in a given month, when an NGO has a 
temporary presence, the difference in the logs of expected attacks targeting civilians is expected to 
decrease 0.4964 units, holding all else constant. 
88 The negative binomial model also reports negative results, although the coefficient does not achieve 
significance (𝜷=-0.1894, SE=0.1365). 
89 It would be ideal to present a graph with monthly measures, rather than annual measures.  However, 
the resulting image is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret, given the number of months included in 




and, while one attack closely follows NGO presence (in 2011), the second attack is 
isolated from NGO presence, and the third attack occurs the month after the gap in 
data in 1993. 
 
Figure 8.  Human rights NGO temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs in 
Algeria: hypothesis one. 
 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the relationship between ICRC 
presence and targeted attacks are presented in Table 12.  As mentioned previously, 
hypothesis one refers to campaigning organizations only and, thus, ICRC is excluded 
from these predictions.  However, a model of the impact of ICRC temporary presence 
on attacks targeting civilians and the state has been included for the sake of 
comparison.  Results indicate that ICRC does not significantly impact incidents 
targeting these two groups.  It is of interest, however, that the direction of the 
relationships is only compatible with theoretical expectations when the presence is 
permanent and counters expectations when it is temporary.   
Hypothesis two: Campaign content 




Table 12. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Algeria 
International Committee of the Red Cross conflict-area presence 





































































































































     
‡ p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
NGO’s campaign content, both advocacy and anti-TO content, and subsequent TO 
activity.  Similar to hypothesis one, predictions differentiate between attacks targeting 
civilians, NGOs, and the state; an increase in any form of campaign content is 




state and NGOs.  This set of analyses is specific to human rights organizations (AI, 
HRW, and local NGOs).   
Table 13 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
autoregressive Poisson models addressing hypothesis two in Algeria.  In regards to 
attacks targeting civilians and the state, there is evidence that both advocacy work and 
anti-terrorist work appear to incite a response from TOs.  However, the response for 
each measure of campaign content is, unexpectedly, positive for both civilians and for 
the state.  Specifically, holding all else constant, results indicate that advocacy work 
increases attacks targeting civilians (𝜷=0.0965, IRR=1.11); these results would have 
been marginally significant with a two-tailed hypothesis.90  Criticism levied at the TO 
also appears to increase attacks targeting civilians but the impact is trivial.  As for 
state attacks, campaign content coefficients are in the predicted direction, although 
only advocacy is marginally significant (𝜷=0.1352), and can be interpreted as 
IRR=1.23, or an increase of 1.23 attacks per month (p<.10).91 
Hypothesis two also incorporates a prediction concerning attacks targeting 
NGOs.  Figure 9 provides annual points of NGO campaign activity and TO attacks.  
As can be seen in Figure 9, the frequency of these incidents and human rights NGO 
campaign content, both advocacy and anti-terrorist work, does not provide support for 
the prediction that content influences NGO attacks.  Specifically, there is no notable 
relationship between either measure of campaign content and subsequent violence 
directed towards NGOs.   
 
                                                 
90 The negative binomial coefficient is similar (𝜷=0.961, SE=0.0662) but would not have reached 
significance with a two-tailed test. 




Table 13. Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis two and hypothesis four in Algeria 
Human rights NGO campaign content NGO media activity 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state All attacks 
      
NGO advocacy 0.0965 (0.059)  
0.1352‡ 
(0.057)   





Media activity     
0.0566‡ 
(0.031) 





































































































































































      






Figure 9.  Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Algeria: hypothesis two. 
 
Hypothesis three: Service provision 
Hypothesis three predicts that the presence of service provision organizations 
will increase attacks targeting NGOs.  Given that AI and HRW are campaigning 
organizations, this hypothesis is specific to ICRC presence only.  As mentioned 
previously, attacks targeting NGOs are rare events and, therefore, quantitative 
analysis is not feasible.  However, some preliminary qualitative or descriptive 
analysis can be provided.   
Figure 10 presents the relationship between annual ICRC presence and attacks 
against NGOs.  First, ICRC permanent presence does not appear to have a notable 
relationship to TO attacks (if it did, the graph would indicate a cluster of attacks 
following the beginning of ICRC’s permanent presence).  Second, the relationship 
seems to be as follows: temporary ICRC visits are followed by TO attacks.  Third, 
this relationship is likely artificial or driven by something else entirely, given the time 
lag between isolated NGO visits and TO attacks.  Specifically, it appears that the gap 




years.  Theoretically, there is no reason to expect that an NGO visit at one point 
would elicit a violent response two years later.  Therefore, there appears to be no 
support for hypothesis three in Algeria.    
 
Figure 10.  Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross presence and 
attacks targeting NGOs in Algeria. 
 
Hypothesis four: Media coverage 
The last hypothesis refers to NGO media coverage in relation to a conflict 
area.  Specifically, hypothesis four predicts that, as NGO media activity increases, so 
too does terrorist activity.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for the 
autoregressive Poisson model results are presented in Table 13 and demonstrate 
marginal significance.   Specifically, an increase in media activity results in an 
increase of 1.06 terrorist incidents in a given month (𝜷=0.0566, p<.10), holding all 
else constant.92   
                                                 





Control variables: All models 
This section will provide general observations concerning the influence of the 
control variables included in the Algeria models.  Table 14 presents the number of 
models that report significant or marginally significant relationships between a given 
control variable and a) attacks targeting civilians or b) attacks targeting the state.  The 
maximum number of models that can display a significant relationship for each attack 
type is five.93   
Table 14. Number of models (maximum of five) displaying a significant relationship 
between the control variables and the dependent variables in Algeria   
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 
Relationship direction  + - + - 
GDP  5   
Urban population 2   5 
Population density     
Natural disaster    5 
Democratic orientation  5  5 
Population growth   5  
Infant mortality 5    
Life expectancy   5  
Military expenditures     
Military personnel 5   5 
GTD generation 1 4    
GTD generation 3  5   
Number of active TOs 5    
Anti-civilian orientation    5 
Pro-civilian orientation     
 
 
There are two overarching observations that can be made.  Firstly, the same 
variables, for the most part, appear to be influential across models.  Secondly, these 
variables have vastly different results for different target types.  The first observation 
suggests that these measures are salient and the exclusion of them would have biased 
the results.  The second observation provides support for the proposition that TO 
                                                 
93 The five models are human rights NGO temporary presence, ICRC temporary and permanent 
presence, and advocacy and anti-TO campaign content.  The media activity model has been excluded, 




targeting decisions are driven by diverse and unique considerations.  Specifically, it 
appears that, with the exception of one variable (democratic orientation), all of the 
remaining significant control variables are either significant for only one target type 
or significant for both target types but report opposing directional influences for each 
target type.  This suggests that decisions to target civilians are driven by different 
considerations than decisions to target the state.  These same relationships will be 
assessed in the next section with the Lebanon context. 
Results for Lebanon 
This section of the chapter present results for the Lebanon models.  Figure 11 
provides an overview of the frequency of TO attacks and NGO activity within 
Lebanon over the time period of interest.  Data points represent quarterly measures, 
TO attack data points report the number of attacks over the three month period, and 
the NGO data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO activity is 
present each period. As the figure illustrates, there is no easily identifiable pattern 
between any particular NGO activity and TO activity.  The details of these trends will 
be elaborated upon in the following sections.   
Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence 
The hypotheses that are applied in the Lebanese and Turkish context are 
similar to those that guide the Algerian models.  Hypothesis one consists of a set of 
predictions relating to the impact of human rights NGOs’ physical presence, both 
temporary and permanent, on subsequent terrorist activity.94  The estimated 
                                                 
94 In order to avoid redundancy, the details of hypotheses are not repeated in the Lebanon or Turkey 





Figure 11.  Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly 
periods in Lebanon. 
 
coefficients and standard errors for the models testing these relationships are 
presented in Table 15.  There are three observations that can be made about the 
results presented in the table.  The first observation is that temporary presence seems 
to have no notable impact on TO activity.  Secondly, permanent presence or 
establishing an office demonstrates a negative relationship with TO attacks. Finally, 
this relationship is in the predicted direction and marginally significant for attacks 
targeting civilians only.  Specifically, an increase in permanent presence is related to 
a decrease of 0.22 attacks targeting civilians per month (𝜷=-1.4957, p<.10).95   
                                                 





Table 15.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Lebanon 
Human rights NGO conflict-area presence 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 







































































































     
‡ p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
In addition to attacks targeting civilians and the state, hypothesis one also 
includes predictions regarding incidents targeting NGOs.  Similar to Algeria, these 
incidents are rare, making quantitative analysis problematic.  Therefore, the 
relationships between this dependent variable and the presence variables included in 
the Lebanon analyses are graphed and qualitatively assessed.  Figure 12 presents 




very little evidence of a relationship between NGO presence and attacks targeting 
NGOs.  The majority of the attacks are clustered in the beginning of the period of 
interest (four out of seven attacks occurred in 1988 alone), while NGO temporary 
presence tends to be clustered in the middle and end of the period of study.  This 
appears to be the case for both temporary and permanent presence.   
 
Figure 12.  Human rights NGO presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon: 
hypothesis one. 
 
Results for the impact of ICRC presence are included for the sake of 
comparison and the estimated coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 
16.96  As is shown in the table, results indicate that ICRC’s temporary presence does 
not have a significant impact on TO activity targeting the state or civilians, although 
it does have a consistently positive relationship.97   
                                                 
96 ICRC maintained a permanent presence in Lebanon during the whole period of study, with the 
exception of one month when the NGO closed operations due to threats; therefore, permanent presence 
is removed from the analysis.   
97 As mentioned in chapter five, the final analyses do include all TO attacks, regardless of group 
attribution.  However, additional analyses are conducted with two smaller data sets that exclude a) 
unknown TOs and b) all TOs that do not advocate for a constituency.  Once unknown TOs are 
removed, ICRC temporary presence appears to have a positive and significant relationship on attacks 
targeting the state in Lebanon.  However, restricting the dataset further in order to only include TOs 




Table 16.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Lebanon 
ICRC conflict-area presence 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 








presence  N/A  N/A 
GDP -13.3421* (6.022) N/A 
2.7702 
(2.425) N/A 
Urban population -5.0104* (1.950) N/A 
-1.1579 
(0.999) N/A 
Population density -0.0784 (0.054) N/A 
-0.0015 
(0.031) N/A 
Natural disaster -0.2018 (1.339) N/A 
0.0048 
(0.747) N/A 
Population growth -0.6041* (0.258) N/A 
-0.3367* 
(0.143) N/A 
Infant mortality -3.6176** (1.251) N/A 
-1.3874* 
(0.653) N/A 









Military personnel 0.3726 (0.335) N/A 
-0.4211** 
(0.155) N/A 
GTD generation 1 0.6250 (1.166) N/A 
0.0475 
(0.526) N/A 
GTD generation 3 2.9467* (1.341) N/A 
-0.2438 
(0.576) N/A 






     
‡ p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
In summary, it appears that there is very limited support for hypothesis one in 
Lebanon.  Specifically, while the relationship between advocacy NGOs’ permanent 
presence and attacks targeting the civilians is marginally significant, the relationship 
between NGO permanent presence and attacks targeting the state is non-significant 
and in the direction opposite predictions.  In addition, NGO temporary and permanent 




Hypothesis two: Campaign content 
Hypothesis two addresses the potential relationship between the content of an 
NGO’s campaign and subsequent TO activity. Estimate coefficients and standard 
errors for the models testing this set of hypotheses are presented in Table 17.  As is 
evident in the table, there are no notable relationships between campaign content and 
TO activity in Lebanon.98   In addition, graphing the annual relationship between 
NGO campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs, as presented in Figure 13, 
suggests a null relationship. All attacks targeting NGOs took place during periods of 
advocacy work; however, 1991 is the only year that did not report some level of this 
kind of campaign content.99  In addition, while the majority of attacks occurred 
during periods of anti-TO campaign content, the majority of periods of anti-TO work 
does not also report attacks on NGOs.  
Hypothesis three: Service provision 
Hypothesis three predicts a positive relationship between the presence, both 
temporary and permanent, of a service provision organization (ICRC) and attacks 
targeting NGOs. This is assessed through graphing the relationship and observing any 
potential patterns that emerge, as presented in Figure 14.   
In regards to ICRC temporary presence and attacks targeting NGOs, as Figure 
14 illustrates, there is a lack of an easily identifiable relationship between the two 
variables and, thus, the hypothesis does not appear to be supported.  Attacks targeting 
NGOs are clustered, for the most part, in the late 1980s (four attacks in 1988 and one 
                                                 
98 It is interesting to note that the relationship between anti-TO campaign work and attacks targeting 
the state is positive and significant in the negative binomial model (𝜷=0.2183, SE=0.054, p<.001) 




Table 17.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis two and hypothesis four in Lebanon 
Human rights NGO campaign content Media activity 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state All attacks 
      
NGO advocacy 0.0471 (0.162)  
-0.0281 
(0.109)   
NGO criticism  0.2600 (0.255)  
0.1901 
(0.183)  
Media activity     
-0.0107 
(0.057) 


















































































































      
‡ p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 (one-tailed tests) 
 
in 1989), while NGO activity does not appear until the early 1990s. In addition, the 
majority of years that report ICRC temporary presence do not also report attacks 
targeting NGOs. 
Hypothesis four: Media coverage 
Hypothesis four addresses the potential impact that NGO media activity may 





Figure 13.  Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon: hypothesis 
two. 
 
Figure 14.  Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross temporary 
presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon. 
 
of the autoregressive Poisson model, which are presented in Table 17, do not provide 
support for the hypothesis.  The relationship is in the direction opposite predictions 
and the coefficient is small and insignificant.  Therefore, there is no evidence that 
NGO media activity has an influence on the frequency of TO attacks in Lebanon.   
Control variables: All models 




Table 18.  Number of models (maximum of five) displaying a significant relationship 
between the control variables and the dependent variables in Lebanon   
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 
Relationship direction + - + - 
GDP  5   
Urban population  5   
Population density  1   
Natural disaster     
Population growth  5  5 
Infant mortality  5  5 
Life expectancy  3  5 
Military expenditures     
Military personnel    5 
GTD generation 1     
GTD generation 3 5    
Number of active TOs   5  
 
 
significant relationships between a given control variable and a) attacks targeting 
civilians or b) attacks targeting the state.  Similar to Algeria, the maximum number of 
models that can display a significant relationship for each attack type is five.100   
As is evident in Table 18, the control variables included in the Lebanon 
models behave in a manner similar to those included in the Algeria models.  
Specifically, many of the same variables maintain significance for the majority of the 
models, illustrating the importance of their inclusion.  In addition, many of these 
variables have a significant relationship with one form of targeted attack but not for 
the other.  In fact, there are only three control variables that influence both civilian 
and state attacks, while the remainder are either non-significant or influence only one 
of the two targeting types.101  This provides support for the supposition that targeting 
decisions are informed by diverse factors.  The influence of these control variables 
will also be assessed in the Turkey analyses. 
                                                 
100 The five models are human rights NGO temporary presence, ICRC temporary and permanent 
presence, and advocacy and anti-TO campaign content.  The media activity model has been excluded, 
given that it looks at all attacks, not civilian or state attacks. 




Results for Turkey 
Figure 15 provides an overview of the trends in TO attacks and NGO activity 
in Turkey between 1987 and 2011.  The figure reports quarterly periods, TO attack 
data points report the number of attacks over the three-month period, and the NGO 
data points represent a 1/0 measure of whether a given NGO activity is present each 
period. The details of these trends will be elaborated upon in the following sections.   
 
Figure 15.  Frequency of TO attacks and the presence of NGO activity over quarterly 
periods in Turkey. 
 
Hypothesis one: NGO physical presence 
The same hypotheses that are applied in the Algerian and Lebanese context 
are applied in the Turkish/Kurdish context.  Hypothesis one assesses the impact of the 
physical presence of a campaigning NGO on the subsequent activity of a TO.  The 




presented in Table 19.102  It is interesting to note that, for the most part, the 
relationships are negative.  Despite this directional trend, the table reports null 
findings only.  Graphing the relationship between presence and attacks targeting 
NGOs provides some support for the hypothesized relationship between NGO activity 
and attacks targeting NGOs.  As Figure 16 illustrates, the majority of incidents 
targeting NGOs may occur during periods of NGO activity.  In addition, three of the 
six attacks occurred within one or two months of a period of NGO temporary 
presence. 103  
ICRC is included as a comparison between the influence of campaigning and 
service organizations on attacks targeting the state and civilians. The estimated 
coefficients and standard errors are reported in Table 20.  Similar to human rights 
NGOs, ICRC’s presence appears to have no notable impact on either type of targeted 
attack.  Therefore, it appears that the temporary or permanent presence of both human 
rights and service provision NGOs have no impact on TO activity in Lebanon with 
the possible exception of attacks targeting NGOs, although this requires further study.  
The next section will assess the influence of campaign content on TO activity. 
Hypothesis two: Campaign content 
Hypothesis two references the predicted impact of NGO campaign content on 
TO activity.  The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the autoregressive 
Poisson models are presented in Table 21.  These results indicate that campaign 
activity does not influence TO activity in Turkey.  This conclusion is not dependent 
                                                 
102 Recall that only AI had a permanent presence in Turkey during the period of interest.  Therefore, 
while the temporary presence variable includes both AI and HRW, the permanent presence variable 
only includes AI activity. 




Table 19.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and human rights NGOs in Turkey 
Human rights NGO temporary presence and Amnesty International permanent presence 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 































































































































     







Figure 16.  Human rights NGO temporary presence, AI permanent presence, and 
attacks targeting NGOs in Turkey: hypothesis one. 
 
on the particular target type; the table reports null findings for both advocacy work 
and anti-terrorism work.  
Figure 17 maps out the annual points of attacks targeting NGOs and anti-
terrorist campaign content.104  Although there is no consistent relationship between 
these two measures, it is interesting to note that the majority of the attacks overlap 
with anti-TO work.  However, the actual attacks followed anywhere from 4-10 
months after a period of anti-TO campaign content, suggesting that the latter does not 
influence the former, given that there is no theoretical reason to expect a four- to ten-
month lag in TO response. 
Hypothesis three: Service provision 
Hypothesis three refers to the potential influence that the presence of a service 
provision organization (ICRC) may have on attacks targeting NGOs.  Figure 18 plots 
the annual measures of TO attacks targeting NGOs and ICRC temporary and 
permanent presence in Turkey. As is clear in the figure, there does not appear to be an  
                                                 
104 Advocacy campaign content was not included given that, for at least one month out of every year, a 




Table 20.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis one and International Committee of the Red Cross in Turkey 
ICRC conflict-area presence 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 































































































































     





Table 21.  Estimated coefficients and standard errors for autoregressive Poisson 
models: hypothesis two and human rights NGOs in Turkey 
Human rights NGO campaign content Media activity 
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state All attacks 
      
NGO advocacy 0.0470 (0.086)  
-0.0394 
(0.062)   





Media activity     
-0.0051 
(0.042) 
















































































































































      






Figure 17.  Campaign content and attacks targeting NGOs in Turkey: hypothesis two. 
 
Figure 18.  Distribution of International Committee of the Red Cross temporary 
presence and attacks targeting NGOs in Lebanon. 
 
easily identifiable relationship.  Half of the TO attacks occur one or more years 
following temporary presence and only one attack occurs during a period of 
permanent presence.105 
                                                 
105 There are six attacks in total.  Two of the attacks occurred in 2001 and, as such, look like a single 




Hypothesis four: Media coverage 
The last hypothesis addresses the potential relationship between NGO media 
activity and the frequency of all terrorist attacks.  The estimated coefficients and 
standard errors for the autoregressive Poisson model are reported in Table 21 and 
indicate that there is no support for hypothesis four in Turkey. Specifically, the 
relationship is in the direction opposite theoretical expectations.  These model results 
are similar to the results from the other models indicating that NGOs have no 
influence on TO activity in Turkey.   
Control variables: All models 
The control variables included in the Turkey models are similar to those 
included in Algeria and Lebanon.106  The control variables included in the models 
suggest two conclusions: 1) many of them are significant and, thus, influential for TO 
activity; and 2) in comparison to Algeria and Lebanon, there is less target-specific 
differences in the influence of the variables.  These relationships are summarized in 
Table 22, which presents the number of models (with a maximum of six) reporting a 
specific directional relationship between each control variable and TO attacks. 
As Table 22 illustrates, many of the same variables have the same significant 
directional influence across models, namely population measures, democratic 
orientation, health measures, the number of active TOs, and a period of negotiation 
between the state and a TO leader.  However, there were a few variables, including 
GDP, military personnel, and the GTD coding generation, that are influential for one 
                                                 
106 The exceptions to this statement are the unemployment and negotiation period variables, which are 
absent from all countries other than Turkey, and the democratic orientation variable, which is absent 




Table 22.  Number of models (maximum of six) displaying a significant relationship 
between the control variables and the dependent variable in Lebanon.   
 Attacks targeting civilians Attacks targeting the state 
Relationship direction + - + - 
GDP   4  
Unemployment      
Urban population  6  6 
Population density 6  6  
Natural disaster     
Democratic orientation  6  6  
Population growth 6  6  
Infant mortality  6  6 
Life expectancy  6  6 
Military expenditures     
Military personnel    6 
GTD generation 1     
GTD generation 3    5 
Number of active TOs 6  6  
Negotiation period 6  5  
 
 
target type but not for the other.  This indicates that, although there are some target-
specific differences, unlike Algeria and Lebanon, it appears that many of the control 
variables are influential regardless of the target type. 
In Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the hypotheses and the models that were 
introduced in chapter three and chapter five.  The first section of this chapter 
reviewed descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models.  This was 
followed with a summary of quantitative model results and qualitative assessments of 
distributions between key independent and dependent variables.  The next and final 
chapter provides concluding thoughts on the meaning and implications of these model 
results.  It also identifies policy implications, limitations of the analyses, and 





CHAPTER 7: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter discusses the findings regarding the relationship between NGO 
activity and subsequent TO activity.   The chapter begins with a review of the results 
for each of the hypotheses across Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.  This is followed 
with a discussion of the limitations inherent in the analyses conducted for this 
dissertation.  These limitations lead into a discussion of prospective future research 
prompted by the work undertaken here.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a 
summary of potential policy implications.   
What was done 
This dissertation originated with a short media story.  In 2011, BBC reported 
that, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab engaged in a sequence of attacks targeting international 
NGOs.  The string of attacks ended when Al-Shabaab stormed aid offices, informed 
the agencies that 16 NGOs were being banned, and ordered staff members to leave.   
This article (and others reporting on the same incidents) provided the grounds upon 
which a suspicion was born and developed. The research questions that arose from 
this suspicion were simple: do NGO activities influence TO activities and, if so, how?  
A careful review of the literature by this author did not turn up any existing body of 
empirical work that asked the same question or provided a pool of ready information 
about the nature or direction of this potential relationship.107  However, theory and 
                                                 
107 The one empirical piece by Murdie and Stapley (2013) was published the year following the 




general terrorism-related empirical results offered a premise upon which to tease 
apart the nuances of a potential relationship between NGOs and TOs. 
Media coverage and general knowledge suggested that NGOs and TOs 
advocate for the same constituents, share similar goals and grievances, but use 
different methods of ‘negotiation’.  Game theory and rational choice provided the 
framework upon which to develop the expectation that the differences in tactics 
would take priority over compatible goals and grievances, leading to a natural 
competition, rather than a convenient alliance, between the two groups of 
organizations.  Game theory suggested that, while NGOs and TOs both need 
constituent support, media attention, funding, and recruits in order to ensure group 
survival and success, they are locked in a zero-sum game of competition.  As such, 
rational choice theory suggested that the TO would choose a course of action likely to 
eliminate or undermine the competition and increase the chances of gaining support 
and attention from the constituents and the public at large.  Putting these different 
pieces together suggested a series of hypothesized relationships between NGO 
activity and TO activity.   In general, increases in NGO activity were predicted to 
result in increases in attacks targeting the state and NGOs and a decrease in attacks 
targeting civilians. 
These hypotheses were tested within three different countries selected 
specifically for their range of constituent issues, TO presence, and relationships with 
NGOs.    As expected, results varied between Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.  Despite 





What was Discovered 
Although Algeria did not neatly fit theoretical expectations, given that the 
TOs and NGOs did not share a common constituency for the majority of the study 
period, Algeria reported the greater number of significant relationships when 
compared to the other two countries.  While there was some limited evidence of a 
relationship between presence, campaign content, and media activity in Algeria, 
Lebanon only reported a marginally significant relationship for one measure of 
presence, while Turkey did not report a single significant relationship for any of the 
models.  In addition, there were some notable similarities and differences across these 
relationships.  NGO presence variables had select negative and significant influences 
on attacks targeting civilians in Algeria and Lebanon, as predicted, but this was 
reported for temporary presence only in Algeria and permanent presence only in 
Lebanon.  In regards to campaign content, model results indicated a positive 
relationship with civilian attacks, regardless of the country and the type of content, 
despite the expectation that these relationships would be negative.  The only measure 
of campaign content that displayed the expected relationship was advocacy work and 
attacks targeting civilians in Algeria.     
In sum, model results did not, for the most part, conform to expectations.  In 
fact, there was very limited and inconsistent support presented in the three countries 
for the hypothesized relationships.  These outcomes beg consideration and 
explanation.  There are two possible reasons underlying the discordance between 




flawed or the results may be flawed and the expectations may be accurate.  While I 
advocate for the former, I fail to reject the latter. 
Flawed Expectations? 
This dissertation was built around the assumption that NGOs matter to TOs in 
the grand scheme of things.  However, this might be a generous stipulation or an 
assumption that requires further refinement.  While NGOs are proliferating at an 
impressive rate and have notable long-term impacts on shifts in practices and policy, 
as the ban on landmines and the treaties on torture illustrate, these influences are the 
end result of, in many cases, years of negotiation and effort (Maxwell et al., 1998; 
Spar and Dail, 2002).  NGO interest in an issue does not signal immediate shifts in 
the landscape of oppression.  TO presence, on the other hand, can elicit an abrupt 
response from interested parties, such as governments and enforcement agencies 
(Bolz et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2002).  Previous research suggests that TOs consider 
these short-term actions and reactions as more relevant to their strategy and do not 
prefer an incremental or elongated process (Crenshaw, 1987; Pape, 2003).  This 
observation suggests the possibility that NGO activities will be perceived as non-
threatening to TOs, if TOs are operating with a short-term action-reaction model of 
change.   
While TOs may disregard NGOs due to the sheer time-intensive model of 
change that NGOs employ, TOs may also fail to regard NGOs as effective advocates.  
TO actions can and have resulted in landmark moments of attention and concessions.  
As events such as the hostage-taking in Munich during the 1972 Olympics, the 




Center and other U.S. sites in 2001 illustrate, TOs have been successful in affecting 
global policy and practice with a single incident (Montague, 2012; Wright, 2006).  
NGOs, on the other hand, may not necessarily share comparable moments of infamy 
and influence (Frank et al., 2007; Hearn, 2002).  To the active observer, this would 
suggest, on the surface, that NGOs are an ineffectual global player, undermining their 
threat as a competitor. 
If TOs perceive NGOs as sluggish and ineffective at promoting change, it is 
logical that TOs project this impression onto the constituents, potential funders, and 
recruits.  Research shows that organizations will project their opinions on to their 
audience, assuming the audience shares the same opinion as the organizational body 
(Gunther et al., 2001; Marks and Miller, 1987).  Therefore, if the TO views the NGO 
as ineffectual and slow-moving, the TO would expect that the constituents and other 
potential supporters would share the same opinion, further minimizing the threat that 
NGOs pose to TOs.   
In sum, there are grounds upon which to posit that the null findings of this 
dissertation are an accurate reflection of the lack of TO interest in NGO activities.  
This does not undermine the theoretical frameworks summarized and applied in 
chapter three, but it does suggest that NGOs may simply be an invisible player in 
these conflict areas.  At least they might be invisible to TOs, which might work more 
towards their advantage than disadvantage.  
Having said this, there are some methodological shortcomings inherent in the 
analytical choices made for this dissertation that suggest an alternative explanation 




captured in the areas chosen for this dissertation or with the variables included in the 
models. 
Flawed Results? 
There are several notable limitations that potentially affect the results of this 
dissertation.  These relate to the generalizability of results and the validity of the 
measures employed.  Regarding the former, the analyses were restricted to three 
countries and the TOs that operate within those borders.  As such, while the results 
may speak to the relationships inherent in those countries and those specific TOs, 
they cannot be applied to other contexts.   
An additional consideration stems from the frequency of NGO attacks in other 
countries.  Incidents targeting NGOs are relatively rare events but these are more 
common in countries not included in this dissertation.  For example, the GTD reports 
more than 100 attacks with NGOs as the primary target in Afghanistan during the 
period of study included in this dissertation.  Somalia and Pakistan both report 
approximately 70 attacks.  This dissertation offered very little in the way of 
identifying the particular relationship between NGO activities and attacks targeting 
NGOs, given the rarity of these types of incidents.  Analyses carried out in countries 
where these attacks are more prevalent may produce interesting and revealing results.   
Omitted variable bias is also a concern that requires acknowledgement and 
some discussion.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the control variables played 
a prominent role in target selection.  Several key variables were significant for one 
target type only or, in many cases, for both civilian and state attacks, although some 




the controls that were included, in general, but also suggests that hypotheses that are 
crafted around particular target types must consider the contextual variables that may 
influence those specific targeting choices.  The literature suggests at least one 
potential omitted variable based on research focused on target selection: religious 
tensions (Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Tavares, 2004; Piazza, 2006).  In 
addition, previous studies suggest an additional variable not employed in this 
dissertation that, although not target-specific, has been identified as an important 
determinant of terrorism in general: ethnic tensions (Abadie, 2006; Gassebner and 
Luechinger, 2011;  Goldstein, 2005).  Both of these tensions underlie the 
oppressor/oppressed dynamics presented in chapter two and, as such, are assumed to 
be relevant for both TOs and NGOs, although different tensions are prominent in 
different countries.  The assumption built into this dissertation is that these tensions 
are constant when, in fact, they may fluctuate considerably.  In addition, while one 
kind of tension is prominent in the countries of interest,108 the other kind of tension 
can certainly arise periodically, contributing to oppressive dynamics and capturing 
the attention of TOs and NGOs alike.  As such, the relationship between NGOs and 
TOs may be partially driven by these tensions and a failure to include measures that 
parse out these effects may lead to bias in the results.  If TOs and NGOs both respond 
in kind to changes in tension, this change may mask subtle influences that NGOs 
have on TOs, leading to inflated standard errors and Type II error.  Unfortunately, 
these measures were not readily available for the countries and years selected for this 
dissertation.   
                                                 
108 Religious tensions underlie the dynamic of oppression in Algeria and Lebanon while ethnic tensions 




A final area of concern relates to the validity of measures employed in this 
dissertation.  Firstly, while the analyses included several different measures of NGO 
activity, there are additional operationalizations that may have more effectively 
tapped into NGO interest in a conflict area.  These could include such public-record 
variables as NGO spending on a conflict-area campaign, the number of press releases 
published around a campaign, social media presence, or protest and lobbying 
activities.  These are just a few options but each of these provides an additional metric 
of NGO activity that may further compliment the variables included in this 
dissertation.  
Secondly, there are further parameters that could have been placed on the 
terrorism variables in order to refine the relationship.  Incidents were not selected 
with consideration for such factors as whether all GTD inclusion criteria (summarized 
in chapter five) were met or whether the original GTD coder expressed doubts about 
labeling a given incident terrorism.   Specifically, the GTD includes a variable called 
doubt terrorism proper (DTP) that indicates whether there is doubt that an incident is 
pure terrorism.  The grey-area cases considered to meet DTP requirements are often 
suspected of being purely criminal acts, unintentional, or incidents of intra- and inter-
TO violence.  There is no reason to expect that NGO activity facilitates crime, 
unintentional violence, or internecine activity and, as such, the inclusion of these 
grey-area cases could have obscured the impact of NGO influence, potentially 
increasing standard errors and leading to Type II error.   
Therefore, while there are justifications supporting the position that NGOs 




the possibility that NGOs are influential, if assessed in a different context with 
additional variables and an alternate analytical strategy.  As such, one of the main 
findings here is the need for additional research.   
Future Research 
There are several areas of future research that would be valuable to explore.  
As mentioned previously, replicating the analyses carried out for this dissertation in 
other countries, particularly areas with high frequency of attacks targeting NGOs and 
variations in the oppressed/oppressor dynamic, would be highly beneficial in 
establishing the nuances of the relationship between NGO and TO activity.  In a 
similar vein, the results of the analyses conducted here provide little support for the 
hypothesized relationships; replication in additional countries could aid in 
corroborating these findings or undermining them.  Either outcome serves to further 
flesh out the dynamics between NGOs and TOs.   
As mentioned earlier, although the possibility of Type II error cannot be ruled 
out, it is the position of this author that the results reflect flawed expectations.  
Specifically, while Lebanon and Turkey demonstrate a majority of null findings, 
Algeria reports some significant relationships.  This suggests that NGOs may matter 
to TOs in certain contexts but not in others.  Algeria is unique in the sense that the 
TOs are not defending a constituency but are defending an anti-western ideal.  
Therefore, perhaps TOs do not respond to NGOs as potential competitors but do 
respond to them as representatives of unwelcome western influence.  This would 
suggest that, in areas where the TO is defending a constituency against a local threat 




where a TO is advocating for an Islamic caliphate, for example, international NGOs 
may elicit a response.  Replication of the analyses included in this dissertation should 
be conducted in countries that present a ready example of an anti-western dynamic, 
such as Syria or Iraq, in addition to countries that encapsulate the 
oppressor/oppressed dynamic outlined in chapter two.   
In addition to replication in other countries, future analyses could consider a 
variety of other actors that may play a role in the oppressor/oppressed dynamic, 
including diplomatic institutions such as the United Nations and its many branches, 
such as the World Food Programme, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), and Children's Fund (UNICEF).  These actors, although 
not NGOs, can serve a function similar to those fulfilled by NGOs in conflict areas, 
but do not require the support of the constituents and other resources that NGOs and 
TOs need for survival and success.  However, diplomatic institutions oftentimes have 
a unique relationship with NGOs; they may be allies, NGOs may share membership 
in the diplomatic institution, or NGOs may serve as advisors (Martens, 2004).  
Therefore, the TO may perceive diplomatic institutions as a threat nonetheless, due to 
perceived ties between the institution and NGOs.  As such, the presence of diplomatic 
institutions may serve to aggravate tensions between NGOs and TOs.   
In summary, future research needs to focus on replicating the analyses carried 
out for this dissertation with different contexts and actors.  Until replication occurs, 
however, there are some preliminary policy implications that can be drawn from this 





There are two clear policy implications that arise from the results of this 
dissertation.  On a positive note, NGO activities, in most cases, do not appear to incite 
violence.  On a less-positive note, NGO campaigns directed towards minimizing TO 
activity do not appear to have the intended effect.   
In regards to the first implication, of the 35 models included, only two 
reported a marginally significant increase in violence following an increase in NGO 
activity.109  Specifically, NGO advocacy work and media coverage were related to 
increases in TO activity in Algeria.  Meanwhile, the remaining 33 models were 
insignificant or related to a decrease in attacks.  Therefore, contrary to concerns 
expressed by the academic community (e.g., Murdie and Stapley, 2013; Stapley, 
2014), NGOs do not appear to incite violent response from TOs, at least in Lebanon, 
Turkey, and to some extent, Algeria.   
Regarding the second implication, one of the variables included in this 
dissertation was a measure of NGO anti-TO campaign work.  This variable captured 
if, at any point in time, an NGO directly criticized or campaigned against the TO.  
The majority of these activities consisted of directly appealing to the TO to halt 
violent activity, to begin a peaceful negotiation process, and to cease any violence 
directed towards the citizenry.  Unfortunately, it does not appear that this is a useful 
tactic.  Criticizing the TO was related to an increase in attacks targeting both the 
citizenry and the state in all three countries, although these relationships were 
insignificant.  It appears that anti-TO campaign work is a poor use of resources and 
                                                 





investment in such a strategy may even make matters worse in the conflict area of 
interest. 
Conclusions 
In summary, this study assessed the relationship between NGO activity and 
subsequent TO activity in Algeria, Lebanon, and Turkey.  It was hypothesized that an 
increase in a variety of NGO measures would lead to an increase in attacks targeting 
the state and NGOs, and a decrease in attacks targeting civilians.  Results did not 
support these hypothesized relationships, for the most part, although there was some 
support found for physical presence in Algeria and Lebanon, and advocacy work and 
media coverage in Algeria.  While this suggests that NGOs may not matter to TOs, at 
least not enough to alter TO behavior, there are some limitations to this dissertation 
that prevent drawing a strong conclusion, such as generalizability and validity of 
measures.  Instead, these results suggest the need for further research in other 
countries, particularly areas with a greater frequency of NGO attacks and different 
contextual and political factors.  Despite the need for replication of results, there are 
some tentative implications that arise from this dissertation.  The first is that, for the 
most part, NGOs do not appear to incite violence from a TO when NGOs take an 
active interest in a conflict area and, as such, NGOs may not need to consider this 
when choosing a strategy.  The second implication is that NGO investment in an anti-
TO campaign appears to be a poor use of resources, given this does not decrease TO 
violence.  Perhaps this unfortunate consequence is another avenue for future 






APPENDIX A: Models, Variables, and Definitions 
Variables     Definition 
 
Models addressing NGO physical presence (hypothesis one) 
 
Dependent variables  
Number of attacks - state Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, 
government, and military 
Number of attacks - civilians Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians 
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
  
Independent variables  
Human rights NGO physical presence - 
temporary 
NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
Human rights NGO physical presence – 
permanent  
NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
  
Control variables  
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous) 
Unemployment (Turkey only) Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, 
percentage) 
Urban population Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, 
percentage) 
Population density Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land 
(annual, continuous) 
Population growth Percent change in the population size from previous 
year (annual, percentage) 
Infant mortality rate Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous) 
Life expectancy at birth Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous) 
Military expenditures Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military 
expenditures (annual, percentage) 
Military personnel Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, 
percentage) 
Democratic orientation (Algeria and 
Turkey only) 
Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation 
(annual, scale) 
Natural disaster Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1) 
Number of active TOs Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count) 
GTD generation (I and III) GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1) 
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and 
anti) 
Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1) 






Variables     Definition 
 
Models addressing NGO campaign content (hypothesis two) 
 
Dependent variables  
Number of attacks - state Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting police, 
government, and military 
Number of attacks - civilians Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting civilians 
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
  
Independent variables  
Human rights NGO campaign content - 
advocacy 
Pro-constituent campaign work in a given month (0,1) 
Human rights NGO campaign content – 
anti-TO criticism  
Anti-TO campaign work in a given month (0,1) 
  
Control variables  
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous) 
Unemployment (Turkey only) Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, 
percentage) 
Urban population Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, 
percentage) 
Population density Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land 
(annual, continuous) 
Population growth Percent change in the population size from previous 
year (annual, percentage) 
Infant mortality rate Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous) 
Life expectancy at birth Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous) 
Military expenditures Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military 
expenditures (annual, percentage) 
Military personnel Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, 
percentage) 
Democratic orientation (Algeria and 
Turkey only) 
Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation 
(annual, scale) 
Natural disaster Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1) 
Number of active TOs Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count) 
GTD generation (I and III) GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1) 
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and 
anti) 
Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1) 






Variables     Definition 
 
Models addressing NGO service provision (hypothesis three) 
 
Dependent variables  
Number of attacks - NGO Monthly count of terrorist attacks targeting NGOs 
  
Independent variables  
ICRC presence - temporary NGO temporary presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
ICRC presence – permanent   NGO permanent presence in a conflict area in a given 
month (0,1) 
  
Control variables  
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous) 
Unemployment (Turkey only) Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, 
percentage) 
Urban population Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, 
percentage) 
Population density Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land 
(annual, continuous) 
Population growth Percent change in the population size from previous 
year (annual, percentage) 
Infant mortality rate Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous) 
Life expectancy at birth Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous) 
Military expenditures Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military 
expenditures (annual, percentage) 
Military personnel Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, 
percentage) 
Democratic orientation (Algeria and 
Turkey only) 
Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation 
(annual, scale) 
Natural disaster Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1) 
Number of active TOs Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count) 
GTD generation (I and III) GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1) 
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and 
anti) 
Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1) 






Variables     Definition 
 
Models addressing media coverage (hypothesis four) 
 
Dependent variables  
Number of attacks  Monthly count of terrorist attacks  
  
Independent variables  
All media activity NGOs were prominent in media coverage about the 
conflict area during a given month (count) 
  
Control variables  
GDP Gross domestic product per capita (annual, continuous) 
Unemployment (Turkey only) Percent of the labor force without employment (annual, 
percentage) 
Urban population Percent of total population in an urban center (annual, 
percentage) 
Population density Average number of citizens per square kilometer of land 
(annual, continuous) 
Population growth Percent change in the population size from previous 
year (annual, percentage) 
Infant mortality rate Infant deaths per 1,000 births (annual, continuous) 
Life expectancy at birth Average expected lifespan (annual, continuous) 
Military expenditures Percent of the gross domestic product spent on military 
expenditures (annual, percentage) 
Military personnel Percent of military personnel in the labor force (annual, 
percentage) 
Democratic orientation (Algeria and 
Turkey only) 
Scale of democratic versus autocratic orientation 
(annual, scale) 
Natural disaster Natural disaster occurrence (monthly, 0,1) 
Number of active TOs Number of active TOs in a conflict area (annual, count) 
GTD generation (I and III) GTD data collection generation (monthly, 0,1) 
Civilian orientation (Algeria only – pro and 
anti) 
Period of pro- or anti-civilian orientation (monthly, 0,1) 
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Advocacy action terms  













Neutral action terms  
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